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preference parameters are constant over time. We show that rare, temporary, and plausible fluctuations in the
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) and risk aversion (RA) can quantitatively explain numerous
regularities in U.S. asset prices including: the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, excess return and
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and team performance statistics and publicly available athletic program revenue data. I find that a star college
football player is worth up to $1.2-$2.1 million while star college basketball players are worth up to
$655,000-$1.1 million a year. Interestingly, I also find evidence suggesting that a college recruiter's ability to
identify revenue generating star players is limited and that the marginal revenue product of star college players
declines as the team's media coverage increases.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN ASSET PRICING AND APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS
Mark William Clements
Kent Smetters
In the first chapter, Christian Goulding and I present a model of asset prices with recursive
preferences and the simple consumption growth dynamics of Mehra and Prescott (1985)
but relax the assumption that preference parameters are constant over time. We show that
rare, temporary, and plausible fluctuations in the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution
(EIS) and risk aversion (RA) can quantitatively explain numerous regularities in U.S. asset
prices including: the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles, excess return and consump-
tion growth predictability, a counter-cyclical risk premium and an upward-sloping real yield
curve. A novel implication is that time-varying EIS is more important than time-varying
RA for explaining many of these regularities, suggesting a new source of risk in investors’
ability to plan their consumption over long horizons. In addition, our model can accommo-
date a behavioral interpretation of psychological factors (e.g. fear) that drive fluctuations
in asset prices beyond traditional risk factors.
The second chapter is an empirical study of the value of star college athletes. Collegiate
athletes in the U.S. are not allowed to be paid directly for their athletic ability. Under
the current regulations imposed by the NCAA, any compensation beyond scholarships and
grant-in-aid to cover some basic living expenses is forbidden. This artificial constraint on
athletes’ wages, when university athletic programs are generating significant revenues, has
sparked much recent debate over the compensation of college athletes. To help inform this
debate, I quantify the value of a NCAA Division 1 FBS (Football Bowl Subdivision) star
football and NCAA Division 1 star basketball players by estimating their marginal revenue
v
product using a novel dataset of individual player and team performance statistics and
publicly available athletic program revenue data. I find that a star college football player
is worth up to $1.2 − $2.1 million while star college basketball players are worth up to
$655, 000− $1.1 million a year. Interestingly, I also find evidence suggesting that a college
recruiter’s ability to identify revenue generating star players is limited and that the marginal
revenue product of star college players declines as the team’s media coverage increases.
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CHAPTER 1 : Preference Irregularities and Asset Pricing Regularities.
1.1 Introduction
Following Mehra and Prescott (1985), an enormous literature in consumption-based asset
pricing models has attempted to explain the equity premium puzzle and other stylized facts
of asset prices with varying degrees of success.1 Many models propose more complicated
consumption dynamics than those in Mehra and Prescott (1985) in an attempt to capture
sources of excluded risk in the consumption channel. However, the observed time series
for aggregate consumption growth in the U.S. data is very smooth (Campbell and Deaton
(1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1989)). Given this modest volatility, it is no surprise that
modeling the risk faced by investors as coming exclusively from consumption risk leads to
difficulty generating many of the stylized facts of asset prices.2 Other models (e.g. Con-
stantinides (1990), Weil (1989) and Epstein and Zin (1989)) propose alternative preference
specifications to the standard constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences of Mehra
and Prescott (1985) with limited success. A more recent literature that explores alterna-
tives to standard CRRA preferences suggests that counter-cyclical risk aversion (RA) is an
important feature for improving the standard model.3 Moreover, recent empirical work by
1Leading models in this literature fall roughly into three schools of thought: habits, long-run risks and
rare disasters. The habits framework of Campbell and Cochrane (1999) argues that shocks to the current
level of consumption that move consumption relative to habit (a moving average of past consumption)
explain aggregate asset prices. The long-run risks models of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal, Kiku, and
Yaron (2012) argue that shocks to expected long-run consumption growth, an unobservable component in the
consumption growth process, and time-varying consumption volatility are crucial for explaining fluctuations
in asset prices. The rare disasters literature (Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012) and Wachter (2013),
among others) points to large and rare drops (disasters) in consumption and changes in the severity or
probability of these disasters as crucial for explaining asset prices.
2For example, Julliard and Ghosh (2012) provide arguments and evidence suggesting that the rare dis-
asters framework is an unlikely explanation of the equity premium puzzle.
3Campbell and Cochrane (1999) generate time-varying risk aversion through the surplus ratio of an exter-
nal habit relative to current consumption. Gordon and St-Amour (2000, 2004) accomplish this by modeling
the time-varying risk aversion parameter directly in the CRRA utility function. Melino and Yang (2003) do
something similar under recursive preferences. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) generate time-varying
risk aversion through time-varying loss aversion that enters directly into Prospect Theory’s value function.
Routledge and Zin (2010) achieve this time-variation through variation in the endogenously determined prob-
ability of disappointment with generalized disappointment aversion preferences that overweights lower-tail
outcomes.
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Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) and Cohn, Engelmann, Fehr, and Marechal (2013)
provides direct evidence for counter-cyclical (and hence time-varying) risk aversion from
survey and experimental data. These studies indicate that the standard assumption of con-
stant preference parameters is a source of model misspecification.
Much less has been done in the consumption-based asset pricing literature exploring the
assumption of a constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) as a potential source
of model misspecification. Crossley and Low (2011) provide empirical evidence from con-
sumer demand data that rejects the assumption of a constant EIS. Guvenen (2009) shows
that a two-agent model with limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the
EIS is consistent with prominent features of asset prices.4 Melino and Yang (2003) present
an asset pricing model with recursive preferences that allows for both time-varying risk
aversion and EIS parameters that is able to match the first two moments of equity returns
and risk-free rates. A more recent paper by Kamstra, Kramer, Levi, and Wang (2014)
shows that seasonal variation in the EIS improves the ability of their representative agent
asset pricing model to match the seasonal patterns of equity and Treasury returns.
To explore further the importance of time-varying EIS for asset prices, we present a consumption-
based asset pricing model with recursive preferences, along the lines of Epstein and Zin
(1989), that relaxes the standard assumption of constant preference parameters but main-
tains the consumption dynamics of Mehra and Prescott (1985). We model rare and tempo-
rary changes in the preference parameters that govern RA and the EIS as a joint Markov
process with consumption growth, taking the shocks that drive temporary fluctuations in
these parameters as exogenous.5 Furthermore, changes in preference parameters are not
permanent structural breaks. They are temporary, anticipated by investors with rational
4A related household finance literature allows for the EIS to be heterogeneous across households and vary
with endogenous factors such as wealth (Attanasio and Browning (1995), Atkeson and Ogaki (1997, 1996),
A´lvarez Pela´ez and Dı´az (2005), Guvenen (2006)).
5Possible interpretations of this modeling device are given in Section 1.2.9
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expectations, and are expected to revert to their regular values. Also, these changes are
small to moderate in magnitude and plausible based on guidance from empirical studies
(see Section 1.3). We show that allowing for time-varying preferences in this way is enough
to simultaneously generate many stylized facts that have proven historically challenging for
consumption-based asset pricing models to match. Furthermore, we show that time-varying
EIS is a source of uncertainty that affects an investor’s ability to plan their consumption
profile over long horizons. This source of risk is distinct from the usual consumption risk
that affects an investor’s ability to smooth consumption and is important for the model to
produce many of these challenging stylized facts.
In particular, under the baseline calibration of the model, the RA and EIS parameters
are at their regular values the majority of the time. However, once about every 42 years
RA is elevated to an irregular value while once about every 18 years the EIS parameter
is depressed to an irregular value. Both parameters stay in states of irregular values for
about 3 to 4 years on average. Our consumption process replicates that of Mehra and
Prescott (1985) but is calibrated to annual data over the sample 1930-2013. With these
dynamics for preference fluctuations and consumption growth our model is able to pro-
duce a high equity premium with a low risk-free rate, along with volatilities and first-order
auto-correlations, that are consistent with the data. The model also generates the more
challenging stylized facts on the predictability of price-dividends. For instance, the model
yields double-digit excess return predictability by price-dividend ratios over long horizons.
Furthermore, the model produces almost no predictability of consumption growth by price-
dividends or predictability of price-dividends by lagged consumption growth. These are
features that leading consumption-based asset pricing models are unable to generate simul-
taneously. The model also produces a volatile and counter-cyclical risk premium as well as
a counter-cyclical Sharpe Ratio. Finally, the model is able to generate an upward sloping
real yield curve with a ten-year yield of 1.62 and a 15 basis point spread over the short rate.
This last feature is particularly difficult for consumption-based asset pricing models with
3
Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences to produce.
Our model is also amenable to a framework of investor decisions influenced by anticipatory
emotions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001)).6 The shocks in our model that
shift preferences to irregular levels are exogenous but can be interpreted as external events
coinciding with low consumption growth that induce fear in the market. For example, a
terrorist attack or the perceived severity of a recession due to its portrayal in media coverage
might induce fear in the market unrelated to the actual decline in consumption. This fear is
an anticipatory emotion that immediately influences an investor’s choice, inducing irregular
preferences for risk and inter-temporal substitution in some states. However, investors have
rational expectations and anticipate possible future fear states when making investment
decisions today. Therefore, investors are “sophisticated” in the sense that they are aware
that future states of fear will influence their contemporaneous decision in those future pe-
riods and take this into account in their optimal investment decision. In our model, this
effect of anticipatory emotions on investor behavior will drive fluctuations in asset prices
beyond traditional, fundamental risk factors. Periods of fear-induced irregular EIS and
RA correspond to periods in which investors either pay “too much” for all assets (“excess
frugality” motive) or pay “too much” for the risk-free asset to rebalance their portfolios
(“excess safety” motive) relative to market fundamentals by accepting a lower and even
negative return.7 However, these returns are realized in an equilibrium that does not aban-
don investor rationality.
This behavioral interpretation of our model is consistent with evidence from Guiso et al.
6Loewenstein (2000, 1996) shows that visceral psychological factors such as fear can bypass the cognitive
decision process and immediately influence an investor’s decision. This contrasts to the traditional economic
modeling view of anticipated emotions that are expected consequences of the decision rather than emotions
experienced at the time of decision.
7We assume complete markets and the states of “excess frugality” and “excess savings” are fully antici-
pated under rational expectations, hence investors can fully hedge themselves against these states through
a set of state-contingent claims that span the state space.
4
(2013) who repeatedly survey clients of an Italian bank before and after the 2008 financial
crisis and find empirical evidence for substantially increased risk aversion after the crisis.
They find that this increase in risk aversion cannot be explained by the usual risk factors
such as changes in wealth, consumption habits, background risk or investor expectations.
The authors then test the hypothesis that visceral psychological factors such as fear might
be driving this change and give experimental evidence that a fear based explanation is
consistent with their survey results. Cohn et al. (2013) also provide experimental results
indicating that fear decreases an investor’s willingness to take risks even if the fear is com-
pletely unrelated to economic events.
Our model most closely resembles that of Melino and Yang (2003), which is nested as a
special case. Table 4 of Melino and Yang (2003) reports several combinations of parameter
values that allow their model to match the first two moments of the risk-free rate and eq-
uity returns exactly with values of risk aversion ranging from 19.91 to 52.89. In response
Donaldson and Mehra (2008) point out: “The reader may judge for herself whether any of
the reported combinations constitute a reasonable resolution of the equity premium and as-
sociated puzzles. We venture only to comment that, for all cases, the degree of risk aversion
implied by the low growth state seems high, especially in a context where the probability
that the low growth state will continue for more than one period is less than 50 percent.”8
However, we depart from the Melino and Yang (2003) setup in three important ways that
allow us to match more stylized facts with a reasonable calibration for risk aversion. First,
they impose perfect correlation between preference parameters and consumption growth
which we break by allowing co-movement between consumption growth and preference pa-
rameters to occur with some probability. Second, in their model RA and the EIS always
change together whereas we allow states where each, neither or both change. Lastly, the
8Donaldson and Mehra (2008), page 55.
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frequency of preference parameter changes in their model is tied directly to the persistence
in consumption growth and occurs 50% of the time. In contrast, our model is calibrated for
very small transition probabilities, allowing for rare time-variation in preference parameters.
Our model contributes to the literature in several ways. First, with a parsimonious model
that nests Mehra and Prescott (1985) as a special case, we are able to simultaneously
generate many regularities of U.S. asset prices that have been historically difficult for
consumption-based asset pricing models to produce. Second, the model captures an ad-
ditional source of risk unrelated to consumption risk per se: fluctuations in preferences for
smoothing consumption. This “smoothing risk” affects an investor’s ability to plan con-
sumption over long horizons, whereas consumption risk only affects an investor’s ability to
smooth, conditional on having a particular preference for smoothing. Third, while previous
models have disentangled the effects of RA and the EIS on asset prices using Epstein and Zin
(1989) preferences, our model disentangles the effect of time-variation in RA and the EIS on
asset prices. Our model shows that time-varying EIS is more important than time-varying
RA for many features of asset prices in the data, although time-varying RA can sharpen the
overall fit.9 This relationship is evident from the model’s reliance on time-varying EIS to
resolve the risk-free rate puzzle, generate an upward sloping real yield curve and generate
the predictability results for consumption growth and lagged consumption growth—results
not achieved with time-varying risk aversion alone. Fourth, the model provides additional
quantitative motivation for future theoretical and empirical research on time-variation in
preferences, especially time-varying EIS, which has received less attention in the literature.
Finally, our model provides a theoretical framework that is consistent with recent empirical
studies indicating that investor preferences can change for reasons unrelated to standard
fundamental risk factors like changes in wealth, income risk, or consumption habit. This
9Melino and Yang (2003) come to a similar conclusion that time-varying EIS matters more than time-
varying RA or a time-varying time discount factor for matching the first two moments of returns. Guvenen
(2009) concludes that heterogeneity in the EIS and not in risk aversion is essential to improve the classic
real business cycle model’s poor asset pricing implications. Kamstra et al. (2014) show seasonal variation in
the EIS parameter is important for matching seasonality in equity and Treasury returns.
6
feature is something that the traditional consumption-based asset pricing literature, which
assumes marginal utility is driven exclusively by consumption innovations, is unable to do.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model economy;
describes the joint Markov process for preference parameters and consumption growth; and
derives the equilibrium stochastic discount factor. Section 1.3 presents the baseline cali-
bration and several alternative calibrations of the model. Section 1.4 presents the model
implications for matching asset pricing moments, predictability results, risk premium vari-
ation and the real term structure under the baseline and alternative calibrations. Section
1.5 presents a behavioral interpretation of the model results, defines the excess frugality
and excess safety motives and discusses how they are related to discount factors, returns
and the equity premium while Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
1.2.1 Economy
We model a closed economy populated by a continuum of identical, infinitely-lived investors
with no idiosyncratic uncertainty in individual endowments. Output in the economy is a
homogenous good that is completely perishable as in the Lucas (1978) endowment economy.
There is a single, non-durable consumption good Ct with supply C = (Ct)
∞
t=0 and equity is
a claim to the endowment process (Yt)
∞
t=0, the only asset held in non-zero net supply.
1.2.2 Endowment Process
In order to be able to cleanly discuss any potential gains achieved by relaxing the constant
preference parameters assumption, we choose to model consumption dynamics as simply
as possible. One immediate consequence of this choice is that our model, by construction,
7
cannot say anything about variance ratios or predictability of consumption volatility by
stock prices. However we gain the ability to isolate preference channels from other potential
dynamics and the ability to solve the model analytically. This parsimonious setup is coarse,
and in tying our hands with such simple consumption dynamics the fact that the model is
able to do as well as it does with fewer degrees of freedom is quite surprising. We specify
the stochastic process for the agent’s endowment as in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Let Yt
be the aggregate endowment of the representative investor and suppose (Yt)
∞
t=0 follows the
stochastic process
Yt+1 = λY,t+1Yt.
In the model economy, the aggregate endowment is equal to aggregate consumption in
equilibrium, hence λY,t+1 = Gt+1. Now suppose the growth rate of consumption process
(Gt)
∞
t=0 is a finite-state time-homogeneous Markov process on the following two states
gh = µc + σ,
gl = µc − σ,
where gh and gl indicate high and low consumption growth states. Here, µc is the mean
and σ the standard deviation for Gt+1. The transition probabilities are given by
P [Gt+1 = gh|Gt = gh] = P [Gt+1 = gl|Gt = gl] = 1 + ρ
2
,
P [Gt+1 = gh|Gt = gl] = P [Gt+1 = gl|Gt = gh] = 1− ρ
2
,
where ρ indicates the persistence of the consumption growth process. As is commonly done
in endowment economy asset-pricing models, we specify a scaled consumption process for
dividends that accounts for the fact that the volatility of dividend and consumption growth
can, in general, be different due to leveraging.10 Therefore, we specify the growth rate of
10See for example, Campbell (1986, 2003), Abel (1999), Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2008) and
Wachter (2013))
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dividends (Dt)
∞
t=0 as following the stochastic process
Dt+1 = λD,t+1Dt,
λD,t = µD + φD(Gt − µc), (1.1)
where µD is the mean of dividend growth and φD is the dividend leverage parameter.
1.2.3 Preferences
Individual preferences in this economy are defined recursively over current consumption as
in Epstein and Zin (1989) with the modification that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
γt and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) parameter ψt are allowed to vary
over time. Individuals investors choose ct, however, since they are identical and we assume
there is no idiosyncratic uncertainty in individual endowments, we can price assets in this
economy by solving the following representative agent’s choice of aggregate consumption Ct
and asset holdings ht according to
Vt(Wt) = max{Ct,ht}
[
C
1−γt
θt
t + δ
(
Et
[
Vt+1(Wt+1)
1−γt]) 1θt ] θt1−γt
subject to the period budget constraint
Ct + P
′
tht+1 = d
′
tht + P
′
tht ≡Wt
where θt ≡ 1−γt1− 1
ψt
; Pt refers to a n× 1 vector of asset prices per share at date t that offers a
real dividend stream of dt+j , a n× 1 vector with j = (1, . . . ,∞); and ht is a n× 1 vector of
asset holdings at the end of period t− 1, which includes the risk-free asset.
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1.2.4 Model Dynamics
Discrete State Joint Markov Process
Let (st)
∞
t=0 ≡ (Gt, γt, ψt)∞t=0 be a joint stochastic process that captures the state of con-
sumption growth, risk aversion and the EIS parameter. Investors in the model have ratio-
nal expectations so they know the equilibrium aggregate growth rate will be Gt at time
t. However, since an individual investor is of measure zero, an investor’s choice of ct is
“external” to the state variable st.
11 That is, at time t, aggregate consumption growth Gt
and preference parameters γt and ψt are exogenous to an individual investor’s choice of ct.
Suppose that at time t consumption growth, risk aversion and the EIS parameter can each
realize one of two possible states Gt = {g`, gh}, γt = {γ0, γelev} and ψt = {ψ0, ψdepr} where
(γ0, ψ0) are the “regular” values of risk aversion and the EIS parameter while (γelev, ψdepr)
represent “irregular” preferences, driven by an exogenous shock, where risk aversion is ele-
vated from its regular level γ0 and the EIS parameter is depressed from its regular level ψ0.
We use the term “irregular” here in its literal sense: contrary to what is normal and do not
wish to invoke the imagery of irrationality or mistaken preferences. Furthermore, it should
be noted that changes in γt and ψt are not permanent structural breaks in investor prefer-
ences. Rather, they are temporary, anticipated by investors with rational expectations and
expected to revert to their regular values.
Suppose that st evolves according to a finite-state, time-homogenous Markov process over
11We use the notion of “external” in the same way it is used in the external habits models of Abel (1990)
and Campbell and Cochrane (1999).
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the states:
s1 : (gh, γ0, ψ0)
s2 : (g`, γ0, ψ0)
s3 : (g`, γelev, ψ0)
s4 : (g`, γ0, ψdepr)
s5 : (g`, γelev, ψdepr)
s6 : (gh, γelev, ψ0)
s7 : (gh, γ0, ψdepr)
s8 : (gh, γelev, ψdepr).
The states {s1, s2} are those where preferences are at their regular values and do not change
with the state of consumption growth. Guiso et al. (2013) and Cohn et al. (2013) provide
empirical evidence for counter-cyclical risk aversion while Melino and Yang (2003) find
counter-cyclical risk aversion necessary to match the first two moments of asset prices, so
we impose this assumption in our model by restricting γ0 < γelev and disregarding states
{s6, s8}. Crossley and Low (2011) show that the EIS is not constant over time, although, to
the best of our knowledge there are no empirical studies to date regarding the direction of
its cyclicality with the business cycle. However, Melino and Yang (2003) find a pro-cyclical
EIS parameter is necessary for their model to match the first two moments of asset prices,
so we impose this assumption by restricting ψ0 > ψdepr and disregarding state s7.
State Space Transition Matrix
Given our assumptions that risk aversion is counter-cyclical and the EIS parameter is pro-
cyclical, we restrict the state space to be S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. We specify the transition
matrix Πt,t+1 that governs the joint Markov process of consumption growth and preferences
as
11

(gh, γ0, ψ0) (g`, γ0, ψ0) (g`, γelev, ψ0) (g`, γ0, ψdepr) (g`, γelev, ψdepr)
(gh, γ0, ψ0)
1+ρ
2
[1− (b(1− d) + d)]
(
1−ρ
2
)
b(1− d)
(
1−ρ
2
)
d(1− b)
(
1−ρ
2
)
bd
(
1−ρ
2
)
(g`, γ0, ψ0)
1−ρ
2
[1− (b(1− d) + d)]
(
1+ρ
2
)
b(1− d)
(
1+ρ
2
)
d(1− b)
(
1+ρ
2
)
bd
(
1+ρ
2
)
(g`, γelev, ψ0)
1−ρ
2
0 (1− d)
(
1+ρ
2
)
0 d
(
1+ρ
2
)
(g`, γ0, ψdepr)
1−ρ
2
0 0 (1− b)
(
1+ρ
2
)
b
(
1+ρ
2
)
(g`, γelev, ψdepr)
1−ρ
2
0 0 0
(
1+ρ
2
)

,
(1.2)
where b is the conditional probability of transitioning from regular risk aversion (γ0) into a
state of elevated risk aversion (γelev) when an exogenous shock occurs that coincides with
low consumption growth next period. In other words, when a period of low consumption
growth occurs under regular risk aversion, the risk aversion will be elevated with probability
b where
b = Pr [γt+1 = γelev|γt = γ0, Gt+1 = g`] .
Similarly, d is the conditional probability of transitioning from a regular level of the EIS
parameter (ψ0) into a state where the EIS parameter is depressed (γelev) when an exogenous
shock occurs that coincides with low consumption growth next period. In other words, when
a period of low consumption growth occurs under the regular value of the EIS parameter,
the EIS parameter will be depressed with probability d where
d = Pr [ψt+1 = ψdepr|ψt = ψ0, Gt+1 = g`] .
Recall that we want to retain the simple consumption dynamics of Mehra and Prescott
(1985) in order to cleanly investigate whether relaxing the assumption of time-varying pref-
erences buys us any ability to explain asset prices. Notice that the transition matrix pre-
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serves these dynamics:
Pr{st+1 = s1|st = s1} = Pr{st+1 ∈ {s2, s3, s4, s5}|st ∈ {s2, s3, s4, s5}} = 1 + ρ
2
Pr{st+1 = s1|st ∈ {s2, s3, s4, s5}} = Pr{st+1 ∈ {s2, s3, s4, s5}|st = s1} = 1− ρ
2
.
Our transition matrix also generalizes the Markov transition specifications of both Mehra
and Prescott (1985) and Melino and Yang (2003). When b = d = 0 the transition matrix is
equivalent to the one in Mehra and Prescott (1985). Furthermore, because we are using the
same preference specification as in Melino and Yang (2003), their model is nested in ours
for when b = d = 1. This nesting comes from the fact that they only model states {s1, s5}
and impose perfect correlation between preference parameters and consumption growth.
In other words, their model is restricted so that preference parameters change every time
realized consumption growth changes from its previous value.
Our model departs from the Melino and Yang (2003) setup in three important ways. First,
we break this perfect correlation by allowing co-movement between consumption growth
and preference parameters to occur with probabilities 0 < b < 1 and 0 < d < 1. This
allows us to capture time-varying preferences and the desired cyclical relationship between
consumption growth and preference parameters while also allowing the potential for realized
states in which consumption growth transitions but preferences remain unchanged. Second,
in their model, γt and ψt always change together and we allow states where either γt
changes, ψt changes, or they both change. Finally, in Table 4 of Melino and Yang (2003)
they report several combinations of parameter values that allow their model to match the
first two moments of the risk-free rate and equity returns exactly with values of risk aversion
ranging from 19.91 to 52.89 with average levels of risk aversion ranging from 10.12 to 26.02,
which as Donaldson and Mehra (2008) suggest are too high and occur too frequently to
seem plausible. This occurs in their model because the frequency of preference parameter
changes is tied directly to the persistence in consumption growth and occurs 50% of the
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time.12 Our generalization addresses these issues and our model is calibrated for very small
values of b and d (shown below), allowing time variation in preference parameters but only
requiring them to change very rarely and implying a more reasonable value of the average
level of risk aversion.
1.2.5 Model Timing
The model timing goes as follows. At time t individual investors observe a realization of
state variable st = (Gt, γt, ψt), which contains all the information about the current state
of the economy Gt. Since individual investors are of measure zero, consumption growth
Gt and the preference parameters of the representative agent γt and ψt are exogenous to
an individual investor’s choice of ct, which they choose at time t given st. This is what
we mean by the individual investor’s choice of ct being external to the state variable st at
time t. With some probability b or d an exogenous shock occurs at time t, coincidentally
with the realization of Gt, resulting in a realization of state st where preference parameters
are at irregular levels. If a shock occurs, since individual investors are of measure zero and
have identical preferences, in equilibrium they will make their consumption choice given the
irregular preference parameter values of the representative agent.
1.2.6 Equilibrium Pricing Equations
We solve the representative agent’s problem and show in Appendix A.1 that the asset
pricing restrictions on any arbitrary asset j with gross return Rj,t+1 satisfy the equilibrium
condition
Et[Mt+1 ·Rj,t+1] = 1
12For instance, in an annual data sample of 84 years, their model restricts γt and ψt to both change 42 of
those years.
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where
Mt+1 = δ
θtZ1−θta,t G
−γt
t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−1 (1.3)
is the stochastic discount factor (SDF), Gt =
Ct
Ct−1 is aggregate consumption growth and
Za,t is the price-dividend ratio for the unobservable asset with gross return Ra,t+1 that pays
aggregate consumption as a dividend given by
Za,t = δ
(
Et
[
G1−γtt+1 (Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1
]) 1
θt . (1.4)
The parameter θt is defined as before while ζt,t+1 ≡ 1−γt1− 1
ψt+1
. All sources of risk in this econ-
omy will be generated by innovations in the equilibrium SDF in Equation (1.3). However,
a closed form expression for these innovations is not available without further assumptions
due to the fact that the SDF is non-linear in the state variable st and the fact that Za,t is a
recursive, non-linear function of st. To avoid this type of difficulty, researchers will typically
make simplifying assumptions such as assuming Za,t is linear in certain state variables or
log-linearizing the SDF. The advantage of our parsimonious setup is that it is relatively
straightforward to solve these equations exactly. This allows the model to produce exact
population values for all the moments we are interested in rather than relying on simulation.
We can gain insight into the structure of these risks by looking at an equivalent expression
for the equilibrium SDF in Equation (1.3), which we derive in Appendix A.2,
Mt+1 = M
ez
t+1(γt, ψt) · (Za,t+1 + 1)ζt,t+1−θt (1.5)
where M ezt+1(γ, ψ) ≡ δθG
− θ
ψ
t+1R
−(1−θ)
a,t+1 is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor under the
standard Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences. Taking logs of Equation (1.5) gives
mt+1 = m
ez
t+1(γt, ψt) + (ζt,t+1 − θt) · ln(Za,t+1 + 1) (1.6)
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where lower case m’s denote the log values of their M counterparts and define
srt+1 ≡ (ζt,t+1 − θt) · ln(Za,t+1 + 1).
Finally, it can be shown by straightforward algebra that
ζt,t+1 − θt = (γt − 1)
(
ψt+1 − ψt
(ψt+1 − 1)(ψt − 1)
)
.
The discussion that follows is meant to guide the intuition of the model’s results and should
be taken as illustrative given the fact that Equation (1.5) is nonlinear in the state variable st.
1.2.7 Smoothing Risk
Since consumption growth and preference parameters are the only sources of stochastic
fluctuations in our model, Equation (1.6) implies that innovations in mt+1 come through
two channels. The first channel is the usual innovations in consumption growth under the
standard Epstein and Zin (1989) stochastic discount factor mezt+1 with the modification that
the market price of this risk, which is a function of preference parameters, will be ampli-
fied by fluctuations in preference parameters γt and ψt.
13 However, there is an additional
source of risk coming from innovations in srt+1. First, consider what happens if we shut
down time-variation in the EIS parameter so that only risk-aversion is time varying, then
ζt,t+1 = θt so that srt+1 = 0. This results in an SDF that gives the same pricing implications
as the standard recursive preference model although investors are willing to pay a much
higher premium for assets that pay them off in a recession state with elevated risk aversion
versus the premium they will pay for claims in a regular recession: the usual market price
of consumption growth risk associated with innovations in mezt+1 are scaled up when γt is
13For instance, in the model of Bansal and Yaron (2004), the market price of risk for innovations in
consumption growth is given by λm,η =
(
− θ
ψ
+ θ − 1
)
.
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large because it is counter-cyclical.
However, consider shutting down time variation in risk aversion but allowing the EIS pa-
rameter to be time varying. Then from Equation (1.6) we see that srt+1 will either increase
or decrease the marginal utility relative to the standard recursive utility model depending
on which states are being transitioned into.14 From this expression, it is clear that if the
economy is transitioning into a state where the EIS parameter is depressed, then ψt > ψt+1
and since γ > 1 we have ζt+1 − θt < 0, which implies srt+1 < 0. Alternatively, if the econ-
omy is transitioning from a state where the EIS parameter is depressed to a state of regular
preferences then srt+1 > 0. If both parameters are allowed to vary over time, risk aversion
will amplify the magnitude of srt+1 because γt itself enters the expression ζt,t+1 − θt as a
scale factor.15
This identifies an additional risk channel in this economy that comes from innovations in
srt+1, which are due to fluctuations in investor’s preferences for inter-temporal substitu-
tion. This new risk channel we call “smoothing risk” and it operates through investors’
uncertainty about their preference for how much they should consume today versus save for
the future. That is, there is some uncertainty about what the investor’s optimal lifetime
consumption profile should look like when making consumption and savings decisions at
time t that inhibits the investor’s ability to plan for future periods. This risk channel is
distinct from the usual consumption risk channel that affects the investor’s ability to smooth
consumption conditional on having a particular preference for consumption smoothing. Of
course, because Za,t+1 is itself a function of Gt+1, γt and ψt we are unable to determine a
priori from the functional form of Equation (1.5) if the consumption risk or smoothing risk
is more important for equilibrium asset prices. Fortunately, the exact solution of our model
14We also have the standard market prices of risk being time-varying and scaled by the value of ψt as in
the case when only RA is time-varying.
15However, the overall effect on marginal utility is unclear due to the non-linear function Za,t being a
function of st.
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allows us to investigate this further by testing the sensitivity of the equilibrium SDF for
each of these risks, which we discuss in Section 1.4.1
1.2.8 Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
The previous section demonstrated that fluctuations in the parameter ψt generate a new
source of risk for asset prices. Up to this point, we have taken great care in referring to
ψt as the EIS parameter and not simply as “the EIS.” In models where the parameter ψ is
not time-varying, this is indeed the EIS. However, as Melino and Yang (2003) show, when
ψ is allowed to be time-varying with recursive preferences, the EIS is not simply just the
parameter ψt, it takes the following form:
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) , (1.7)
where Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor and Gt+1 =
Ct+1
Ct
is aggregate consumption
growth. The assumption we make restricting the transition matrix by only allowing prefer-
ences to revert to normal when high consumption growth is realized is sufficient to ensure
that pro-cyclicality in the EIS parameter ψt implies the EIS is also pro-cyclical. This is
stated formally in the following lemma
Lemma 1. If the discrete state, joint Markov process of st = (Gt, γt, ψt) is restricted over
states S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} so that preferences do not revert from irregular (γelev or ψdepr)
to regular (γ0 or ψ0) states until high consumption growth is realized, then pro-cyclicality
of the EIS parameter ψt implies that EISt,t+1 (as given by Equation (1.7)) is pro-cyclical.
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix A.5. In light of this, in the discussion that
follows regarding how the cyclicality of the EIS is related to asset prices, we will refer to
the EIS parameter ψt and the EIS given by Equation (1.7) interchangeably.
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Given that rare fluctuations in the EIS generate a new source of risk crucial for many
of the model’s results, it is useful to discuss what the EIS is and what it means for the
EIS to be time-varying. Researchers often refer to the EIS in different ways. Two of the
most common ways are as consumption (savings) sensitivity to changes in interest rates
and as a preference for consumption smoothing. In general, the elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution is approximately defined to be
EIS ≈ ∂ ln(ct+1/ct)
∂r
, (1.8)
a percent change in consumption growth per percent increase in the net interest rate. Sup-
pose two investors A and B have preferences for inter-temporal substitution such that
EISA < EISB.
16 In terms of an elasticity, investor A’s consumption choice is less sensitive
to changes in the interest rate than investor B’s choice. This is another way of saying that
investor A has a stronger preference for consumption smoothing than investor B.
To see why a lower EIS implies a stronger preference for consumption smoothing, take the
extreme case of investor A preferring a completely smooth consumption profile. This pref-
erence implies that ∂ ln(ct+1/ct) is constant. Then Equation (1.8) implies that if investors
A observes a large change in interest rates and she prefers to keep ∂ ln(ct+1/ct) constant
through her consumption choice, she must have a low EIS and lower than B who has a
weaker preference for consumption smoothing. We can think of A and B as the same in-
vestor over two different time periods, with future-self A having a stronger preference for
consumption smoothing than present-self B.
Finally, to assist our intuition on what it means for the EIS to vary over time, it is useful
to understand how it is different from investor risk aversion. The investor’s level of risk
16In an endowment economy, since the entire endowment is consumed in equilibrium, talking about the
sensitivity of investor consumption choice versus the growth rate of consumption relative to changes in
interest rates is equivalent since the former determines the latter.
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aversion measures how averse an investor is at time t to variation in consumption across
different states at time t + 1. Whereas the EIS measures how averse an investor is at
time t to consumption variation across future time periods along a deterministic path of
consumption. The EIS changing over time implies that there are periods when an investor
is more or less averse to fluctuations in consumption across time. In this way we can think
of the smoothing risk, associated with the EIS changing over time, as affecting an investor’s
ability to plan their consumption profile over long horizons.
1.2.9 Discussion
We do not explicitly model the shocks that drive changes in γt and ψt, they are taken to
be exogenous to the model. This simplifying assumption allows the model to be agnostic
to the stochastic process that is driving changes in preference parameters. However, we
present the following as one plausible behavioral interpretation for why preferences might
be time-varying that is consistent with the evidence presented in Guiso et al. (2013) and
Cohn et al. (2013): preferences are at their regular levels (γ0, ψ0) most of the time, however,
on rare occasion an exogenous shock that coincides with low consumption growth induces
a psychological reaction — such as fear — in individuals, which changes their appetite for
risk and/or their desire to smooth consumption across periods to irregular levels.
Under this behavioral interpretation, since the state st is taken as given at the time of the
investment decision, when fear induces a particular state st it is an anticipatory emotion
(Loewenstein et al. (2001)) that investors experience at the time they make their decisions.
Hence, this visceral psychological factor (Loewenstein (1996, 2000)) can bypass the cognitive
decision process and immediately influence an investor’s decision. This is in contrast to the
traditional economic modeling view of anticipated emotions that are expected consequences
of the decision (e.g. regret or disappointment) rather than emotions experienced at the
time of decision. However, investors in our model have rational expectations and anticipate
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possible future fear states when making investment decisions today. Furthermore, investors
are sophisticated in the sense that they know that future states of fear will influence their
contemporaneous decision in those future periods and they take this into account when
making their optimal investment decision. Therefore, there is no dynamic inconsistency in
the model because investors have rational expectations and take into account the fact that
there might be rare future periods when their preferences will be irregular, due to some fear
inducing shock.
Given this interpretation, states {s3, s4, s5} can be thought of as “fear states” under which
consumption growth is low and preferences are at irregular levels. While {s1, s2} are states
with preferences at regular levels and invariant to whether high or low consumption growth
is realized. In our model, the EIS is pro-cyclical so that when low consumption growth is
realized in a fear state, the EIS decreases from its regular level to its irregular level. This
implies when the economy is in a fear state—relative to a regular state of the economy—
investors are less sensitive to changes in the interest rate and have a stronger preferences for
consumption smoothing. Likewise, since risk aversion in counter-cyclical, when the economy
is in a fear state investors are more risk averse relative to regular states of the economy.
It is important to note that this behavioral interpretation merely provides a plausible ex-
planation for the source of variation in preference parameters (that is not being explicitly
modeled) that is, in part, driving fluctuations in equilibrium asset prices in the model.
With this in mind, there are a few modeling assumptions that are reflected in the structure
of the transition matrix. First, we assume that the probabilities b and d are independent,
an assumption made simply for modeling parsimony. Second, and more importantly, we do
not allow the state to revert from a fear state with irregular preferences (γelev or ψdepr) to
states with regular preferences (γ0 or ψ0) before consumption growth is high again. That
is, if investors are in a fear state, we assume that realized high consumption growth is taken
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to be good news, which assuages investors fears and shifts their preferences back to regular
levels. The second assumption we make on the transition matrix might seem arbitrary,
especially abstracted from this behavioral interpretation. However, we did not set out with
the intent to match asset pricing moments and then back out the necessary restrictions on
the transition matrix to make the model work.17 Rather, we had this behavioral interpre-
tation in mind and constructed a transition matrix that is consistent with this view of what
might be driving preferences to vary over time.
The state space of our model also assumes that preference changes coincide with some reces-
sions and not with others. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Guiso et al. (2013) document
evidence that the Great Depression and Great Recession were associated with changes in
investor risk aversion. Of course, these studies just provide evidence for preference changes
coinciding with recessions but we cannot infer from them that there are recessions in the
U.S. data that do not coincide with preferences changing nor do they say anything about
the preference for consumption smoothing changing. One plausible explanation for the EIS
changing in some recessions and not in others is if the recession induces uncertainty about
the value of a long-term asset or the long-term path of the economy. For instance, two
recessions might look identical in terms of the observed decline in aggregate consumption.
However, suppose one is driven by all sectors being negatively affected by the same amount
while the other recession was driven by a particularly large decline in a sector like housing or
technology (the Dot Com bubble). Unprecedented or un-anticipated events that generate
uncertainty about consumption over the long-run can cause agents to re-evaluate every-
thing, possibly affecting their preferences to be more averse to consumption fluctuations
going forward.18
17Indeed, this might just be one of many transition matrix specifications that could potentially result in
the model matching the data.
18Most models of the housing market assumed no aggregate drop in prices since no aggregate price drop
had been observed in the data prior to the 2008 financial crisis.
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A different explanation, that is consistent with the behavioral interpretation given above, is
that fear might be the reason an investor’s preference for consumption smoothing changes
in some recessions and not others. For instance, if a recession coincides with an event
like a terrorist attack, this attack could induce fear about the long-term implications of
the attack on the economy. Likewise, if a recession is accompanied by a lot of negative
media coverage, this could induce fear as people perceive the recession to be much worse
than it actually is in terms of the economic fundamentals. The key is that the observed
consumption decline could be the same in a recession that coincided with a terrorist attack,
a lot of negative media coverage or neither. Therefore, one way to think of the effect of
fear on investor preferences is that fear induces a preference for consumption rationing.
That is, investors prefer to have a stable and smooth consumption profile in the face of fear
induced uncertainty about the long-term path of the economy that is unrelated to market
fundamentals.
1.3 Model Calibration
In order to derive the asset pricing implications from the model outlined in the previous
section, we calibrate aggregate consumption and dividend growth dynamics to annual U.S.
data from 1930-2013. Details on the data used for the calibration are provided in Appendix
A.3. Our baseline calibration is reported in Table 1, along with alternative calibrations for
a few special cases to be discussed in subsequent sections. The dividend leverage parameter
is chosen to be 4.5, which is a bit higher than the value used by others, but the same value
as used in Lettau et al. (2008).19 Furthermore, this choice of calibration results in a model
implied value for the standard deviation of dividends that is within the 95% confidence
interval from the data estimate over our sample as reported in Table 2. We also calibrate
the conditional probabilities b and d in the transition matrix to 5% and 12.5% respectively.
19For example, Abel (1999) uses 2.74 while Bansal and Yaron (2004) use 3. However, unlike here, these
models assume lognormal returns so the values are not directly comparable.
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Recall the regular (γ0, ψ0) and irregular (γelev, ψdepr) preference parameters. We define the
parameter kγ to be the elevated risk aversion factor where γelev = γ0kγ and kψ to be the
depressed EIS offset where ψdepr = ψ0 − kψ. The model calibration implies a constant
regular level of risk aversion of 7.25 for the vast majority of time periods. However, on
rare occasion (b = 0.05) an exogenous shock elevates investor risk aversion by a factor of
kγ = 3.24 times the regular level. This calibration is consistent with the empirical evidence
presented in Guiso et al. (2013) who estimate that after the 2008 financial crisis, risk aver-
sion increased 2.0-3.5 times the pre-crisis level.20 Mehra and Prescott (1985) argue that a
value of 10 for risk aversion is the maximum feasible value, a rule of thumb often invoked
in the asset pricing literature using the class of representative agent preferences. In our
baseline calibration, in the majority of periods, we require a value for risk aversion of only
7.25. However, the elevated value for risk aversion is γelev = γ0kγ = 23.5, which is high but
still much lower than, for example, the risk aversion of about 80 implied by Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) when consumption surplus is at its steady state (and in the hundreds for
low-consumption surplus ratios, which correspond with“recessions”) and in the low-end of
the range for this parameter reported in Table 4 of Melino and Yang (2003). Furthermore,
risk aversion is rarely this high in our model, elevated by the plausible factor of 3.24 only
once every 42 years on average and then reverting to its regular level in under four years
on average. If preference parameters, such as risk aversion, actually vary over time then
prior estimates of risk aversion from the data are estimates of the mean level of a random
variable. In the bottom panel of Table 1 we report the model implied unconditional means
of γt and ψt. Under this interpretation of previous acceptable benchmark values of risk
aversion being the mean of a random variable, our model requires E[γt] to be 8.60, which
is less than the plausible maximum benchmark of 10.
20They estimate a change in risk aversion by a factor of 2 for the average investor in their data and 3.5
for the median investor.
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We also calibrate the regular level of the EIS parameter to be 0.956. The “correct” value
of the EIS is widely debated and there is an extensive empirical literature that attempts
to estimate it with estimates ranging from very small (even negative) to larger than one.21
In our calibration, we did not set out with a particular value for this parameter in mind,
however, our model matches more regularities of asset prices with the EIS parameter at just
below one (E[ψt] = 0.9556), which implies a preference for early resolution of uncertainty
since 1/EISt,t+1 < γt in all states of our model. In the end, among other consumption
based asset pricing models in the literature, our calibration of ψt fits right between the
small values of around 0.1-0.3 (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Guvenen (2009)) and
the larger values of 1.0-1.5 (Wachter (2013), Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al.
(2012)).
The calibrated level of the EIS parameter is 0.956 for the vast majority of years, how-
ever, on rare occasions (d = 0.125) an exogenous shock depresses the EIS parameter by
kψ = 0.002. It may seem striking that our calibration only requires such a small movement
in the EIS parameter. Since we have little empirical guidance on plausible variation in
the EIS, small movements are a conservative assumption. Moreover, given the difficulty in
statistical estimation of the EIS in the literature under the assumption of constant EIS,
the small movement in our calibration is very likely not to be rejected by statistical test.
However, this magnitude is in the range of values that Kamstra et al. (2014) require in
seasonal fluctuation of the EIS parameter. Also, the magnitude of kψ implies a 20 basis
point change in the sensitivity of consumption growth to a change in interest rates, which
does not strike us as implausibly small. The probability b in the baseline calibration implies
21Havranek, Horvath, Irsova, and Rusnak (2013) provides a recent broad survey of estimates across mul-
tiple studies and countries and show a wide variation in estimates. Campbell (1999) reports widely varying
and often imprecise estimates. Hall (1988), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) and Guren, Manoli, Weber, and Chetty
(2011) estimate EIS to be small (around zero or less than one). While Hansen and Singleton (1982), Attana-
sio and Weber (1989), Beaudry and Wincoop (1996), Gruber (2006) and Engegelhardt and Kumar (2009)
estimate the EIS to be large (around one or greater than one). Guren et al. (2011) provides a good survey
on the various estimates of the EIS and how these estimates vary depending on if they are micro or macro
estimates.
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that risk aversion transitions into an irregular state about once every 42 years, with an
average duration of irregular risk aversion of about 3.8 years. Likewise, the probability d in
the baseline calibration implies that the EIS parameter transitions into an irregular state
about once every 18 years, with an average duration of about 3.8 years. If we assume the
Great Depression and the Great Recession were periods of low consumption growth that
corresponded with a state of fear shifting investor preferences, then our baseline calibration
is roughly consistent with the frequency and duration of these states of the U.S. economy
over the sample period 1930-2013.22
Before discussing the model’s ability to match the stylized facts of aggregate asset prices,
it is important to note the number of degrees of freedom our model exhibits. Of all the
parameters in Table 1, only the discount factor (δ), the regular values of risk aversion and
the EIS parameter (γ0, ψ0), the depressed EIS parameter offset (kψ) and the conditional
probabilities (b, d) are not calibrated directly to data or from empirical evidence. However,
the EIS parameter offset is very small, which would not obviously amplify the results of
the model a priori. Furthermore, b and d are closely tied to the average levels of RA and
EIS generated by the model, and those levels were targeted under the constraints that
the relevant literature implies a plausible risk aversion be less that 10 and estimates of
the EIS to be somewhere between 0 and 2. Hence, we only have six degrees of freedom
in calibrating our model. Given this feature, coupled with the fact that we assume very
simple consumption and dividend dynamics with a very coarse state space, it is actually
quite surprising the model does well in producing as large a number of asset price features
as it does, lending credibility to the model’s basic insights.
22This assumption is consistent with the empirical studies of Malmendier and Nagel (2011) and Guiso
et al. (2013) documenting evidence that these periods were associated with changes in investor preferences.
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1.4 Model Implications and Results
1.4.1 Equilibrium Discount Factors
The stochastic discount factor in Equation (1.5) is highly nonlinear because Za,t+1 will be
a recursive function of the model primitives, including the state variable st. As a result, we
do not have closed-form expressions for innovations in the SDF. However, our parsimonious
setup allows us to solve the model exactly without invoking a log-linear approximation and
simulation, which means we can look at the state contingent SDF being generated directly
from the model. Step by step details of our numerical solution method are outlined in
Appendix A.4. Let M denote the equilibrium stochastic discount factor generated by the
model where each row and column corresponds to one of the model’s five states at time t
and t+ 1 respectively. Under our baseline calibration, we obtain:
Mt,t+1 =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
s1 0.83 1.38 2.63 0.52 0.54
s2 0.68 1.13 2.15 0.42 0.44
s3 0.03 . 1.53 . 0.01
s4 1.46 . . 0.92 0.96
s5 2.08 . . . 0.73

. (1.9)
Recall the five states of the model:
{s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} = {(gh, γ0, ψ0), (g`, γ0, ψ0), (g`, γelev, ψ0), (g`, γ0, ψdepr), (g`, γelev, ψdepr)}.
In consumption-based asset pricing models, the equilibrium discount factor has a direct
relationship with investor marginal utility as discount factors for state contingent claims in
a complete market will reflect the relative marginal utility the investor faces in each possible
state of the world. More precisely, investors will pay a premium for state contingent assets
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that insure them against bad states of the world that pay them when marginal utility is
high. Likewise, investors will demand a discount for state contingent assets that pay them
in good states of the world when marginal utility is low. Looking at Matrix (1.9), in times
of regular preferences, and in recessions with only elevated risk aversion (state transition
paths between s1, s2 and s3), discount factors behave as expected under the standard model.
Investors are willing to pay a premium (1.38, 1.13, 2.63, 2.15, 1.53) and demand a discount
(0.83, 0.68, 0.03) for a claim in an expansion when marginal utility is low with the premiums
and discounts being higher under elevated risk aversion.
However, in recessions with a depressed EIS parameter, the SDF seems to price assets
counter to the standard model with discounts demanded to hold contingent claims paying
off in states s4 and s5 when consumption growth is low. Although this result may seem
counterintuitive, it turns out that it is not because investors in the model consider states
s4 and s5 to be states of low marginal utility from the perspective of time t, even though
consumption growth is low. To see why, we will compare states s2 = (g`, γ0, ψ0) and s4 =
(g`, γ0, ψdepr) that differ only in that s4 is a state of depressed EIS. Recall that the smoothing
risk relates to uncertainty about what the investor’s optimal lifetime consumption profile
should look like when making consumption and savings decisions at time t; whereas, the
consumption risk channel affects the investor’s ability to smooth consumption conditional
on having a particular preference for consumption smoothing. When consumption growth
is more persistent, this increases the investor’s ability to plan for future periods relative to,
say iid consumption. All else equal, an investor with a stronger preference for smoothing
consumption should prefer these states of the world. Note that the transition matrix (1.2)
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generated by the model calibration is given by
Πt,t+1 =

s1 s2 s3 s4 s5
s1 0.735 0.220 0.012 0.032 0.002
s2 0.265 0.611 0.032 0.087 0.005
s3 0.265 0 0.643 0 0.092
s4 0.265 0 0 0.698 0.037
s5 0.265 0 0 0 0.735

. (1.10)
From time t perspective, s2 and s4 have a probability of 73.5% of remaining in a low con-
sumption growth state, implying identical consumption persistence if the economy stays
in these relative states. However, in spite of the fact that these states are identical aside
from ψt and have identical consumption persistence over low consumption growth states,
the model implies from Matrix (1.9) that s2 is a state of high marginal utility while s4 is a
state of low marginal utility. The only way this can happen is if investors are better off in
utility terms when persistence in consumption growth is high when ψt = ψdepr relative to
states where ψt = ψ0. If this is the case, then we would expect discount factors for s2 and
s4 to diverge as consumption persistence increases. We can test this directly by solving the
model for a grid of ρC and reporting the discount factors for s2 and s4 if the economy is
in state s2 at time t (the second row of Matrix (1.9)). These results are shown in Figure 1
and we see that indeed, the discount factors diverge as consumption persistence increases.
The intuition of this result is that if consumption is persistent and investors have a stronger
preference for consumption smoothing, they will be better able to plan for future periods
in a way that will give them higher overall utility relative to states where they have a weak
preference for smoothing.
Given that states s4 = (g`, γ0, ψdepr) and s5 = (g`, γelev, ψdepr) are low marginal utility states
with low consumption growth, it may seem odd that these discount factors are always lower
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than when s1 = (gh, γ0, ψ0) for low marginal utility states since consumption growth is high
in this state. The only way for this to be true is if marginal utility is more sensitive to the
smoothing risk than consumption risk. Or equivalently, the proportion of equilibrium asset
prices explained by the smoothing risk investors face is larger than that of consumption
risk. To determine if this is true, we solve for the equilibrium discount factors for s4 and
s5 if the economy is in state s1 at time t (the first row of Matrix (1.9)) for values of con-
sumption growth volatility, the EIS offset parameter kψ and the risk aversion scale factor
kγ holding the other parameters fixed under the baseline calibration in each case. Varying
the size of the parameters kψ and kγ will lead to larger fluctuations in risk aversion and EIS
in the model. We also normalize all discount factors by the discount factor in s1 for ease
of comparison. The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 2. It is clear from the fig-
ure, comparing across panels, that discount factors, hence marginal utility and asset prices,
are much more sensitive to fluctuations in the EIS parameter than shocks to consumption
growth or fluctuations in risk aversion. This latter point is consistent with our previous
discussion that risk aversion will just scale up the effect of EIS fluctuations in states where
both shift to irregular levels. This can be seen in Panels (c) as risk aversion magnitudes
increase, for a fixed value of the EIS offset parameter, discount factors are shifted up and
the line for s5 lies strictly above the line for s4.
Given the discussion so far, it is clear where the smoothing risk enters discount factors. The
EIS measures how averse an investor is at time t to consumption variations across future
time periods along a deterministic path of consumption growth. In our model, there is some
uncertainty about the “right amount” of consumption variation given that an investor’s
preference for smoothing might increase with some small probability d as their EIS falls in
some future period. As argued above, from the perspective of time t, states where this event
is realized are not “bad” states per-se because this increased desire to smooth consumption
is complemented by persistence in consumption growth. However, once the investor is in
this state of an increased desire to smooth consumption, uncertainty about their ability to
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plan for the future will be seen as a risk. This is why investors are willing to pay a premium
for the s1 state contingent claim conditional on being in one of the rare states s4 or s5, to
insure themselves against this smoothing risk.
1.4.2 Aggregate Asset Price Moments
In Table 2, under our baseline calibration, we report the model implied first and second
moments and autocorrelations for equity returns, the risk-free rate, the equity premium,
price-dividend ratios, and the dividend yield as well as the Sharpe Ratio. Because we
are able to solve the model exactly, we do not rely on simulation or estimation to produce
moments from the model. This means the model moments reported in Table 2 and elsewhere
are population moments and are computed without sampling error. Also, since we do not
assume lognormal returns, all the returns, prices, and dividends reported in Table 2 are
exact (not transformed on a log basis) and our model can produce both price-dividends
and the dividend yield. Along with the population moments implied by the model, we
report the corresponding estimates for these moments from annual data over the sample
period 1930-2013. As shown in Table 2, the model produces values for all reported moments
within the 95% confidence interval (and in many cases within one standard error) of the
data estimates with the exceptions of the price-dividend and dividend yield volatilities and
the first order autocorrelations of price-dividends. In particular, the model does a good job
matching the equity premium and Sharpe Ratio while simultaneously producing both a low
expected risk free rate and high enough volatility of the risk free rate to match the data.
This feature is something that is typically difficult to generate in the class of representative
agent asset pricing models without assuming unreasonable levels of risk aversion. To further
understand how the model is generating these features, we can look at the model implied
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equity and risk-free returns as well as expected returns to equity.

Rf
s1 1.0380
s2 1.0235
s3 1.0057
s4 0.9419
s5 0.9179


Et[Rm]
s1 1.0828
s2 1.0904
s3 1.4763
s4 0.9451
s5 0.9335


Et[Rm −Rf ]
s1 1.0448
s2 1.0669
s3 1.4706
s4 1.0032
s5 1.0156


pi
s1 0.50
s2 0.28
s3 0.04
s4 0.13
s5 0.04

The first thing to notice is that relative to periods of high consumption growth (s1) if the
economy is in a recession (s2) then demand for the risk-free asset increases as agents re-
balance their portfolios toward less risky securities. This pushes the price of the risk-free
asset up and its net return down, as we see comparing s1 and s2 in the Rf vector. As ex-
pected, the inverse relationship shows up in expected equity returns as this rebalancing has
the opposite effect on equity prices. If an exogenous shock elevates risk aversion (s3) then
these effects are only magnified because higher risk aversion induces even more portfolio
rebalancing toward less risky securities driving the net return of the risk-free asset further
down and expected equity returns even higher.
However, if there is an exogenous shock that depresses the EIS (s4 and s5) so that investors
have a stronger preference for smoothing consumption returns for both the risk free rate
and expected equity returns fall. The reason is that all assets in the economy are vehicles
for transferring consumption across future periods, even risky ones. Therefore, even though
consumption growth is low, the investors prefer even smoother consumption and are will-
ing to buy assets that will achieve this goal. Investor demand pushes prices of both the
risk-free rate and equities higher and their preference for smoothing in these periods is so
strong that they are willing to accept negative returns to ensure a smooth consumption
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profile over future periods. Hence, investors end up paying a premium in the form of lower
returns to transfer consumption into these rare states of depressed EIS.
As argued above, elevated risk aversion only amplifies the effect of a depressed EIS on dis-
count factors so that if risk aversion is also elevated, demand for the risk-free asset is even
higher, pushing its price up and return down. This can be seen comparing the gross risk-free
return of 0.9419 in s4 (a net loss of about 5%) with the smaller gross return of 0.9179 in s5
(a net loss of about 8%). However, this accelerated increase in the price of the risk-free asset
would make the price of the risky asset that pays off in state s5 relatively more attractive
than the one that pays off in state s4. Therefore, equity prices go up slightly in s5 relative
to s4 taking pressure off the risk-free rate, which is consistent with the expected equity
returns being lower in state s5 than in state s4.
The dynamics just described generate volatility across states in the risk-free rate and ex-
pected returns and therefore, in the equity premium. As expected, in s3 investors demand
a very high risk premium to hold equities because low demand for risky assets in periods of
elevated risk aversion drives prices down and investors must be compensated for this risk in
the form of higher returns. In states with depressed EIS, we see that investors demand less
of a risk premium than in the other three states even though the economy is in a recession
due to a stronger preference for consumption smoothing, which increases demand for both
risk-free and risky assets. Overall, these effects generate variation in the equity premium but
with reasonable average levels for risk aversion because these states of irregular preferences
happen very rarely in the model. The steady state probabilities in the pi vector show that
the model spends almost 80% of the time in states where investors have regular preferences.
We only require rare and temporary periods of irregular preferences to generate the model’s
equity premium of 6.21.
33
Price Dividend Volatility
Although the model does a good job in matching the first moments of price-dividend ra-
tios and dividend yields, the most obvious area where the model struggles is in generating
enough volatility in these variables. Counterfactually low price-dividend volatility is an
issue that the long-run risks models of Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al. (2012)
also struggle with, so despite this weakness our model is in good company. Those models
also use recursive preference specifications but very different consumption and dividend dy-
namics than our model assumes.
There are a few things we might do to improve the model’s ability to generate price-dividend
volatility. First, our model has a very small state space and expanding the state space for
consumption and dividend growth could potentially add additional variation that the cur-
rent model is unable to capture. Second, the dividend growth process we have specified
(leveraged consumption growth) is too auto-correlated and too strongly cross correlated
with consumption growth (it is equal to 1 by construction) relative to dividends data. This
strong correlation between dividend growth and consumption growth results in the model
producing an unconditional contemporaneous correlation of 0.46 between excess returns
and consumption growth, which is much too high relative to the low correlation found in
the data. However, even though we do not assume separate processes for consumption and
dividends, our model implied value of 0.46 is less than the value of 1.0 produced by the
standard time-separable model and close to the value of 0.47 produced by Campbell and
Cochrane (1999) from simulations at an annual frequency.23 The reason this correlation is
not 1.0 in our model is that some of the variation in returns is being explained by varia-
tion in preference parameters that are not directly tied to changes in consumption growth
(transitioning between states 2-5 in the model). This counterfactual result, as Cochrane and
Hansen (1992) point out, is a major factor in the empirical failures of the consumption-based
23The models of Barberis et al. (2001) and Bansal and Yaron (2004) produce a contemporaneous correlation
between consumption growth and returns of 0.15, which is much closer to estimates from the data.
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asset pricing model. Relaxing this unrealistic restriction in future iterations of the model
would introduce more dividend volatility into the model and could improve the model’s fit.
Alternative Calibrations
Given the model’s ability to match key asset pricing moments, it is useful to look at a few
alternative calibrations to reveal what features of the model are responsible for this success.
In Table 1 we presented several different alternative calibrations to our baseline calibration.
One point of debate between proponents of either long-run risk models following Bansal and
Yaron (2004) or habits models following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) is whether or not
consumption growth is independently and identically distributed (iid). The long-run risks
model assumes a predictable, long run component in consumption growth, while the habits
model assumes consumption is a random walk (ρC = 0). In our baseline calibration, we do
not assume consumption is a random walk, we calibrate ρC to the data sample we have.
However, in Table 1 we specify an alternative calibration (4) of the model with ρC = 0 that
is otherwise nearly identical to our baseline calibration with the exception that regular level
of risk aversion is calibrated to be 7.5 and the risk aversion scaling parameter kelev = 4.93.
We report the model fit in Table 3. As shown in the table, the model performs just as well
under the assumption of iid consumption growth with the exception that the volatility of
the risk-free rate is too high. The takeaway from this exercise is that the particular nature
of the consumption growth dynamics being assumed as either iid or having a predictable
component is not crucial for our model to fit the data.
Calibrations (1)-(3) in Table 1 are special cases of the baseline calibration that maintain
the exact same calibration as the baseline but shut down variation in the EIS parameter,
risk aversion or both. Calibration (1) sets b = 0, which shuts down time-variation in the
risk aversion parameter and only allows the EIS parameter to be time-varying in order to
highlight the importance of variation in the EIS. Comparing this calibration to the baseline,
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two features stand out. The first is that the EIS seems to be entirely responsible for the
model’s ability to match the moments for the risk free rate. Furthermore, since γ0 = 7.25
in the baseline, this implies variation in the EIS is important for resolving the risk-free rate
puzzle. Second, variation in the EIS also seems important for the model to produce high
mean price-dividend ratios and what little variation in price-dividend ratios the model is
able to generate.
Turning to calibration (2), which shuts down time-variation in the EIS and only allows
risk aversion to be time-varying, we see that risk aversion is important for matching the
moments for equity returns and the equity premium; however, it does so at the expense of
the risk-free rate puzzle creeping in with almost no volatility and a much higher mean for
the risk-free rate. The last baseline special calibration (3) is the case where both param-
eters are constant over time so that the Markov transition matrix is equivalent to the one
in Mehra and Prescott (1985). As expected, this calibration is unable to generate a large
equity premium and is also prone to the risk-free rate puzzle with γ0 = 7.25.
Alternative calibrations (1b) and (2b) are different from the baseline calibration and at-
tempt a “best fit” for the case when b = 0 and d = 0. The purpose of these calibrations are
to answer the hypothetical question “if we had to choose just one parameter to be time-
varying, which one would we prefer?” Looking at calibration (1b), which only allows the
EIS parameter to be time-varying is similar to the baseline with two exceptions. First, the
dividend leverage parameter is higher at 5.83, however, at this value the model produces
the exact value of the sample estimate of dividend volatility (12.53) as seen in Table 3. In
other words, this is the value of the dividend leverage parameter that would be estimated
from Equation (1.1) using the sample moments of µD and σD. The second difference is that
the constant risk aversion parameter is set at 9.5, which is still below the benchmark of 10.
It is clear from the table that this calibration does as good or better in some cases than our
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baseline calibration.
Alternative calibration (2b) sets d = 0, which only allows risk aversion to vary over time.
The main difference between this calibration and our baseline is that kγ is now 4.75, im-
plying the model requires a higher level of irregular risk aversion (28.5) although the mean
risk aversion of 7.86 is still reasonable. Under this calibration the model does reasonably
well, although it does not generate enough risk-free rate volatility and does not perform as
well as the baseline or alternative calibrations (1b). The overall takeaway from the model
performance under these alternative calibrations is that, although both are important, al-
lowing the EIS to be time-varying seems to be more crucial in the model fitting these asset
pricing moments than time-varying risk aversion since calibration (1b) does better than
(2b). Time variation in the EIS parameter seems particularly important for simultaneously
generating both a low expected risk free rate and high enough volatility of the risk free rate,
matching the equity premium and Sharpe Ratio, and maintaining a risk aversion coefficient
of less than 10.
1.4.3 Predictability
A large empirical literature has formed documenting the ability of price-dividends to predict
excess stock returns and their inability to predict future dividend growth (Fama and French
(1988), Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Hodrick (1992) among others). This feature of ag-
gregate asset prices has become standard for evaluating the performance of asset pricing
models. In Table 4 we report the predictability results implied by our model under the
baseline calibration along with estimates from the data for both the price-dividend regres-
sor coefficient and R-squared. However, before discussing these results, a word of caution
regarding the validity of these estimations is in order. As Stambaugh (1999) points out,
because the price-dividend ratio time-series is highly persistent with innovations correlated
with the innovations in excess returns, the coefficient estimates from these predictive re-
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gressions will be biased. Furthermore, the results in Cavanagh, Elliot, and Stock (1995)
imply this bias is present as well in the t statistics and R-squared estimates. Therefore, as
Beeler and Campbell (2012) discuss, the predictability of excess returns can only be used
to reject a model statistically at horizons longer than one year in the annual data while the
bias is much less of a concern for consumption and dividend growth predictability.
With this in mind, the top panel in Table 4 shows that our model does quite well at pro-
ducing the predictability of excess returns by price-dividend ratios at long horizons. In
particular, the model implied R-squared statistics are within one standard deviation of
their data estimates. Moreover, as in the data, the model implied coefficients are decreas-
ing while predictability is increasing with the horizon.24 Our model also produces virtually
no predictability of consumption growth or dividend growth at all horizons with coefficient
estimates similar to those estimated from the data. Beeler and Campbell (2012) are critical
of the long run risks model for not generating enough excess return predictability and gen-
erating too much consumption and dividend growth predictability and the model output in
Table 4 indicates that our model is not subject to these critiques.25 Likewise Bansal et al.
(2012) point out a shortcoming of the Campbell and Cochrane (1999) habits framework is
that it counterfactually implies too much predictability of price-dividend ratios from past
consumption growth. The final panel in Table 4 shows that our model produces very little
predictability of price-dividend ratios by past consumption growth, which is consistent with
the data.26
24Bansal et al. (2012) suggest using dividend yields adjusted by subtracting the real risk-free rate to reduce
the persistence in the return predictability regressor to help counteract the bias pointed out by Stambaugh
(1999). They report that this adjustment leads to return predictability in the data that is weaker than when
using the price dividend ratio, with five-year horizon R-squared droping from 31% to %14. We do not report
our model’s results under this alternative specification, however, it appears that less predictability would
only serve to help our model match predictability in the data.
25Beeler and Campbell (2012) also conduct their analysis using the Bansal et al. (2012) calibration and
report the model does better at consumption and dividend predictability but need extreme movements in
volatility to produce results roughly in line with the data.
26The trend in the coefficient estimates is the opposite of what is estimated from the data. However,
these point estimates are clearly estimated with a lot of noise (very wide confidence intervals) and are not
statistically different from zero anyway.
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Our model is able to simultaneously match both forward and lagged consumption pre-
dictability features in the data because innovations in the stochastic discount factor are
driven by innovations in preferences and these parameters are only moderately correlated
with consumption growth as reported in Table 1. This results in a model implied con-
temporaneous correlation between price-dividend ratios and consumption growth of 0.0645,
compared with an estimate of 0.0643 (se 0.1196) in annual data over the 1930-2013 sample
period. This result is rather surprising given the fact that we assume, through our sim-
plifying assumptions about the dividend growth process, that consumption and dividends
are perfectly correlated. This result suggests the smoothing risk associated with fluctua-
tions in the EIS parameter is driving fluctuations in equity prices more than consumption
growth risk. That fluctuations in the EIS dominate fluctuations in consumption volatility
in terms of their effect on equilibrium discount factors, and hence their effect on marginal
utilities and equilibrium prices, speaks to this fact.27 The takeaway from these predictabil-
ity results is that our model is able to produce excess return predictability at long horizons
consistent with what we see in the data while simultaneously producing no predictability
of consumption or dividend growth and no predictability of price-dividend ratios by lagged
consumption, something (as far as we are aware) that the current asset pricing literature is
unable to do.
Alternative Calibrations
It is useful to look at the alternative calibrations of our model to see if we can identify what
is driving the predictability results. Table 5 reports the model implied predictability results
under the three baseline special cases as well as the best fit calibrations. Comparing excess
return predictability across calibrations, the model can still produce reasonable predictabil-
ity of excess returns under iid consumption growth, implying again that our particular
27This was shown previously in Figure 2.
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assumption of non-iid consumption growth is not what is driving our results. However it
is obvious from comparing calibrations (2) and (2b) to the other baseline special cases and
best fit calibration (1b) that excess return predictability is driven almost entirely by time-
varying risk aversion and that time-varying EIS has little or nothing to do with this result.
However, it is also clear from comparing calibrations (1) and (1b) to the other baseline spe-
cial cases and best fit calibration (2b) that time-variation in the EIS parameter is what is
driving the model’s ability to produce low consumption and dividend growth predictability,
as discussed in the previous section. Likewise, looking at the model implied predictability of
price-dividend ratios by lagged consumption growth it is clear from comparing calibrations
(1) and (1b) to the others that time-varying EIS is much more crucial in generating this
low predictability than time-varying risk aversion.
1.4.4 Countercyclical Variation of the Risk Premium
It is a well known empirical fact that risk premia vary over time and this variation in equity
risk premium leads to volatile asset prices and excess return predictability.28 We report
several features of the equity risk premium implied by our model that are consistent with
this fact in Table 6. Under the baseline calibration our model produces an equity risk pre-
mium that is quite volatile. In addition, the model produces risk premium volatility that is
itself quite volatile. Looking at the alternative calibrations, it is clear that time-variation
in risk aversion is crucial for generating this volatility, which is consistent with our earlier
finding that time-variation in risk aversion is what is driving excess return predictability
in the model. This is also consistent with Campbell and Cochrane (1999) that attribute
time-variation in the equity risk premium to countercyclical risk aversion.
Furthermore, Chou, Engle, and Kane (1992) show that, for U.S. data, the equity pre-
mium and the Sharpe Ratio are both counter-cyclical. Although we do not replicate their
28For example see Fama (1984), Harvey (1989), Fama and French (1989) and Li (2001).
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estimates here, we show in Table 6 under the baseline calibration, our model is able to qual-
itatively match the data by generating both a counter-cyclical risk premium and Sharpe
Ratio. Again, looking at the alternative calibration (4), the results still hold under iid con-
sumption so this results is not being driven by our assumptions about consumption growth.
Comparing across baseline special case calibrations (1)-(3) as well as the best fit calibrations
(1b) and (2b), the main takeaway from Table 6 is that time variation in the EIS parameter
is crucial for the model to produce counter-cyclicality of the Sharpe Ratio.
While this is an interesting result, more work needs to be done to understand why exactly the
smoothing risk associated with fluctuations in the EIS is important for generating a counter-
cyclical Sharpe Ratio in the model. Nevertheless, Guvenen (2009) states that “with few
exceptions this counter-cyclicality of the market price of risk has been difficult to generate
in consumption-based asset pricing models” and concludes that heterogeneity in the EIS is
crucial to produce the stylized facts in 6.29 That these exceptions include Campbell and
Cochrane (1999), Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal et al. (2012) and Wachter (2013) speaks
favorably to the fact that our model is also able to produce a counter-cyclical Sharpe Ratio.
1.4.5 Real Term Structure
Estimates for the real term structure are very limited due to the unavailability of long time
series for inflation indexed bonds. Because of this, there is some debate on the empirical
nature of the real term structure. Beeler and Campbell (2012) state that the observed term
structure on U.S. Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) has never had a quantita-
tively significant negative slope. Wachter (2013) claims that U.S. Treasury yield curves are
upward sloping (on average) in the data. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) also cite evidence
that the average real yield curve constructed from the U.S. TIPS data is upward sloping.
Other studies have shown evidence from real bonds in the U.K. of a downward sloping real
29Guvenen (2009) page 1735.
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yield curve.30 Although empirical estimates of the real yield curve should be taken with
caution, our model is calibrated to match U.S. equity data. Therefore, we think the upward
slope of the real yield curve in the U.S., as suggested by TIPS data, is the appropriate
stylized fact for our model. Table 7 reports the real term structure generated by our model
under the baseline calibration. The model is able to produce an upward sloping real yield
curve with a yield spread of 15 basis points at a 10 year horizon. In addition to the slope,
the real yields at long horizons produced by the model are never negative and are in the
ballpark of 2%, which is roughly consistent with what Campbell, Shiller, and Viceira (2009)
report for the real yield on long-term TIPS.
Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989) point out that that under the standard CRRA utility
model with values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion below ten, the average returns
of long bonds in excess of the short rate are small and negative. This “bond premium puz-
zle” has traditionally been difficult for consumption-based asset pricing models to overcome.
Our model is primarily focused on matching aggregate stock prices and we do not use any
bond data in calibrating or solving the model. Given this, it is surprising that our model,
with reasonable values for risk aversion, is able to overcome the bond premium puzzle and
yield magnitudes that appear consistent with real bond data.31 Along this dimension, our
model compares favorably to several other asset pricing models. The habits framework of
Campbell and Cochrane (1999), as demonstrated by Wachter (2006), is able to overcome
the bond premium puzzle for real bonds. However, for instance, the long-run risk model of
Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal et al. (2012) are unable to produce these features of
the real term structure while the rare disasters model of Wachter (2013) is also unable to
produce an upward sloping real term structure.
30See Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) for a more detailed discussion.
31In the baseline calibration, the coefficient of relative risk aversion is 7.25 in the vast majority of periods,
while the average level of risk aversion is 8.6, both values less than the benchmark of ten.
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Looking at calibrations (1) and (1b) in Table 7 compared with calibrations (2), (3) and (2b)
it is clear that time-variation in the EIS is important in generating a steeply, upward sloping
real yield curve. When b = 0, so that time-variation in risk aversion is shut down and only
the EIS parameter is allowed to vary, the yield spread between the 10 year and 1 year bond
is 28 basis points in the baseline special case and 95 basis points in the best fit case of b = 0.
Also, note that calibration (4) with iid consumption produces a yield spread of 0.57, again
indicating this feature of the model is not being driven by our assumption on consumption
dynamics. These results suggest that smoothing risk is important for long-term bonds to
be viewed as risky, which generates an upward sloping yield curve.
To investigate why smoothing risk is generating this result, it would be useful to look at the
model implied risk premium for long-term bonds.32 However, due to the non-linearity of
the stochastic discount factor, we do not have a closed form solution for this risk premium.
Instead, we report the risk premium on bonds for the standard Epstein and Zin (1989)
model under log-normal consumption growth shocks and an EIS set to one, as derived in
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), to guide our discussion:
Et
(
rx
(n)
t+1
)
= −covt
(
mt+1, Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
mt+1+i
)
− 1
2
vart
(
p
(n−1)
t+1
)
(1.11)
where rx
(n)
t+1 = p
(n−1)
t+1 − p(n)t − y(1)t is the return on buying an n-period real bond at time t
for price p
(n)
t and selling it at time t+1 for p
(n−1)
t+1 in excess of the short rate. The covariance
term in Equation (1.11) is the risk premium on long-term bonds while the variance term
comes from Jensen’s inequality. From Equation (1.11), it is clear that the risk premium on
bonds is due to the covariance between marginal utility mt+1 and the price of the long-bond.
As Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) point out, the yield curve is upward sloping (on average)
if the right hand side of Equation (1.11) is positive on average. Therefore, Equation (1.11)
32We refer to the risk premium for bonds as defined in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006): the return on buying
an n−period real bond at time t for price p(n)t and selling it at time t + 1 for p(n−1)t+1 in excess of the short
rate.
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implies that the yield curve is upward sloping when marginal utility and bond prices are
negatively correlated.
First, consider what happens if we shut down time variation in both the EIS and risk
aversion. Then expected changes in marginal utilities are only driven by consumption
growth shocks. Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) show that under Epstein and Zin (1989)
preferences the risk premium on bonds implied by our model in this case should be negative,
which it is as shown in calibration (3) of Table 7. Recall that marginal utilities in our model
are driven by shocks to risk aversion and the EIS in addition to consumption growth shock
and are given by Equation (1.6). Ignoring the Jensen’s Inequality term (since bond prices
are not very volatile) we can re-write the bond risk premium as
Et
(
rx
(n)
t+1
)
= −covt
(
(mezt+1(γt, ψt) + srt+1), Et+1
n−1∑
i=1
(mezt+1+i(γt+i, ψt+i) + srt+1+i)
)
(1.12)
where as before, the second term in the covariance expression of Equation (1.12) is the price
of a long-term bond. Of course, the model’s true risk premium on long-bonds will be a more
complicated function that will depend on covariances between all the random variables in
the model, so this expression is meant only to be roughly illustrative. Consider allowing
only the risk aversion to be time varying so that srt+1 = 0 in Equation (1.12). From the
perspective of time t, marginal utility is high in every state that risk aversion is elevated
(Section 1.4.1). Also, increased risk aversion should push prices for bonds up relative to
risky assets that pay off in those future states. Therefore the correlation between marginal
utilities and bond prices is positive, which implies risk premium on long-term bonds are
negative from Equation (1.12). This is indeed the case looking at the real yield curve for
calibrations (2) and (2b) in Table 7.
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Now consider allowing the EIS to be time varying so that srt+1 6= 0 for all t. From the
perspective of time t, marginal utility is low in every state that the EIS is depressed (Section
1.4.1). Also, we argued that when the EIS is depressed, investors have a stronger prefer-
ence for consumption smoothing and they will demand more of any asset that transfers
consumption across periods (Section 1.4.2). Therefore, the price of long-term bonds will be
pushed up as investors demand more of these bonds. Hence, marginal utility is negatively
correlated with bond prices, which generates a positive risk premium on bonds. This is
apparent looking at the real yield curve for calibrations (1) and (1b) in Table 7.
Allowing for both risk aversion and the EIS to be time-varying in our baseline calibration
also produces a positive risk premium on long-bonds. This is true even though shocks to
consumption growth and risk aversion fluctuations push the risk premium in the opposite
direction (negative) as fluctuations in the EIS (positive). The reason is that, as previously
shown in Figure 2, marginal utilities are more sensitive to fluctuations in the EIS than con-
sumption volatility or risk aversion fluctuations so the former effect on the risk premium on
long-term bonds dominates. Therefore, the consumption and risk aversion hedging of long-
term bonds is dominated by the positive risk premium being generated by the smoothing
risk.
This analysis supports the implication of the model that smoothing risk generates an upward
sloping real yield curve. Intuitively, the reason that long-term bonds are viewed as risky
by the investor is because these bonds give investors a stream of consumption in future
periods t+ i+ 1 (for i = 1, 2, . . . ) that is consistent with their preference for smoothing at
time t. However, if their preference for smooth consumption changes before these bonds
pay off, they are stuck holding assets that give them a different consumption profile than
what their new preferences would optimally choose. Hence, the uncertainty coming from
the smoothing risk affects an investor’s ability to plan over long horizons. However, agents
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in the model are rational and there is no dynamic inconsistency because this uncertainty is
priced into assets in equilibrium as a positive risk premium for long-term bonds.
1.5 Discussion
The model results in the previous section provide compelling evidence that time-variation in
the EIS parameter seems to be the primary channel allowing the model to match aggregate
asset pricing moments, consumption and dividends predictability, counter-cyclicality of the
market price of risk, and the real term structure. Time-varying risk aversion helps the model
fit better but is itself the primary channel through which the model is able match the em-
pirical evidence that price-dividend ratios predict excess stock returns at long horizons and
generate a volatile equity premium. Furthermore, we have argued that these fluctuations
in the EIS parameter effects equilibrium asset prices in the model through the smoothing
risk channel. However, the model remains agnostic as to why investor preferences fluctuate
in such a way as to introduce this additional risk being priced into assets.
In the discussion that follows, we provide arguments for these mechanisms under the behav-
ioral interpretation in Section 1.2.9 that rare exogenous shocks coinciding with recessions
induce fear in the market that shifts investor preferences to irregular levels. Given that mar-
ket fundamentals, which are captured by realized consumption growth, are the same across
regular and irregular preference states, we can think of these fluctuations in preferences as
overreactions to bad news. Hence, investors make decisions based on fear induced irregu-
lar preferences resulting in optimal consumption and savings choices that depart from what
these investors otherwise would have made given the same news about the fundamental state
of the economy. Under this interpretation, fear influences investor preferences through two
channels: investors’ contemporaneous appetite for risk and their desire to smooth consump-
tion across future states of the economy. We emphasize that this behavioral interpretation
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is not necessary for the model results to hold, it merely guided our assumptions restricting
the transition matrix and provides an intuitive explanation for how assets are priced in
this model economy; this interpretation is also consistent with the evidence presented by
Guiso et al. (2013) and Cohn et al. (2013) that fear influences investor choice in ways not
attributable to standard risk factors.
1.5.1 Excess Safety Motive
When an investor’s appetite for risk is elevated due to fear but their preference for con-
sumption smoothing is unchanged at its regular level, we have seen that discount factors
behave as expected in a standard consumption-based asset pricing model. However, look-
ing at Matrix (1.9), investors pay premiums (2.63, 2.15) for contingent claims paying off
in recessions when marginal utility is high under fear-induced elevated risk aversion that
are larger than premiums (1.38, 1.13) for claims in recessions when there is no fear in the
market. Likewise, investors require a larger discount for state contingent claims in periods
of fear than they otherwise would for claims paying in expansions when marginal utility
is low (0.03 versus 0.68). This appetite for risk results in investors paying too much for
the risk-free asset, in the form of accepting lower returns, as they rebalance their portfolios
away from risky assets. The key thing to note is that the value of realized consumption
growth is the same (Gt = g`) in states s2 and s3, hence relative to the market fundamentals
investors are overly conservative in taking risks when in irregular periods of elevated risk
aversion. So we can think of investors as having an “excess safety” motive, induced by fear,
for investments relative to what the market fundamentals would otherwise dictate.
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1.5.2 Excess Frugality Motive
Risk aversion only measures how averse an investor is at time t to variation in consumption
across different states at time t + 1. However, the EIS measures how averse an investor
is at time t to consumption variation across future time periods along a determinist path
of consumption. Therefore, when investors are fearful regarding the future states of the
economy they might prefer consumption profiles that are smoother because they are wor-
ried about not having enough to eat tomorrow and over longer horizons. In this case, fear
induces a stronger preference for smoothing consumption than what the fundamentals of
the economy dictate because the persistence of consumption growth is unchanged across
fear and regular states. The limiting case of this strong preference for smoothing would be
that investors guarantee for sure that they have the same amount of consumption in every
period, even if market fundamentals indicate a different consumption and savings decision
under regular preferences for smoothing. Hence, as mentioned previously, one way to think
of the effect of fear on investor preferences is that fear induces a preference for consumption
rationing that is unrelated to market fundamentals. This will tend to drive prices up on any
asset that allows the investor to smooth consumption and their fear induced preference for
smoothing is so strong that they are willing to accept negative returns in these fear states.
In this sense investors have an “excess frugality” motive in fear states because they will pay
more than they should in the form of lower (negative) returns given the fundamentals of
the economy.
This discussion points to the following conclusions. When rare shocks occur that induce
fear in the markets and cause investors to have temporary, elevated risk aversion, this shock
induces an excess safety motive: investors pay a lot for the risk-free asset—more than
the fundamentals say they should—and subsequently demand a large risk premium to hold
risky assets. However, if this fear shock causes a decreased EIS and a stronger preference for
consumption smoothing, the shock induces an excess frugality motive: investors are willing
48
to pay a lot—more than the fundamentals say they should—for all assets that transfer
consumption to future periods. The low risk premiums in these states offset the very high
risk premiums in the excess safety state and result in a model implied equity premium
consistent with the data. Overall, these fluctuations generate the variation in asset prices
that are crucial for the model to match many of the stylized facts of aggregate U.S. asset
prices.
1.6 Conclusion
Much of the current literature on consumption based asset pricing attempts to explain
fluctuations in aggregate asset prices through shocks to the aggregate consumption pro-
cess, which is accomplished by specifying increasingly complex dynamics for consumption.
Many studies have considered alternative preference specifications to the standard CRRA
preferences. An influential subset of these studies has indicated that time variation in risk
aversion is important for matching various stylized facts of U.S. asset prices. In addition, a
few studies have suggested that accounting for time variation in the EIS is also potentially
important for explaining asset prices. We develop a model with recursive preferences along
the lines of Epstein and Zin (1989) that relaxes both assumptions of constant risk aversion
and constant EIS parameters without departing from the simple consumption dynamics of
Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Our parsimonious model with a limited state space nests the model of Mehra and Prescott
(1985). We show that rare and temporary periods of irregular levels of the EIS and risk
aversion can quantitatively explain numerous regularities in U.S. asset prices: the equity
premium and risk-free rate puzzles, excess return and consumption growth predictability,
a countercyclical risk premium, and an upward-sloping real yield curve. The ability of
our model to simultaneously generate excess return predictability and no predictability in
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consumption growth (or lagged consumption growth predicting price-dividend ratios) along
with a countercyclical risk premium and an upward sloping real yield curve is something
that models in the extensive consumption-based asset pricing literature appear to be un-
able to do. A novel implication of our model is that, although counter-cyclical risk aversion
is key for producing excess return predictability and countercyclical risk premium, small
pro-cyclical fluctuations in the EIS generate a new smoothing risk channel for asset prices;
furthermore, this new risk channel is important for producing most of the other challenging
asset pricing regularities. This smoothing risk reflects uncertainty in investors’ ability to
plan for future consumption due to fluctuations in the EIS. Therefore, the model identifies
a new risk channel that is distinct from the usual consumption risk governing investors’
ability to smooth consumption absent such EIS fluctuations.
We also present a behavioral interpretation of sophisticated investors with rational expec-
tations to explain our results: fear in the markets induces periods of excess safety or excess
frugality where investors pay “too much” to smooth consumption or hedge against risk in
the form of accepting lower returns relative to what market fundamentals dictate. Under
this interpretation, our model provides a theoretical framework, consistent with investor
behavior not reflected in traditional fundamental risk factors, to investigate the idea that
psychological factors, such as fear, might alter investor preferences and drive fluctuations
in aggregate asset prices.
Overall, our results suggest there is value in pursuing future research that relaxes the as-
sumption that preference parameters are constant over time, particularly the EIS parameter,
which has been largely neglected in the literature. Furthermore, our results motivate future
empirical work to estimate and provide further evidence regarding time-varying risk aver-
sion and the EIS. Exploring this channel as a source of model misspecification could lead to
fruitful advances in our understanding of what is driving asset prices and risk premiums.
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Table 1
Model Calibration
This table provides the baseline and alternative calibrations for the model at an annual frequency. The moments
for consumption and dividends are calibrated to the 1930-2013 sample period. Conditional on transitioning to a
state with low consumption growth, elevated risk aversion, γelev = kγγ0, occurs with probability b, and depressed
EIS, ψdepr = ψ0 − kψ , occurs independently with probability d. Calibrations (1-3) are special cases of the baseline
calibration, shutting down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS parameter (d = 0) or both (b = 0
and d = 0) and are otherwise identical to the baseline calibration. Calibration (4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative
calibration from the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid process. Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are
alternative calibrations from the baseline that best fit two special cases of the model when time variation in risk
aversion (b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down.
Baseline Special Cases Best Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b)
b = 0
Baseline b = 0 d = 0 d = 0 ρC = 0 b = 0 d = 0
Time Varying Risk Aversion Y N Y N Y N Y
Time Varying EIS Y Y N N Y Y N
Parameter Symbol
Mean Consumption Growth µC 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89
Consumption Growth Volatility σC 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
Consumption Growth Autocorr. ρC 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0 0.47 0.47
Mean Dividend Growth µD 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97 1.97
Dividend Leverage Factor φD 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.83 4.25
Time Discount Factor δ 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.999
Risk Aversion, Regular γ0 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.25 7.50 9.5 6
Elevated Risk Aversion Factor kγ 3.24 — 3.24 — 4.93 — 4.75
Low Growth Cond. Probability b 0.05 0 0.05 0 0.05 0 0.05
EIS Parameter, Regular ψ0 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.956 0.968 0.956 0.965
Depressed EIS Offset kψ 0.002 0.002 — — 0.002 0.003 —
Low Growth Cond. Probability d 0.125 0.125 0 0 0.125 0.100 0
E[γt] 8.60 7.25 8.60 7.25 8.90 9.5 7.86
E[ψt] 0.9556 0.9556 0.956 0.956 0.9678 0.9556 0.965
Corr(γt, Gt) -0.30 — -0.30 — -0.22 — -0.30
Corr(ψt, Gt) 0.39 0.40 — — 0.32 0.35 —
51
0.5
1
1.5
2
St
at
e 
Pr
ice
 
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
 
Consumption Growth Persistence
State 2 State 4 State 5
Figure 1
This figure plots the equilibrium discount factors from st = {s2} to st+1 ∈ {s2, s4, s5}
where {s2, s4, s5} = {(gh, γ0, ψ0), (g`, γ0, ψ0), (g`, γ0, ψdepr), (g`, γelev, ψdepr)} for values for
the persistence of consumption volatility. The vertical line indicates the value of ρC =
0.47 in the baseline calibration of the model. The figure illustrates that as persis-
tence in consumption growth increases, discount factors in s2 and s4 diverge. This di-
vergence in discount factors implies that investors are better off in utility terms when
persistence in consumption growth is high when they have a strong preference for
smoothing ψdepr relative to states with a weaker preference for smoothing ψt = ψ0.
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(a)
Discount Factors and Consumption Growth Volatility
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(b) Discount Factors and EIS Fluctuations
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(c) Discount Factors and Risk Aversion Fluctuations
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Figure 2
This figure plots the equilibrium discount factors from st = {s1} to st+1 ∈ {s1, s4, s5}
where {s1, s4, s5} = {(gh, γ0, ψ0), (g`, γ0, ψdepr), (g`, γelev, ψdepr)}. All of the discount factors
reported in the figures are normalized by s1, hence all discount factors are relative to the
horizontal line at the value of 1. The vertical line in each panel indicates the value of that
parameter in the baseline calibration of the model. Panel (a) solves the model and generates
equilibrium discount factors for values of consumption volatility holding everything else fixed
according to the baseline calibration. Panels (b) and (c) do the same thing over values for the
EIS offset parameter kψ and the risk aversion scaling parameter kγ . The vertical line in each
graph indicates the parameter’s value in the baseline calibration of the model. Comparing
states s4 and s5 across the graphs, these figures illustrate clearly that equilibrium discount
factors and hence, marginal utility and asset prices are much more sensitive to fluctuations
in the EIS parameter than shocks to consumption growth or fluctuations in risk aversion.
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Table 2
Asset Price Moments
This table provides the model implied asset pricing moments at an annual frequency for the baseline
calibration in Table 1. The sample period is 1930-2013 and all data moments are estimated using 10
Newey West lags for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. All returns,
prices and dividends are exact and not transformed on a log basis.
Moment Data SE 95% CI Model
E(Rm) 7.95 1.83 [4.35, 11.55] 7.68
σ(Rm) 19.50 1.78 [16.01, 22.98] 22.49
AC1(Rm) -0.02 0.08 [-0.17, 0.13] -0.08
E(Rf ) 0.41 0.74 [-1.04, 1.87 ] 1.47
σ(Rf ) 3.69 0.76 [2.20, 5.18] 3.73
AC1(Rf ) 0.61 0.07 [0.48, 0.74] 0.67
E(Rm −Rf ) 7.54 1.93 [3.75, 11.32] 6.21
σ(Rm −Rf ) 19.52 2.29 [15.02, 24.01] 21.99
AC1(Rm −Rf ) 0.01 0.09 [-0.15, 0.18] -0.12
Sharpe Ratio 0.39 0.12 [0.15, 0.62] 0.28
E(P/D) 32.17 4.94 [22.48, 41.86] 25.06
σ(P/D) 16.12 3.67 [8.93, 23.32] 4.25
AC1(P/D) 0.91 0.06 [0.80, 1.00] 0.65
E(D/P ) 3.82 0.46 [2.92, 4.72] 4.13
σ(D/P ) 1.68 0.23 [1.24, 2.12] 0.91
AC1(D/P ) 0.76 0.10 [0.57, 0.95] 0.63
σD 12.53 3.07 [6.52, 18.55] 9.68
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Table 3
Asset Price Moments - Alternative Calibrations
This table provides the model implied asset pricing moments at an annual frequency for the baseline and alternative
calibrations in Table 1. The sample period is 1930-2013 and all data moments are estimated using 10 Newey West
lags for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Calibrations (1-3) are special cases of the
baseline calibration, shutting down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS parameter (d = 0) or both (b = 0
and d = 0) and are otherwise identical to the baseline calibration. Calibration (4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative
calibration from the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid process. Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are
alternative calibrations from the baseline that best fit two special cases of the model when time variation in risk
aversion (b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down.
Model
Baseline Special Cases Best Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b)
b = 0
Baseline b = 0 d = 0 d = 0 ρC = 0 b = 0 d = 0
Time Varying Risk Aversion Y N Y N Y N Y
Time Varying EIS Y Y N N Y Y N
Moment Data SE 95% CI
E(Rm) 7.95 1.83 [4.35, 11.55] 7.68 4.51 8.54 5.53 6.93 6.47 8.21
σ(Rm) 19.50 1.78 [16.01, 22.98] 22.49 13.70 21.33 14.35 22.70 19.75 22.42
AC1(Rm) -0.02 0.08 [-0.17, 0.13] -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.08 -0.20 0.00 -0.05
E(Rf ) 0.41 0.74 [-1.04, 1.87 ] 1.47 1.78 2.16 2.25 1.13 0.71 1.57
σ(Rf ) 3.69 0.76 [2.20, 5.18] 3.73 3.45 1.07 1.01 6.17 5.40 1.08
AC1(Rf ) 0.61 0.07 [0.48, 0.74] 0.67 0.66 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.68 0.50
E(Rm −Rf ) 7.54 1.93 [3.75, 11.32] 6.21 2.73 6.38 3.28 5.80 5.77 6.64
σ(Rm −Rf ) 19.52 2.29 [15.02, 24.01] 21.99 12.93 21.41 14.30 21.86 18.54 22.56
AC1(Rm −Rf ) 0.01 0.09 [-0.15, 0.18] -0.12 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.17 -0.05 -0.08
Sharpe Ratio 0.39 0.12 [0.15, 0.62] 0.28 0.21 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.29
E(P/D) 32.17 4.94 [22.48, 41.86] 25.06 48.76 20.12 33.44 30.81 29.88 22.45
σ(P/D) 16.12 3.67 [8.93, 23.32] 4.25 5.08 2.62 2.01 5.13 5.38 3.15
AC1(P/D) 0.91 0.06 [0.80, 1.00] 0.65 0.64 -0.07 0.47 0.45 0.67 0.63
E(D/P ) 3.82 0.46 [2.92, 4.72] 4.13 2.07 5.08 3.00 3.34 3.44 4.58
σ(D/P ) 1.68 0.23 [1.24, 2.12] 0.91 0.20 0.90 0.18 0.67 0.51 0.93
AC1(D/P ) 0.76 0.10 [0.57, 0.95] 0.63 0.62 0.67 0.47 0.43 0.64 0.68
σD 12.53 3.07 [6.52, 18.55] 9.68 9.68 9.68 9.68 9.68 12.53 9.14
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Table 4
Predictability Results
This table reports predictability of excess returns, consumption and dividend growth over one, three
and five year horizons at an annual frequency for the baseline calibration in Table 1. The data sample
is 1930-2013 and all coefficients and R-squared eestimates within each panel are jointly estimated
using the GMM method of Hansen and Singleton (1982) and 5 Newey West lags for heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The coefficient estimates are in units of basis points
(e.g. β = 0.0001 is 0.01% or 1 basis point).
Data Model
βˆ 95% CI Rˆ2 95% CI β R2
ΠJj=1(1 +Rm,t+j −Rf,t+j) = α+ βPDt + t+j
1Y -0.002 [-0.004, -0.000] 0.033 [-0.033, 0.098] -0.016 0.093
(0.001) (0.033)
3Y -0.007 [-0.012, -0.003] 0.128 [-0.029, 0.284] -0.034 0.172
(0.002) (0.080)
5Y -0.015 [-0.022, -0.008] 0.225 [0.032, 0.418] -0.045 0.176
(0.004) (0.099)
ΠJj=1∆Ct+j = α+ βPDt + t+j
1Y 0.0001 [-0.0002, 0.0005] 0.009 [ -0.037, 0.056] 0.0002 0.001
(0.0002) (0.024)
3Y -0.0002 [-0.0009, 0.0006] 0.004 [-0.034, 0.043] 0.0003 0.001
(0.0004) (0.020)
5Y -0.0006 [-0.0016, 0.0003] 0.043 [ -0.081, 0.167] 0.0003 0.000
(0.0005) (0.063)
ΠJj=1∆Dt+j = α+ βPDt + t+j
1Y 0.0013 [-0.0009, 0.0036] 0.029 [ -0.045, 0.102] 0.0007 0.001
(0.0011) (0.037)
3Y 0.0015 [-0.0020, 0.0051] 0.012 [ -0.038, 0.062] 0.0012 0.001
(0.0018) (0.025)
5Y 0.0014 [-0.0022, 0.0051] 0.011 [ -0.049, 0.072] 0.0014 0.000
(0.0018) (0.031)
PDt+1 = α+ βΠ
J
j=1∆Ct+1−j + t+j
1Y -3.78 [-186.83, 179.28] 0.000 [-0.002, 0.002] -18.37 0.009
(93.40) ( 0.001)
3Y -35.69 [-109.63, 38.25] 0.012 [-0.037, 0.060] -12.02 0.021
(37.72) (0.025)
5Y -55.10 [-128.94, 18.75] 0.035 [ -0.060, 0.129] -8.57 0.023
(37.68) (0.048)
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Table 5
Predictability Results - Alternative Calibrations
This table reports predictability of excess returns, consumption and dividend growth over one, three and five year
horizons at an annual frequency for the calibrations in Table 1. The data sample is 1930-2013 and all coefficients
and R-squared eestimates within each panel are jointly estimated using the GMM method of Hansen and Singleton
(1982) and 5 Newey West lags for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. Calibrations
(1-3) are special cases of the baseline calibration, shutting down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS
parameter (d = 0) or both (b = 0 and d = 0) and are otherwise identical to the baseline calibration. Calibration
(4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative calibration from the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid process.
Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are alternative calibrations from the baseline that best fit two special cases of the model
when time variation in risk aversion (b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down. Coefficient estimates are
included for all calibrations in Table 37 in the Appendix.
Baseline Special Cases Best Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b)
b = 0
Data Baseline b = 0 d = 0 d = 0 ρC = 0 b = 0 d = 0
Time Varying Risk Aversion Y N Y N Y N Y
Time Varying EIS Y Y N N Y Y N
ΠJj=1(1 +Rm,t+j −Rf,t+j) = α+ βPDt + t+j
Rˆ2 95% CI R2
1Y 0.033 [-0.033, 0.098] 0.093 0.011 0.058 0.000 0.097 0.011 0.079
(0.033)
3Y 0.128 [-0.029, 0.284] 0.172 0.015 0.109 0.000 0.129 0.016 0.152
(0.080)
5Y 0.225 [0.032, 0.418] 0.176 0.013 0.114 0.000 0.111 0.014 0.165
(0.099)
ΠJj=1∆Ct+j = α+ βPDt + t+j
Rˆ2 95% CI R2
1Y 0.009 [ -0.037, 0.056] 0.001 0.000 0.125 0.221 0.000 0.001 0.118
(0.024)
3Y 0.004 [-0.034, 0.043] 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.119 0.000 0.000 0.064
(0.020)
5Y 0.043 [ -0.081, 0.167] 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.038
(0.063)
ΠJj=1∆Dt+j = α+ βPDt + t+j
Rˆ2 95% CI R2
1Y 0.029 [ -0.045, 0.102] 0.001 0.000 0.125 0.221 0.000 0.001 0.118
(0.037)
3Y 0.012 [ -0.038, 0.062] 0.001 0.000 0.067 0.118 0.000 0.000 0.063
(0.025)
5Y 0.011 [ -0.049, 0.072] 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.037
(0.031)
PDt+1 = α+ βΠJj=1∆Ct+1−j + t+j
Rˆ2 95% CI R2
1Y 0.000 [-0.002, 0.002] 0.009 0.027 0.186 0.221 0.006 0.033 0.179
( 0.001)
3Y 0.012 [-0.037, 0.060] 0.021 0.049 0.133 0.119 0.006 0.052 0.130
(0.025)
5Y 0.035 [ -0.060, 0.129] 0.023 0.048 0.095 0.071 0.005 0.050 0.093
(0.048)
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Table 6
Risk Premium Variation
This table provides the model implied risk premium and Sharpe Ratio correlations with consumption growth
at an annual frequency for the baseline and alternative calibrations in Table 1. Calibrations (1-3) are special
cases of the baseline calibration, shutting down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS parameter
(d = 0) or both (b = 0 and d = 0) and are otherwise identical to the baseline calibration. Calibration
(4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative calibration from the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid
process. Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are alternative calibrations from the baseline that best fit two special
cases of the model when time variation in risk aversion (b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down.
Baseline Special Cases Best Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b)
b = 0
Moment Baseline b = 0 d = 0 d = 0 ρC = 0 b = 0 d = 0
Time Varying Risk Aversion Y N Y N Y N Y
Time Varying EIS Y Y N N Y Y N
σ(Et(Rm,t+1 −Rf,t+1)) 8.76 1.39 6.05 0.20 12.00 1.92 7.15
σ(σt(Rm,t+1 −Rf,t+1)) 8.02 0.87 5.04 0.25 7.29 1.81 6.39
Corr(Gt, Et(Rm,t+1 −Rf,t+1)) -0.20 0.16 -0.30 1.00 -0.18 -0.05 -0.33
Corr(Gt, σt(Rm,t+1 −Rf,t+1)) -0.23 -0.04 -0.39 -1.00 -0.16 -0.28 -0.37
Corr(Gt, SharpeRatiot) -0.42 -0.46 0.79 1.00 -0.31 -0.39 0.80
Table 7
Real Term Structure
This table provides the model implied real term structure at an annual frequency for the baseline and
alternative calibrations in Table 1. Calibrations (1-3) are special cases of the baseline calibration, shutting
down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS parameter (d = 0) or both (b = 0 and d = 0) and are
otherwise identical to the baseline calibration. Calibration (4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative calibration from
the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid process. Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are alternative
calibrations from the baseline that best fit two special cases of the model when time variation in risk aversion
(b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down.
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y 8y 9y 10y
Yield γt ψt
Baseline Y Y 1.47 1.58 1.63 1.66 1.67 1.67 1.66 1.65 1.64 1.62
(1) b = 0 N Y 1.78 1.86 1.92 1.96 1.99 2.01 2.02 2.04 2.05 2.06
(2) d = 0 Y N 2.16 2.01 1.91 1.83 1.77 1.72 1.68 1.64 1.61 1.57
(3) b = 0, d = 0 N N 2.25 2.14 2.08 2.03 2.00 1.98 1.96 1.95 1.94 1.93
Best Fit
(4) ρC = 0 Y Y 1.31 1.61 1.75 1.83 1.87 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.89 1.88
(1b) b = 0 N Y 0.71 1.01 1.21 1.34 1.43 1.50 1.56 1.60 1.63 1.66
(2b) d = 0 Y N 1.57 1.43 1.33 1.25 1.18 1.12 1.07 1.03 0.99 0.95
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CHAPTER 2 : Estimating the “I” in Team: The Value of Star College Football and
Basketball Players.
2.1 Introduction
Collegiate athletics in the United States have been regulated by The National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) since 1901.33 One of the many, and most controversial, as-
pects of collegiate athletics regulated by the NCAA involves the rules on paying college
athletes. Currently the NCAA restricts an athlete’s compensation to in-kind transfers of
institutional financial aid. The maximum amount of this “grant-in-aid” is based off the
cost of attendance as calculated by each institution’s financial aid office and is limited to
tuition, fees, room and board, and required course-related books.34 In addition to the rules
governing institutional financial aid, the NCAA explicitly forbids outside financial aid that
has any relationship to athletic ability in an effort to maintain their claims of amateurism
for student-athletes.35 As Tollison (2012) and Kahn (2007) point out, restricting compe-
tition by restricting payments to players is one of the most compelling arguments for the
claim that the NCAA effectively functions as a cartel.
In a pair of recent studies, Huma and Staurowsky (2011, 2012) document a shortfall that
exists between what a full athletic scholarship covers and the full cost of attending college
for collegiate football players. They also estimate the average full athletic scholarship at a
Division 1 FBS institutions to be worth approximately $23, 204 per year. Given the fact
that Division 1 FBS football programs, on average, generate millions of dollars in revenues
each year while compensating players relatively little, it is not surprising that questions of
fairness have recently emerged in a series of lawsuits centered around the NCAA’s cartel
33See Tollison (2012) for an overview of the formation for the NCAA and how its purpose has shifted over
time.
34See NCAA 2013–2014 Division I Manual, bylaw 15.02.
35See NCAA 2013–2014 Division I Manual, bylaws 12.1.2 and 15.01.3.
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practices.
Former UCLA basketball player Ed O’Bannon brought a case against the NCAA alleging
that the organization used the likeness and image of student-athletes for its own profits
while prohibiting them from being paid for their efforts. On April 14, 2014, the judge pre-
siding over the case ruled in favor of O’Bannon, allowing athletes to receive money from
schools that use their names, images, and likenesses. Although the NCAA can still set a
salary-cap (no lower than $5,000) and bar athletes from marketing themselves, this decision
has been viewed as an important step toward breaking down the NCAA’s cartel power.36
On March 26, 2014 the United States National Labor Relations Board ruled in favor of the
College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), which brought a suit against Northwestern
University to establish that their football players qualify as employees of the university
under federal law and should, therefore, be allowed to unionize.37
Most recently, an ongoing class action lawsuit filed in March 2014 against the NCAA and
and the “Big 5” athletic conferences alleges these institutions function as a cartel.38 The
lawsuit claims that the NCAA’s practice of price-fixing players’ compensation, by allowing
only full grant-in-aid, and boycotting institutions who do not comply with this rule, violates
U.S. anti-trust laws under the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs in this case claim that
The Plaintiffs—top-tier college football and men’s basketball players, along with
the class members whom the players seek to represent—are exploited by Defen-
dants and their member institutions under false claims of amateurism. The De-
fendants and their member institutions have lost their way far down the road of
commercialism, signing multi-billion dollar contracts wholly disconnected from
36The NCAA is currently appealing this decisons as of the time of this writing. For the full decision see
Edward C. O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 2014, 4:09-cv-03329-CW.
37 Northwesern University v. College Athletes Players Association, 2014 13-RC-121359.
38The “Big 5” conferences named in the suit are: the Atlantic Coast Conferece, the Big 12 Conferece, the
Big Ten Conference, the PAC-12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference.
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the interests of ‘student athletes,’ who are barred from receiving the benefits of
competitive markets for their services even though their services generate these
massive revenues.39
The central claim here is that college athletes are directly responsible for generating mil-
lions of dollars in revenues for the institutions they play for. Furthermore, these economic
rents–the difference between the revenues generated by the player and the costs associated
with fielding the player–produced by players are being captured entirely by NCAA member
institutions. The lawsuit’s argument implies that college athletes would be able to capture
a portion of these rents in the form of a market wage if they were allowed to sell their labor
in a competitive labor market. Therefore, players would be compensated far beyond the
value of their current compensation, which is artificially limited by the NCAA to athletic
scholarships of in-kind transfers.
However, there is another side to this “pay for play” debate. In the 2013 documentary film
Schooled: The Price of College Sports,40 Harvey Perlman, the Chancellor of the University
of Nebraska - Lincoln, is filmed saying
I understand the criticism that they are generating all the revenue and they
aren’t getting any of the money and I think that is utterly false. It’s because of
the investments that we made, it’s because of the attraction and passion that
alumni have for their institution, I dont think it’s because football players were
playing football.
Though Mr. Perlman is not speaking on behalf of NCAA member institutions as a whole,
his remarks indicate that the athletes themselves, while necessary, are not the driving force
behind the large revenues being generated by these Division 1 athletics programs. The
question on wether the NCAA’s pay restrictions are unfair and that college athletes should
39 Martin Jenkins et al. v. National Collegiate Athletic Association et al., 2014 3:33-av-00001.
40Directed by Ross Finkel and Trevor Martin, produced by Makuhari Media.
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be paid is a normative one. However, this paper attempts to inform this debate through a
careful empirical analysis of how much college athletes are “worth” to the institutions they
play for.
In a standard labor market, a natural measure of an employee’s worth is how much ad-
ditional revenue the employee generates for their firm. In a perfectly competitive labor
market, the employee’s wage would equal their marginal revenue product (MRP). Although
a formal labor market for college players does not exist, estimating the MRP of the best
performing “star” college players gives us an upper bound on how much the best college
athletes could be paid if they were able to sell their services in a perfectly competitive labor
market.41 Also, if a labor market for college players did exist, it is likely that players would
be paid less than their marginal revenue product. The size of the discrepancy would be
determined by the relative bargaining power of players and universities and if players are
close substitutes for one another. Nevertheless, the MRP of star players provides one useful
measure of how much these stand-out players are worth to their institutions and provides
a useful starting point in understanding the magnitude of the rents being captured by the
NCAA’s member institutions under the current pay restrictions.
In this paper I present fixed effects estimates of the MRP of star football and basketball
players at Division 1 programs using a novel panel dataset spanning 2003-2012.42 I find
that football players named to the All American team are worth just over $1.2 million a
year while Heisman Finalists and Heisman Nominees are worth just over $2.1 million and
41That is, of course, assuming that observed revenues would be similar to the revenues of university athletic
programs under a more competitive market structure.
42Kahn (2007) reports that, on average, the two big revenue sports of men’s basketball and football run
a surplus, however, college sports as a whole report operating losses. This suggests that these two sports
subsidize other athletic programs and non-athletic university expenses, which is why the literature has
primarily focused on men’s college football and basketball. Using the most current revenues data from the
U.S. Department of Education for 2012, Men’s Division 1 FBS football programs accounted for, on average,
54% of total athletic program revenues for the 123 programs contained in the data. Likiwise, men’s Division
1 basketball programs accounted for, on average, just over 18% of total athletic program revenues for the
344 programs contained in the data.
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$1.7 million a year respectively. I also find that having a top Quarterback, Running Back
or Wide Receiver is worth around $600, 000 a year and that star Quarterbacks and Wide
Receivers alone can be worth up to $4.6 and $2.9 million respectively. For basketball, I
find that players who won the Wooden Award, Naismith Award, or were named the most
outstanding player in the NCAA Tournament are worth up to $1.1 million a year while
players named to the All American First Team are worth up to $654, 000. Also, players
that were drafted, a top 5 or top 10 NBA draft pick, or were in the top 10 or 20 points
scorers in a season are worth up to around $200, 000− $400, 000 a year.
While the evidence suggests that star players are worth a lot to their teams, I find evidence
using data from the Yahoo! Sports Rivals.com database suggesting it is difficult for re-
cruiters to identify players ex-ante that will generate revenues above the average player on
the team. I also collect data on a team’s news media mentions and I find that the marginal
revenue produced by these star athletes above the average player on the team tends to
decline as the team is mentioned more frequently in the media. That is, star players seem
to be worth less relative to the average player for teams that are mentioned more often in
the media. To the extent that a team’s media coverage proxies for things like a university’s
long term investment in the sports program or the excitement generated by the team, this
finding gives some tentative support to Mr. Perlman’s claim. However, overall, the results
still suggest that star college football and basketball players generate a significant amount
of revenue for their institutions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides an overview of
the current literature estimating the MRP of college football and basketball players and
discusses this paper’s contributions to that literature. Section 2.3 explains the details of
the revenues data, the sports statistics data, the Yahoo! Sports Rivals.com data, the data
collected to measure a team’s media exposure, and various other data used in the analysis.
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This section also defines the various ways that star football and basketball players are mea-
sured. Section 2.4 describes the empirical strategy used to estimate a star player’s marginal
revenue product while Section 2.5 reports and discusses the MRP estimates. Section 2.6
presents the results from a first-difference estimation and an alternative model for revenues
for robustness. Section 2.7 estimates an ex-ante star player’s marginal revenue product and
discusses the difference between ex-post stars that were surprise stars in college. Section
2.8 reports instrumental variables and differences-in-differences estimates using the number
of injured star players for identification. Section 2.9 reports the MRP estimates for star
basketball players using the Scully Method. Section 2.10 describes a model of revenues that
is used to analyze how a college football or basketball team’s media exposure is related to
the MRP of star players and Section 2.11 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
There are two main approaches to estimating an athlete’s MRP in the current literature:
the “Scully Method” and what I will call the “Direct Method”. Using data on Major League
Baseball players, Scully (1974) was the first to estimate an athlete’s MRP. His method em-
ploys a two-step procedure that involves first, estimating individual player contributions to
winning, then estimating the effect that winning has on team revenues. For the first step,
he estimates a team’s production function by regressing win-percentage on team inputs like
pitching and batting performance. The coefficients of this estimation can be interpreted
as marginal products. Step two is a regression of revenues on win-percentages and mar-
ket characteristics to estimate the marginal revenue generated by winning. The MRP of
baseball players is then computed by multiplying the marginal product coefficient with the
marginal revenue coefficient obtained from this two-step process.
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Zimbalist (1992) points out that the correct way to measure the marginal productivity of in-
dividual players should include an estimate of the marginal contribution of the replacement
player the team would have chosen instead of that player. Identifying the replacement play-
ers the team would have chosen is a nearly impossible task for the econometrician. This is
problematic for the Scully Method, as it relies on estimating a player’s marginal productivity
directly. Krautmann (1999, 2013) raises concerns that the Scully Method gives individual
players on the roster full credit for team wins while ignoring the contributions of factors like
coach quality and cross-player complementarities. An additional concern he raises is that
the researcher’s somewhat arbitrary choice of how to allocate team statistics to individual
players, in calculating the player’s marginal contribution to the team, represents a degree of
freedom that can significantly impact the estimate of a player’s marginal productivity. In
light of this, he uses wages and labor contracts of professional free agent baseball players to
estimate their marginal revenue product. This strategy is feasible for labor markets where
a market wage exist, however, since no market wage currently exists for collegiate athletes,
this approach is not viable for estimating the MRP of college players.
2.2.1 MRP Estimates of Star Football Players
Rather than compute the MRP from estimating the marginal productivity and marginal
revenues separately, an alternative approach is to estimate an athlete’s MRP directly from
revenues data (I will refer to this as the “Direct Method”). The first paper attempting to
do this for college football players was Brown (1993). He estimates the MRP of players that
were chosen in the 1989–1991 National Football League (NFL) draft directly from revenues
data gathered from 47 of the 101 Division 1 FBS football programs for the 1988 season.43
As Brown points out, the skill level of the players acquired by a college team is likely to be
endogenous to the team’s recruiting effort, so the MRP is estimated using an instrumental
variables framework. The author constructs three instruments for the number of players
43There are currently 120 Division 1 FBS football programs in the NCAA but only 101 at the time this
paper was written.
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on the team drafted into the NFL. The first instrument Pool is constructed by taking the
number of major college players produced in each team’s state relative to the number of
Division 1 FBS football teams the state supports. The second instrument Opponent Pool
is just Pool averaged over a team’s opponents. For the third instrument, Opponent Market,
each team’s market potential is divided by their market area then this is averaged over the
team’s conference opponents. The market area of a team is constructed by measuring the
population of each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) within a 100 mile radius of each
team weighted by each MSA’s distance from the university. A team’s market potential is
measured by adding a quality index computed from cumulative point rankings to the num-
ber of other teams in the market area.
Using these three instruments, the author finds that recruiting an additional player with
NFL capabilities is worth $538, 760−$646, 150 in annual revenues for his institution. Brown
and Jewell (2004) update the estimates in Brown (1993) with more recent and extensive
football program revenues data collected by the Kansas City Star newspaper for 87 Divi-
sion 1 FBS football teams for the 1995 season. The instrumental variable methodology is
the same as in Brown (1993), however, state population is used as the instrument for the
number of players on a team drafted into the NFL. The instrumental variable estimation
implies an additional player with NFL capabilities is worth $406, 914 in annual revenues for
his college team.
Brown (2011), expanding the work of Brown (1993) and Brown and Jewell (2004), attempts
to disentangle the effects of a football team’s overall quality and individual players on rev-
enues by estimating a player’s MRP from a system of three equations in an instrumental
variables framework. He uses revenue data collected by the Indianapolis Star newspaper
for 86 Division 1 FBS football teams for the 2004 season. The author constructs three in-
struments for his analysis. The first instrument Recruiting Pool is constructed by dividing
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the university’s state population by the number of teams in its market area, weighted by
the quality of those teams.44 The second instrument is Academic Progress Report, which
measures the degree to which the university provides academic resources to assist student
athletes. The last instrument, Coach Salary is just the football coach’s base salary. The
first equation instruments the number of NFL draftees on the team with Recruiting Pool
and Academic Progress Report. The second equation instruments a measure of team per-
formance by Coach Salary. The predicted values for these two equations are then used in
the second stage regression of team revenues on the number of NFL draftees. Using this
methodology, the author finds that the MRP of a college football player who is drafted
by the NFL ranges from $737, 528 − $1, 195, 306 in 2004, depending on what categories of
revenues are included in the dependent variable.
In a more recent paper, Hunsberger and Gitter (2014) use the Scully Method to estimate the
MRP of Quarterbacks in the Bowl Championship Series conferences using football program
revenues data from 2004–2012 collected by the United States Department of Education.
The authors use a proprietary statistic computed by ESPN called the “Total Quarterback
Rating” (QBR) that attempts to account for the contribution of other players to a Quarter-
back’s passing performance through things like sack prevention and yards after the catch.
Star Quarterbacks are defined to be those with QBRs one standard deviation above the
mean. The authors first estimate a Quarterback’s marginal productivity by estimating the
marginal effect of QBR on win probability, then multiplying the average number of games
in a full season by the change in win probability that results from a change in the QBR.
This marginal productivity is then multiplied by the marginal revenue of an additional
win estimated from a regression of revenues on wins and other controls. Using the Scully
Method in this way, the author find that star Quarterbacks are worth about $2.3 million in
terms of marginal revenue product for their teams.
44Market area is definied to be the population of each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) within a 100
mile radius of each university weighted by the distance each university is from each MSA.
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2.2.2 MRP Estimates of Star Basketball Players
Very few papers have attempted to estimate the MRP of college basketball players. Brown
(1994) was the first to attempt this, estimating the MRP of basketball players directly
from revenues data. In his paper, the MRP of basketball players is estimated for players
chosen in the 1989–1991 National Basketball Association (NBA) drafts using revenues data
for the 1988 season that he gathered from 46 Division 1 men’s basketball teams. Since
the skill level of the players acquired by a college team is likely to be endogenous to the
team’s recruiting effort, he estimates the MRP using an instrumental variables framework
and constructs four instruments for the number of players on the team drafted into the NBA.
For the first instrument, Opponent Market, each team’s market potential is divided by their
market area, which is then averaged over the team’s opponents within their own confer-
ence. A team’s market area is the population of each Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
within a 100 mile radius of each team weighted by each MSA’s distance from the university.
Market potential counts the number of other basketball teams in the team’s market area
and adds to this a quality index, which is computed from cumulative point rankings. The
second instrument Pool is the number of college basketball players produced in each team’s
state relative to the number of Division 1 basketball teams in the state. The third instru-
ment, Opponent Pool, is the average of Pool for the team’s conference opponents. The last
instrument, Rank 85-88, is the team’s average weekly point ranking computed by aggregat-
ing their top-20 weekly rankings for the 1985–1987 seasons then dividing by the number of
weeks. Using these four instruments, the author finds that recruiting an additional player
with NBA capabilities is worth $871, 310 − $1, 283, 000 in annual revenues for his college
team. Brown and Jewell (2004) update the estimates in Brown (1994) with more recent and
extensive basketball program revenues data collected by the Kansas City Star newspaper
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for 95 Division 1 men’s basketball teams for the 1995 season. The instrumental variable
methodology is the same as in Brown (1994), however, only state population is used as the
instrument for the number of players on a team drafted into the NBA. The instrumental
variable estimation implies an additional player with NBA capabilities is worth $1, 194, 469
in annual revenues for his college team.
Lane, Nagel, and Netz (2014) provides the most recent paper (and to the best of my knowl-
edge, the only other paper) attempting to estimate a college basketball player’s MRP. They
use revenues data from 2001–2004 to estimate a player’s MRP using the Scully Method and
revenues data from 2002–2004 using the Direct Method for 169 Division 1 men’s basketball
teams. Using the Scully Method the authors first multiply the coefficients from a regression
predicting a team’s win-loss record with a player’s contribution to team performance.45 The
marginal revenue of a win is then estimated and the marginal product is multiplied by the
marginal revenue to compute a basketball player’s MRP. They find that college basketball
players are worth $91, 030 on average. They also estimate the MRP of players drafted into
the NBA directly from revenues using an instrumental variable approach. The authors use
fifteen instruments for the number of players on the team drafted into the NBA including:
the win-loss ratio; the numbers of points, goals, three-point goals, blocks, rebounds, steals,
and assists per game; the percentages of goals and free throws made; whether the team was
a contender or loser in the previous season; whether the head coach was new, a coach of
the year, or a “winningest” coach; and a measure of the market opportunities for the school
similar to that used in Brown (1993). They include team, year, and conference fixed effects
along with an interaction term for “large” schools, defined to be one if a team has revenues
larger than $10 million. Their results indicate that MRP for players at large schools that
are eventually drafted in the NBA is $1, 188, 945 while the MRP for players at small schools
is not statistically different from zero.
45A player’s contribution to team performance is obtained by multiplying each player’s individual perfor-
mance statistics by his weight on the team, which is just his share of the overall team’s statistic. Please see
the paper for details regarding the statistics used.
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2.2.3 Contributions to Current Literature
This paper contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, I construct a dataset
containing football and basketball program revenues from the U.S. Department of Edu-
cation, geographic location, and detailed performance statistics for both the teams and
individual players. The dataset covers 104 Division 1 FBS college football programs and
282 Division 1 men’s basketball teams spanning 2003–2012. This dataset covers many more
years and athletic programs than the majority of the literature that only uses data from
individual seasons. The dataset also allows for richer control variables in the empirical
analyses than what has been used to date. The long panel structure and the number of
athletic programs included in the dataset allows me to take advantage of both variations in
revenues across time within universities and across universities to identify the effect of star
college players on university revenues in estimating the MRP directly from revenues data.
This panel data analysis is an important contribution to the cross-sectional analysis that
comprises nearly the entirety of this literature.
Another advantage of the panel structure and estimating the MRP directly from revenues
data is that I can avoid the potential problems with the Scully Method mentioned previ-
ously. In addition to these concerns, I would add that the MRP calculated using the Scully
Method is a non-linear combination of random variables, which also has a distribution in-
duced by the non-linear transformation of multiplying coefficients. As such, the standard
errors of the MRP should be computed by either the Delta Method or Bootstrapping to
determine if the calculated MRP is statistically significant. Researchers that employ the
Scully Method never report the standard errors of the MRP and it is not sufficient to as-
sume that the MRP will be statistically significant as long as the marginal revenue and
marginal productivity estimates are statistically significant. Also, the Scully Method im-
plicitly assumes that the only channel through which a star athlete can influence revenues
is through their contribution to producing wins. In Section 2.9 I show that Scully estimates
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for basketball are much lower than those found using the Direct Method. This suggests that
a sizable portion of player MRP comes through channels other than a star player’s ability
to generate wins. The direct estimation of MRP used in this paper allows for star football
and basketball players to impact revenues through multiple channels and is agnostic to the
mechanism through which stars are influencing revenues.
A degree of freedom that is often overlooked in this literature is how the researcher defines
a “star player”. The standard measure of star player in this literature is a player’s NFL or
NBA draft status. There are several reasons that the draft might not be the best metric to
measure a player’s contribution to the performance of his college team, which is discussed
in more depth in Section 2.3. That said, another contribution of this paper is that my data
allows me to report estimates for multiple measures of star player based on a player’s actual
performance in college that might more accurately reflect his ability to influence revenues
in a particular year. Furthermore, while the literature has largely focused on aggregate
measures (drafted players) or just Quarterbacks, this data allows me to look at more posi-
tions in football to investigate how much star players in various positions are worth to the
teams they play on. In addition to the analysis of ex-post measures of star player based on
performance, which is common in the literature, this paper analyzes “ex-ante” measures of
stars players. This novel analysis suggests that it is difficult for college recruiters to identify
players ex-ante that will generate significant revenues above those generated by the average
player on their teams. This result has potential implications for how universities might
prefer to compensate star athletes if they decide to compensate them beyond the current
arrangement.
As previous authors have pointed out, the most likely source of endogeneity in this analysis
is that the number of star players on a team might be driven by unobservable recruiting
effort. Most of the literature has relied on an instrumental variable approach to solve this
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problem of endogeneity. However, it is unclear that the exclusion restriction holds for most
of the instruments used, which is necessary for the instrumental variables estimates to be
consistent. For instance, in Brown (1993, 1994) football and basketball team revenues are
likely to be correlated with Opponent Pool in ways unrelated to the number of star players
on the team as a team’s opponents are not selected at random and consists largely of other
teams in their conference. This is because a team’s opponents are not selected at random
and consist largely of other teams in their own conference. It is well known that certain
conferences generate larger revenues through, for example, television contracts; these rev-
enues will not be directly related to the number of stars on that team. In Brown and Jewell
(2004), football team revenues are also likely correlated with Academic Progress Report and
Coach Salary. That is, if a school has higher football revenues, they potentially have more
resources to spend on improving the academic success of their football players regardless
of the number of stars on the team. Likewise, the coach’s salary is almost certainly corre-
lated with team revenues in ways unrelated to the number of star players on the team since
schools in wealthier conferences or with larger endowments can afford to pay higher salaries
to attract good coaches independent of the number of star players they have on a team in
any given year.
In the basketball studies employing instrumental variables, team revenues are also likely
correlated with Rank 85-88. This is because players other than star players will be con-
tributing to a team’s point ranking, which will be correlated with revenues as more points
means more wins and we know that wins are correlated with revenues. A similar argument
holds for the fifteen instruments used in Lane et al. (2014) because these instruments mea-
sure a team’s performance in ways that are indistinguishable from individual star player
performances. That is, there are players other than stars on the team that are contributing
to these performance measures that are correlated with winning, hence revenues, and in
ways not solely through the star player’s affect on revenues.46
46This problem with the exclusion restriction assumption persists even after accounting for the “included”
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Perhaps more worrisome than the exclusion restriction is that the instruments used in this
literature are fairly weak. As Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) point out, an F-statistic of
above ten in the first stage regression likely means that the instruments are strong enough
to assuage concerns regarding weak instruments. Although F-statistics are not reported,
a back of the envelope calculation results in F-statistics for the above instruments that
range from 7.32 to 7.84; the t-statistics for the instruments in the first stage regression in
Brown (1994) are -0.643, -0.062, 1.50 and 3.35 while the F-statistic is 1.00 for the instru-
ment used in Brown and Jewell (2006). Hahn and Hausman (2005) show that the problem
with weak instruments is that they cause severe finite sample bias in the 2SLS estimates.
This observation seems particularly relevant here given the sample sizes in the previous
football studies employing 2SLS are only 39 and 86 with the previous basketball studies
having sample sizes of 46 and 95. This suggests we should be concerned about potentially
large finite sample bias in the MRP estimates from these studies. Although Rank 85-88
in Brown (1994) has a t-statistic of 3.35, including three additional very weak instruments
and one strong one does not solve the problem of small sample bias being generated by the
other three weak instruments. Lane et al. (2014) do not report their first stage estimates
and instead claim that an over-identification test confirms the validity of the instruments.
However, this test implicitly assumes that both the relevance condition and exclusion re-
strictions hold for some subset of their instruments. As previously mentioned, the exclusion
restriction assumption is not plausible for their excluded instruments, which are based on
team performance measures.
Rather than attempt to build a better instrument to control for the potential endogeneity
caused by recruiting, I rely on the richness of my dataset, which includes variables that
attempt to control for a school’s recruiting efforts. Furthermore, as previously mentioned,
instruments used in their regression specification.
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my data suggests that a recruiter’s ability to identify revenue generating skill ex-ante is
limited, which should help assuage concerns over this source of potential endogeneity in
the MRP estimates using OLS methods. Even after controlling for these observables, there
might still be unobserved team and athletic conference characteristics driving revenues and
biasing the estimates of a star player’s MRP. To this end, the long panel structure of my
dataset allows me to reliably control for the time-invariant unobservable characteristics us-
ing fixed effects. Ultimately, concerns over endogeneity caused by omitted variables is nearly
impossible to rule out under the OLS framework. However, my dataset allows for several
alternative estimation techniques and robustness checks that might help to mitigate these
concerns. For instance, my data contains star players that suffered season ending injuries
or suspensions, which I use in a differences-in-differences framework to estimate star player
MRP. The results of this novel approach to estimating star player MRP provide tentative
support for this paper’s MRP estimates using OLS methods.
Finally, a novel contribution of this paper is the construction of a variable to measure the
number of times a university’s football or basketball team is mentioned in the news. This
variable is meant to capture the “excitement” a team generates over the season as more
exciting teams will generate more press coverage. This variable could also be thought of
as a proxy for unobservables involving a university’s long term investment in their football
or basketball programs if we believe that a concerted effort by the university to improve
the standing of their team is proxied for by their team’s media presence. I am able to use
this variable to estimate how a star player’s MRP is related to their ability to generate
excitement for their university’s sports program and how this MRP varies for teams along
the heterogeneous dimension of how often they are mentioned in the news media.
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2.3 Primary Data Sources
The panel dataset used in this paper’s empirical analysis is constructed using data from the
various sources outlined below so that the unit of observation is the university’s football
or basketball team in a particular year. Since I am looking at the revenues generated by
a university’s football or basketball team, I will often refer to the team and the university
synonymously.
2.3.1 Revenues Data
The U.S. Department of Education, under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA),
requires all institutions with intercollegiate athletics programs that receive federal student
aid funding to report their athletic program revenues. These data are collected separately
each year through an online survey for revenues attributable to both men’s and women’s
athletics across all sports offered at the institution over the academic year. For instance,
these revenues data coded with calendar year 2003 are revenues generated for the academic
year beginning in the fall of calendar year 2003 and ending in the spring of calendar year
2004. Although these data includes both revenues and expenditures, I am not able to use
both revenues and expenditures to compute the profitability of each university’s sports pro-
gram. This is because the EADA survey specifies that the total reported revenues must
cover total reported expenses.47 However, since I am interested in estimating the marginal
revenue product of a star player, I focus just on the reported revenues and collect revenues
for each institution from 2003–2012 that are attributable to Division 1 FBS college football
and Division 1 men’s basketball programs.
The revenues reported in the EADA survey are for all revenues attributable to a university’s
47See Getz and Siegfried (2012) for a discussion of how accounting for revenues and expenses in academic
institutions is quite tricky, partially due to how revenues and expenditures are accounted for across different
departments within an academic institution.
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college football or basketball program and includes: revenues from appearance guarantees
and options, an athletic conference, tournament or bowl games, concessions, contributions
from alumni and others, fund-raising activities, institutional support, program advertising
and sales, radio and television, royalties, signage and other sponsorships, sports camps,
state or other government support, student activity fees, ticket and luxury box sales. Rev-
enues include more than earned income, such as gate receipts, and the basis for determining
whether revenue should be included is simply whether the item was attributable to the
university’s football or basketball program activities. Furthermore, these reported revenues
are actual amounts earned or received, not pledged, budgeted, or estimated amounts. What
is not included in the revenues data are capital assets and related debts (i.e. money specif-
ically identified to pay for capital assets) or money for indirect facilities.
The advantage of using these revenues data is that they are available over a long time hori-
zon for the entirety of universities fielding Division 1 FBS football and Division 1 men’s
basketball teams and they include a comprehensive list of revenue sources. The downside
of using these data is that revenues are not reported by category so that only an aggregate
revenue measure is available. Brown (2011) uses college football program revenues collected
by the Indianapolis Star for the 2004-2005 season that are disaggregated into categories
like ticket sales, game day sales, contributions, and NCAA conference distributions that he
claims are more likely associated with the quality of a team’s current players. His contention
is that if the aggregate revenues measure includes things like students fees, government and
institutional aid or endowment/investment income that are associated with past team qual-
ity and less dependent on the quality of the team’s current players, then the analysis might
overstate the effect of current players on team revenues. This observation is likely correct
although, given the panel structure of my data, these concerns can easily be controlled for
by including measures of past team performance as well as year, conference, and team fixed
effects. This is not possible with the Indianapolis Star data that only covers one season,
limiting the analysis to the cross-section.
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Finally, revenues are reported in nominal U.S. dollars and I convert them to real 2012
U.S. dollars using the headline Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers computed
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Tables 8 and 9 report summary statistics for football
and basketball program revenues, along with other variables used in the empirical analysis.
From the tables we see that the average Division 1 FBS football program over the sample
2003–2012 generated almost $24 million dollars in annual revenues with average revenues for
90% of teams being less than $55 million. Not surprisingly, the revenue distribution is right-
skewed as a few teams generate very large revenues. For instance, the University of Texas
at Austin tops the list with just over $111 million in 2012. Likewise, over 2003–2012, the
average Division 1 men’s basketball program generated almost $4 million dollars in annual
revenues with average revenues for 90% of teams being less than about $10 million. As with
football program revenues, the revenue distribution for basketball programs is right-skewed
with a few teams generating very large revenues. The University of Louisville’s basketball
program tops the list with just over $44 million in revenues for 2011.
2.3.2 Sports Statistics Data
For each academic year and the 104 Division 1 FBS football programs that I have rev-
enues data for, I collect team performance statistics from Sports Reference.48,49 Particular
statistics of interest that will be used to construct control variables for the empirical iden-
tification strategy are: wins, the current coach, the team’s bowl game appearances and
performance, and the team’s schedule strength.50 Several measures of the team’s defense
quality are also collected including: points allowed per game, total yards allowed per game,
48Each academic year corresponds to the football or basketball season over the same time period.
49Sports Reference LLC. 6757 Greene St. Suite 315 Philadelphia, PA 19119. The football data are accessed
from http://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/, while the basketball data are accessed from http://www.sports-
reference.com/cbb/.
50This statistic is denominated in points above or below average where zero is the average. For details
on how schedule strength is computed for football, please see http://www.sports-reference.com/cfb/about/
glossary.html.
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passing and rushing yards allowed per game, and passing and rushing touchdowns allowed
per game. The Sports Reference website also contains historical information on each college
football coach’s win record over their entire career, which are collected and included with
the team performance data. In addition to team level data, I collect performance statistics
for 25, 221 individual football players over the 2003-2012 sample period. These data include
the number of games played by each player in each season along with various performance
statistics like touchdowns and yards for offensive players and accolades such as if the player
was voted to the All-American Team or nominated for the Heisman Trophy.
I also collect team performance statistics from Sports Reference for each season and for
each of the 282 Division 1 men’s college basketball programs that I have revenues data for.
In particular, I collect: wins; the current coach; the team’s NCAA tournament appearances
and performance; the number of teams in each athletic conference that are ranked by the
Associated Press in the NCAA tournament that year, their tournament performance, and
the total number of teams in each conference; and the team’s schedule strength.51 The
Sports Reference website also has historical information for each college basketball coach’s
win record and NCAA Tournament appearances over their entire career, which are collected
and included with the team performance data. In addition to team performance data, I
collect performance statistics for 18, 855 individual basketball players over the 2003–2012
sample period. These data include the number of games played by each player in each
season, the number of points scored by each player in a season and accolades such as if the
player was voted to the All American First or Second Teams, was awarded the Naismith or
Wooden Awards, or named most outstanding player in the NCAA Tournament.
51For details on how schedule strength is computed for basketball, please see http://www.sports-reference.
com/cbb/about/glossary.html.
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2.3.3 Star Player Measures
If we are interested in measuring a college athelete’s MRP to inform the debate on whether
or not college athletes are being unfairly exploited, we need a way to separate an individual
player’s contribution from the team’s contribution to revenues. Conceptually this is a
difficult task since a football or basketball team is a collection of individuals whose direct
individual performances and complementarities with the performance of their teammates all
influence the team’s ability to generate revenue. One way we might attempt to distinguish
between the individual player and the team is to focus the analysis on exceptionally good
players measured by some metric of performance. While this will not allow us to estimate
the MRP of an average player on the team, focusing on the very best players that would
command the highest wages in a competitive labor market will give us an upper bound on
the economic rents being extracted from players by NCAA member institutions.
Star Football Player Measures
I construct six different measures of star player using performance statistics for 25, 221 in-
dividual football players. The first measure is if the player was selected to the consensus
All-American Team. Selection to the consensus All-American team is an honor given each
year to the best college football players at their respective positions. Selection to the team
is recognized by the NCAA and determined by a group of selector organizations.52 The All-
American measure of star allows me to measure star players across all positions in football
since the best player in each position are voted to the All-American team. The second and
third measures are if a player was a Heisman Trophy finalist or nominated for the Heis-
man Trophy. The Heisman Trophy is an award given each year to the most outstanding
player in college football. Selection for the Heisman is determined by sports journalists,
52Since 2009, the full list of selector organizations are: Associated Press, Football Writers Association
of America, American Football Coaches Association, Walter Camp Foundation and The Sporting News. If
three of these organizations select a player, he automatically receives the consensus honor.
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previous Heisman winners, and a fan survey collected by ESPN.53 Typically, around ten
players each year are nominated for the Heisman Trophy and I have defined a finalist as a
player who finished in the top five or better in the Heisman voting among all players who
were nominated. Unlike the All-American team measure, these measures are restricted to
Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers since these positions make up 90% of
all positions nominated for the Heisman over the period 2003-2012.54
The last three measures of star player are computed from individual player performance
statistics. One downside to using performance statistics is that there is not very good data
coverage for positions other than Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers. Al-
though this may seem like a limitation, it may also imply that these are the positions that
people focus their attention on. So to the extent that star players are able to generate
revenues through their salience to fans, it is likely that not much is lost by focusing on
these positions here. In determining how to measure star players based on performance, I
choose to focus on touchdowns scored and yards generated because these are likely to be the
more visible metrics that directly impact a team’s ability to win games, play in lucrative
bowl games, and generate fan excitement. Hence, the fourth measure of star player is if
a Quarterback, Running Back or Wide Receiver was among the top 10 players in scoring
touchdowns or generating yards within their position for that season. I choose the simple
rule for being in the top 10 in one or the other category (or both) to avoid having to ar-
bitrarily pick relative weights in combining statistics, which would otherwise be needed for
an index measure to rank players according to multiple statistics.
The last two measures of star player are the same for Running Backs and Wide Receivers
(top 10 in touchdowns or yards) but changes how star Quarterbacks are defined. The fifth
53For detailed information of the balloting and selection process please see http://heisman.com/sports/
2014/9/15/GEN 0915140346.aspx?.
54There are a total of five Defensive Linemen, four Linebackers and one Defensive Back nominated over
the ten years in the sample.
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measure designates a Quarterback as a star if they are among the top 10 Quarterbacks in
touchdowns, or yards, or in their pass efficiency rating (PER). The PER is a common met-
ric used in sports statistics to rank Quarterbacks by taking into account interceptions, pass
completions, and pass attempts in addition to yards and touchdowns.55 The sixth measure
designates a Quarterback as a star if they are among the top 10 Quarterbacks ranked only
by their PER rating.
Table 10 gives a sense of how rare these star players are over the sample period for each
definition of star player. For example, All-American players make up just under 0.5% of all
players while Heisman Finalists are the most rare with only 0.08%. Among Quarterbacks,
All-American Quarterbacks are the most rare (0.37%) since there are only 11 of them cho-
sen whereas Quarterbacks are overrepresented among players nominated for the Heisman
Trophy.56 Even for the most permissive category (5), star players comprise about only 1%
of all players and 3% of all Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers. Also, only
6% of Quarterbacks are designated as star players under measure (5) while star Running
Backs and Wide Receivers comprise 2.5% and 2% of players in their positions. Although
how one defines a star player is somewhat subjective, the purpose of presenting multiple
measures is to see how estimates of the MRP change depending on the definition since the
question under consideration is relative to how star players are defined.
While the previous literature has primarily focused on future NFL draftee status to define
a star college football player, I prefer the measures in Table 10 for several reasons. First,
these measures of star player are better able to capture a player’s potential contribution
to team revenues in each year they played for the team. Strictly speaking, the NFL Draft
reflects professional scout expectations of future performance at the professional level verses
55The forumula is (8.4×Y ards+330×Touchdowns−200×Interceptions+100×Completions)/Attempts.
56Typically there is just one All-American Quarterback per year, however, the reason there are 11 and not
10 is that there were two Quarterbacks chosen in 2008 as the six selector organizations were equally divided
over Sam Bradford and Colt McCoy.
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the player’s actual performance in college relative to their peers in a given year. Hence,
draft status is not directly connected to a player’s performance in a particular year in which
they might be contributing to school revenues other than in the season immediately before
they were drafted.57 There are also cases of outstanding college athletes that do not fare
well in the NFL draft. For example, Oklahoma quarterback Jason White won the Heis-
man in 2003 and led his team to the national championship but was not selected in the
NFL draft.58 Even more problematic is that NFL draft status may have less to do with
college performance than we think. Berri and Simmons (2011) looked at 121 quarterbacks
from 1999–2008 and found that nearly 20% of the variation in Quarterback draft position
is explained by just the NFL combine factors.59 When performance measures like wins
produced, net points and Quarterback score are added explanatory power only rises less
than 3%. Overall they find that combine factors appear to be more important than the
actual college performance of the Quarterbacks in terms of NFL draft pick.
The six measures of star football player just mentioned are “discrete” in the sense that they
do not account for the fact that there might be variation in how much stars are contributing
to a team’s revenues. For instance, suppose two players are among the top 10 players in
touchdowns or yards in a given year but one only played in half their team’s games while
the other played in all their team’s games that season. The current discrete measures
will treat these two players as identical since the star designation is binary. However, my
dataset contains the number of games played by each player as well as the number of games
played by the team in a given season. Therefore, the richness of my dataset allows me
to compute a more precise “continuous” measure of star player by multiplying the binary
star designation by the proportion of games played by that star player in that season. So
57Alternatively, I could use the NFL draft to designate a player as a star for every year they played college
football if they were drafted in their last year. However, if star players actually have an effect on revenues
such that revenues are higher when a team has a star player, this measure will likely underestimate a star
players effect on revenues as he will be mechanically designated a star player in years of low or average
revenues independent of his performance in that year.
58Hunsberger and Gitter (2014) page 4.
59The NFL combine factors examined were height, weight, Wonderlic score, and 40 yard dash times.
82
in the previous example, one team would have 0.5 of a star player while the other team
would have 1 star player. Likewise, if one team had three star players, one of which only
played in 75% of the games that season, the team would have 2.75 star players under this
continuous measure rather than 3. This continuous measure is more precise in allowing for
a star player’s contribution to team revenues in a season than the discrete measure. The
continuous measure also allows for more variation in the number of star players on a team,
which will result in more precise estimates of a star player’s MRP.60
Star Basketball Player Measures
Using the performance statistics for 18, 855 individual basketball players I construct eight
different measures of star player. The first measure (Award Winners) is if the player was
named most outstanding player in the NCAA Tournament, or won the Naismith Award,
or won the Wooden Award. The most outstanding player in the NCAA Tournament is
selected by the Associated Press for their performance over the course of the tournament
and need not always be on the winning team. The Naismith Award is given by the Atlanta
Tipoff Club to the top men’s college basketball player each year, as selected by a committee
of sports media outlets.61 Another annual award recognizing the most outstanding men’s
college basketball player is the Wooden Award, given by the Los Angeles Athletic Club.62
The second measure of star player is if the player was selected to the consensus All-American
first team while the third measure is if the player was selected to the consensus All-American
first or second teams. Selection to the consensus All-American teams is recognized by the
NCAA and is an honor given each year to the best college basketball players, determined
by a group of selector organizations.63 The fourth measure is if a player was selected in the
60Unless explicitly noted, the continuous measure of star player will be used.
61For detailed information regarding the selection committe and selection process please see http://www.
naismithtrophy.com/about/atlanta-tipoff-club/board-of-selectors/.
62For detailed information regarding the selection process please see http://www.woodenaward.com/
about.
63The full list of selector organizations are: the Associated Press, the United States Basketball Writers
Association, the Sporting News, and the National Association of Basketball Coaches. Each selector chooses
a first and second team and consensus teams are determined by aggregating the results as determined by
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NBA draft while the fifth and sixth measures are if the player was among the top five and
top ten NBA draft picks respectively. The last two measures of star player are computed
from individual player performance statistics and designate a player as a star if he was
ranked among the top 10 or top 20 players in total points scored in that season.
As mentioned above, the previous literature has focused on NBA draft status to define
a star college basketball player. However, as with the NFL draft, it is not clear this is
the best measure of college performance since the NBA Draft reflects professional scout
expectations of future performance at the professional level rather than the player’s actual
performance in college relative to their peers in a given year. Therefore, player’s performance
in a particular year where they might be contributing to revenues will not necessarily be
captured by their NBA draft status. The alternative star player measures in Table 11 are
better able to capture a player’s potential contribution to basketball team revenues in each
year they played for their college team because, in any given season over their collegiate
career, a player may or may not be designated a star according to these metrics. In the
absence of empirical studies citing the questionable linkage between draft status and college
performance that exists in football for basketball, I include NBA draft based star player
measures to provide comparisons with the previous literature. Table 11 reports how few of
these star players there are over the sample period. For example, the rarest group, Award
Winners, make up just 0.05% of all players while drafted players, at 1.06% of all players, are
the most common. As with football, I construct the continuous star measure counterpart for
all eight basketball star player measures by multiplying the discrete star player designation
by the percentage of games played by that star in that season.
the NCAA.
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2.3.4 Yahoo! Sports Rivals.com Data
Each year, Yahoo! Sports collects information on the top high school football and bas-
ketball prospects and ranks them in their Rivals.com database.64 The measures of star
player discussed in the previous sections are all ex-post measures, which are based from
realized performance. However, because Rivals.com ranks players before they enter col-
lege, the Rivals.com ranking allows me to construct ex-ante measures of star player that
are based on a player’s expected performance in college. For all football and basketball
players from 2003–2012 in the Rivals.com database, I collected the rank assigned to them
by Rivals.com and matched these data with the individual data collected from Sports Ref-
erence. Since there is no unique identifier mapping between these two data sources, players
were matched based on the year, their name, and the school they signed with. Since there
was some differences with name spellings between the two datasets, a fuzzy match was
also conducted and then checked by hand to prevent erroneous matches. In the end, I
was able to match 16, 104 of the 25, 221 individual football players and 9, 982 of the 18, 855
individual basketball players in the Sport Reference data with their Rivals.com information.
The rankings published by Rivals.com are compiled by professional recruiting analysts with
both national and regional experts who evaluate hours of film and combine input from
professional, college, and high school coaches with personal observations to rank players
according to their expected impact in college sports. The Rivals.com ranking system ranks
prospects on a numerical scale from 4.9 − 6.1 with 6.1 denoting a “franchise player”, who
is considered one of the “elite of the elite” prospects in the country. For football, these
are players generally considered among the nation’s top 25 players overall and deemed to
have excellent professional potential. For basketball, these are players who are expected to
be college superstars, an upper-end lottery draft pick after one year of college. Football
recruits ranked with a 6.0 are those expected to be All-American candidates, considered
64The Yahoo! Rivals.com data can be accessed at: https://rivals.yahoo.com.
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one of the nation’s top 300 prospects, and deemed to have professional potential with the
ability to make an impact on a college team. Basketball recruits ranked with a 6.0 are elite
prospects who are expected to dominate in college and pegged as a first-round draft pick
after a year or two in college. Rivals.com also provide an alternative star ranking to the
numerical one, with a five-star prospect denoting a player who is generally considered to be
one of the nation’s top 25-30 players.
I use these Rivals.com rankings to construct three ex-ante measures of football stars: Top
Rivals, which includes any player with a Rival.com rank of 6.1, High Rivals, which includes
any player with a Rival.com rank of 6.0 or better, and 5 Star, which includes any player with
a 5-star Rivals.com rating. For basketball, I only construct one ex-ante measure using the
Rivals.com 5-star ranking since the number of players ranked by the numerical Rivals.com
ranking are extremely sparse in my matched sample. Also, although the Rivals.com data
starts in 2003, I only use data for 2005-2012 as the number of ex-ante stars designated in my
matched sample for years prior to 2005 is sparse and fluctuates much more than in the later
years. Since I want to make sure that my results are not being biased by the mechanical
lack of ex-ante star players observed in these earlier years, I restrict the ex-ante analyses
to the 2005-2012 period. The relative frequency of ex-ante stars under these measures are
reported in Table 12 over the sample period 2005-2012. When comparing these relative
frequencies with those in Tables 10 and 11, we see that the ex-ante measures are less rare
than the ex-post measures. However, these ex-ante measures are as restrictive as possible
given how Rivals.com ranks recruits.
2.3.5 Distance and Regional Data
In the empirical strategy outlined in the following section, it will be useful to control for the
distance that each university is from the pool of talented players that it could potentially
recruit in a given year. Included in the Rivals.com data I collected is each football and
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basketball recruit’s hometown and/or where they went to high school. I used the 2013 Na-
tional Places Gazetteer files from the United States Census Bureau to get the latitude and
longitude coordinates for each university’s location and for where individual players went
to high school.65 Since the players listed in the Rivals.com data are the top high school
recruits each year, the college players in the Sports Reference data for which I have latitude
and longitude information represent the pool of players thought to be “good” at the time
they were being recruited by colleges. I use these latitudes and longitudes to compute the
distance that each player was from each university for each year. These distances are then
averaged across players within a year for each university. This calculated measure gives the
average distance in a given year that each university is from where college players in that
year went to high school that were considered top high school recruits.
Additional data is collected on the undergraduate population of each university from the
EADA database and the university’s city and state populations from the United States
Census Bureau’s historical population estimates to control for a team’s potential market
size and market demand. I also collect per-capita personal income for each university’s state
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Regional Personal Income Data and convert
these nominal values to Real 2012 U.S. dollars using the BEA’s personal consumption
expenditure price index for all goods and services.66
2.3.6 News Media Mentions
In an attempt to capture how a star player’s ability to generate “excitement” might relate
to their MRP, I collect data on the number of times a football or basketball team is men-
65The lattitude and longitudes for any towns or cities listed for players in the Rivals.com data that
did not show up as an official place in the Gazetteer files were searched by hand using Google Maps at
http://maps.google.com.
66Personal income data come from BEA Regional Accounts Tables: SA1-3 Personal Income Summary while
the price index is from BEA NIPA Table: 2.3.4 - Price Indexes for Personal Consumption Expenditures by
Major Type of Product.
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tioned in the news from the Newsbank Access World News database. Newsbank’s database
contains eleven source types including audio, blog, university newspapers, journals, maga-
zines, newsletters, newspapers, newswire, transcripts, video, and web-only sources for 4, 533
different publications across the world. The entire universe of publications and sources was
queried for any mention of the university’s football team and the number of “hits” was
collected to count the number of media mentions the team had in that year. Newsbank’s
web-based interface allows for multiple search fields; for instance, if “2012” was entered in
the “Year” field and “ “Texas A&M” + “college football” ” was entered in the “All Text”
field, then the number of results returned represent an entry published in 2012 in any of the
eleven source types across the universe of publications that mentions the phrases “Texas
A&M” and “college football”.
Colloquial team names were used in the search queries rather than official university titles.
For example, “UCLA” and “UNC” were used rather than “The University of California
at Los Angeles” and “University of North Carolina”. This provided a challenge for teams
whose colloquial names are the same as a state and/or have words in common with other
college teams. Take, for instance, the University of Texas at Austin using their colloquial
name “Texas” to search for news mentions using “Texas” + “college football”. To help
prevent hits coming back that mention the state of Texas or any of the other Division 1
FBS college football teams located in Texas with the word “Texas” in their name, the search
query used was: “Texas - Christian - A&M - Tech” + “college football”.67
Tables 8 and 9 gives summary statistics for the number of news mentions. Although the
distribution in both cases is right-skewed, the magnitude of the largest value for football
(7, 368) was in 2010 for the University of Auburn. This was the season when Cam New-
67One might think to search by the team’s mascot, for instance, “Longhorns” or “Texas Longhorns”. This
was tested out and seemed to produce far too few results. Specific details about the search method are
available from the author upon request.
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ton was the Quarterback and Auburn went undefeated in the regular season, beat South
Carolina for the SEC Championship game, and beat Oregon in the BCS National Cham-
pionship Game. That this year and team resulted in the most news mentions is consistent
with the buzz surrounding Cam Newton combined with the newsworthy accomplishment
of going undefeated in both the regular and post seasons that culminated with a national
championship win. For basketball, the largest value (3, 946) was in 2012-13 for the Univer-
sity of Louisville, which won the NCAA tournament that year with a school record 35 wins
that season. Other notable events for Louisville that season were a loss to Notre Dame in a
five over-time game (the longest regular season game in their athletic conference’s history)
and Louisville guard Kevin Ware suffering a compound fracture in their NCAA tournament
regional-final game against Duke; Louisville went on to come from behind and beat Duke by
22 points. Furthermore, while the number of news hits for Auburn and Louisville seem very
large relative to the distribution, they are not extreme outliers. Inspecting the football and
basketball teams that are in the right tail of the news distribution reveals well known teams
that would be expected to be mentioned frequently in the news. This indicates that the
news measure probably is not picking up erroneous news mentions by, for example, grab-
bing all entries with the word “Texas” in them that have little or nothing to do with college
football (basketball) or specifically with the University of Texas’ football (basketball) team.
Of course, it is impossible to guarantee that every resulting entry is directly commenting
on a particular football or basketball team, however, great care was taken to make sure the
queries were as accurate as possible so that the number of news hits provides a reasonable
proxy measure for the frequency of media mentions the team is getting in a given year.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy employed in this paper is to estimate the MRP of star college ath-
letes directly from football and basketball program revenues data. This approach avoids
the concerns with the Scully Method previously discussed because it does not require direct
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estimates of the team’s marginal revenues nor a player’s marginal productivity. Further-
more, the Scully Method assumes that the only way star players can influence revenues
is through their contribution to producing wins and ignores factors such as star players
generating excitement for their teams in ways unrelated directly to the team winning. The
empirical strategy employed here provides more flexibility by allowing for other potential
channels through which star players might affect revenues and is agnostic to the particular
mechanism at work.
There are many team characteristics that cannot be directly observed by the econometrician
that are likely to be correlated with the team’s football and basketball revenues. For
instance, a team’s athletic legacy or a vibrant sporting culture associated with either a
particular team or the team’s surrounding geographic region probably impacts the team’s
ability to generate revenues. Likewise, unobserved characteristics of particular years or
athletic conferences might be correlated with the team’s football or basketball revenues in
ways that are not necessarily related to the number of star players on the team. Without
accounting for these effects, the ability of the econometric analysis to detect a star player’s
true contribution to revenues is likely to be confounded. Fortunately, the panel nature of
my data allows for these unobservable characteristics to be controlled for, which has not
been possible in the previous studies that focus solely on the cross-section of teams in a
particular season. Also, in contrast to previous studies on basketball using a panel dataset
with only three years, the length of my panel data mitigates concerns over potential bias in
the fixed effects estimation coming through the short time dimension.
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2.4.1 Econometric Specification
Consider the following reduced form model relating athletic program revenues to the number
of star players on the team
yi,t = βStari,t +Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + δc + δi + i,t (2.1)
where the level of football or basketball program revenues yi,t for team i in year t is a func-
tion of: the number of star players on the team Stari,t; a vector of variables Xi,t influencing
revenues; a team specific linear trend θit; and unobserved year δt, athletic conference δc,
and team characteristics δi. The economic motivation behind choosing the functional form
of Equation (2.1) and using levels of program revenues is that the coefficient β has the direct
interpretation of a star player’s marginal revenue product.
To take advantage of the panel structure of my data, I estimate a star player’s MRP from
Equation (2.1) using a fixed effects specification including team, year, and athletic confer-
ence fixed effects. Year fixed effects will help control for trends in revenues that are unrelated
to star players. For instance, if a team’s conference renegotiates their revenue sharing agree-
ment or a team signs a lucrative televisions rights deal in a particular year over the sample
period. The athletic conference fixed effect controls for the fact that some conferences, like
the Big 5, are much more lucrative than others. Also included is a linear trend for each team
(γit) to allow for heterogeneity in revenue trend rates. For the estimates of a star’s MRP
to have a casual interpretation, the fixed effect specification requires the strict exogeneity
assumption, E(Stari,t, s,t) 6= 0 for s = t, t− 1, . . . , which rules out feedback from past i,s
shocks to current Stari,t. It is worth noting that the implied counterfactual of the estimate
βˆ under this empirical strategy is the additional revenue a team would have collected if they
had an additional star player, relative to an average player on that team. That is, since I
am using team fixed effects, the counterfactual is relative to the average player that a par-
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ticular team would have had, rather than the average college football player across all teams.
In addition to the fixed-effects, I include several control variables in the regression analysis in
an attempt to control for potential endogeneity. One and two year lags of Stari,t are included
to control for any residual effect that star players have on revenues. For example, Texas
A&M’s season ticket sales might increase for a season or two after Johnny Manziel leaves the
team due to residual excitement he generated for Texas A&M football. Likewise, I include
one and two year lags of the number of wins (Winsi,t−1, Winsi,t−2) to control for the residual
effects of the team’s recent performance on revenues. I also include several variables to
control for the potential market size and market demand for a team’s football or basketball
program. These include the size of the undergraduate student body (UndergradPopi,t), city
and state populations where the team resides (CityPopi,t, StatePopi,t), per-capita personal
income in the state where the team resides (PerCapPIi,t), and the growth rate of the state’s
per-capita income (GrPerCapPIi,t).
Football Controls
For the MRP estimates of star college football players from Equation (2.1), I include con-
trols for if the team went to a bowl game or won a bowl game last season (BowlGamei,t−1,
BowlWini,t−1). I also include two variables to control for the football coach’s impact on
revenues. The first is an indicator, CoachChangei,t, which takes the value of 1 if the team
had a new coach that year. I want to include a control for coach quality, however, it is
difficult to disentangle coach quality from team quality with team level statistics such as
win-loss record since the team’s record is the coach’s record over a given season. Since I
have data on coach performance from Sports Reference that precedes my 2003–2012 sample
for revenues data and since coaches change teams frequently, I am able to measure perfor-
mance of coaches over their entire careers. So I include the win percentage of the team’s
current coach (in year t) over his entire career up to and including the previous season
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(CoachCareeri,t−1).
Completely disentangling an individual star player’s contribution from the rest of the team
is very difficult. In fact, great care must be taken when attempting to control for the
team’s quality that no variables are included that could themselves be outcomes of the
number of stars on a team. These variables would be bad controls and introduce bias
into the MRP estimates. For instance, including the number of wins in the current season
is a bad control since star players in that year are going to be directly contributing to
wins. Fortunately, with football, it is possible to partially control for team quality in the
regressions that use star measures 2–6 by including variables that measure the quality of a
team’s defense. This is because the aggregate star measures 2–6 only include the offensive
positions Quarterback, Running Back, and Wide Receiver. So I include the number of points
allowed (TDPtsi,t), the number of yards allowed (TDY dsi,t), the number of passing yards
allowed (TDPassY dsi,t), the number of passing touchdowns allowed (TDPassTDsi,t), the
number of rushing yards allowed (TDRushY dsi,t) and the number of rushing touchdowns
allowed (TDRushTDsi,t).
68 Note that these team defense variables are bad controls in the
regression using the All-American measure since both offensive and defensive positions are
included in that measure, so I omit them in that regression. I also include a measure of how
strong the team’s schedule is (SOSi,t) as the quality of a team’s opponents likely affects
their ability to generate revenues in that season.69
Basketball Controls
For the MRP estimates of star college basketball players from Equation (2.1), I include con-
trols for if the team went to the NCAA Tournament last season (NCAATourni,t−1) and
if the team made it to the second round (Round2i,t−1), the sweet sixteen (Sweet16i,t−1),
68The prefix “TD” in the variable names denotes “Team Defense”.
69The details of this strength of schedule measure are described in Section 2.3
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the elite eight (Elite8i,t−1), the final four (Final4i,t−1), the final (Finali,t−1), or won the
tournament (Winneri,t−1). As with football, I control for the basketball coach’s impact on
revenues using CoachChangei,t and CoachCareeri,t−1, however, the basketball data allows
me to include an additional control CoachCarTourni,t−1. This additional control variable
for coach quality measures number of times the coach has taken a team to the NCAA tour-
nament in his career up to an including the previous season.
Being selected as one of the 68 teams in the NCAA Tournament is quite lucrative for
these college basketball teams. The 32 teams that win their conference championship are
automatically admitted to the tournament while the 36 remaining slots are given to teams
by a selection committee comprised of athletic directors and conference commissioners. The
committee selects the remaining teams based on national ranking polls and various other
performance measures. This means that the strength of a team’s athletic conference in a
given year is directly related to the likelihood that a team attends the NCAA tournament,
hence correlated with team revenues. To control for this, I include several variables that
attempt to measure how competitive a team’s conference is including: the number of other
teams in the conference (NSchlsConfi,t), the number of conference teams ranked in the
AP poll (NSchlsConfAPi,t), the number of conference teams in the NCAA Tournament
that year (NSchlsConfTourni,t) and the number of conference teams that made it to the
final four that year (NSchlsConfFFi,t). As with football, I also control for the quality of
a team’s opponents using the team’s schedule strength (SOSi,t).
2.4.2 Recruiting Effort
The skill level of players acquired by a college team is likely to be endogenous to its recruit-
ing effort, which is unobserved by the econometrician, so that the number of star players
would likely be correlated with the error term in Equation (2.1). The recruiting process
potentially creates a two-sided selection problem where we might be concerned that teams
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with high revenues can afford to expend more effort to recruit better players and that
better players might select teams that historically generate higher revenues, even holding
recruiting effort constant. For basketball, this selection issue might be particularly acute
for student athletes already out of high school that transfer from one college to another, as
their ability to play college basketball has likely been revealed to a greater extent than a
student being recruited directly from high school. Transferring schools is not uncommon in
college basketball (and to a much lesser extend in football) and since my data allows me
to identify transfer students, I exclude them when designating star players to reduce the
potential for selection bias.
In theory, the relationship between recruiting effort and revenues should be mitigated by
the NCAA’s strict recruiting rules that attempt to level the playing field for recruiters.70
Nevertheless, recruiting effort and how it relates to revenues is still unobservable in the
data and detection of rule violations is far from perfect. If we assume that the recruiting ef-
fort at each university is roughly a constant proportion of revenues–the additional amount
spent on recruiting rises proportionally with revenues at a constant rate over time–then
this selection should not bias the estimates very much because I can control for trends in
revenues with year fixed effects and school specific time trends. However, selection in the
other direction might still be a problem since naturally good players might choose better
teams that generate higher revenues. I can potentially control for this if selection is based
on factors I can observe in the data. Dumond, Lynch, and Platania (2008) show that a
high school football recruit’s decisions are governed primarily by three factors: geographic
distance between the recruit and the college, the school’s recent football rankings and if the
school is in one of the BCS conferences. In particular, the authors find that recruits tend to
choose programs that are closer to where they are from, so I control for this with the variable
Distancei,t, which is the average distance in a given year that each university is from where
college players in that year went to high school that were considered top high school recruits.
70See NCAA 2013-2014 Division I Manual, bylaw 13.01.
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To account for the fact that college football players selected schools based on the school’s
recent football rankings (performance) at the time they were making their decision, I con-
struct three variables: HistWinsi,t, HistBowlsi,t, and HistBowlWinsi,t. The variable
HistWinsi,t computes the average number of wins the team had over the five years 4 years
prior to the current year. For example, the variable value for 2003 measures the average
number of wins the team had over the period 1995–1999. So for college football stars in 2003
that are in their Senior year, this variable measures their current team’s average number
of wins over the time they were in high school plus one year prior to high school.71 The
variables HistBowlsi,t and HistBowlWinsi,t are constructed in the analogous way for the
total number of bowl game appearances and bowl game wins. These variables are meant
to capture the information set that star college players had in terms of the team’s recent
performance when they were being recruited out of high school.
While the Dumond et al. (2008) study was done specifically for football players, it seems
reasonable to assume that the salient set of characteristics governing a player’s prefer-
ences and choice of where to play in college would be the same for basketball players. So
to control explicitly for the factors that drive a student athlete’s choice of school in the
basketball analysis, I include the variables Distancei,t and HistWinsi,t. I also construct
several variables to control for basketball players selecting schools based on recent perfor-
mance. The variables HistNCAATourni,t, HistRound2i,t, HistSweet16i,t, HistElite8i,t,
HistF inal4i,t, HistF inali,t and HistWinneri,t are constructed analogously to the variable
HistWinsi,t for the team’s total number of appearances in: the NCAA Tournament, the
second round, the sweet sixteen, the elite eight, the final four, the final and the number of
times the team won the tournament. As with football, these variables are meant to capture
71On the other end of the spectrum, for Freshman star players in 2003, this variable measures their current
team’s average number of wins over the time they were freshmen in high school back into junior high school.
However, the vast majority of star players in the data are college Seniors and Juniors.
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the information set that star college basketball players had regarding their team’s recent
performance at the time they were being recruited out of high school.
2.4.3 Discussion
As with any fixed effects identification strategy we should be concerned with the potential
for reverse causality and omitted variables bias to confound any causal interpretation of the
coefficient estimates. In this context, reverse causality would imply that football or basket-
ball program revenues generated in the current season are able to turn players into stars in
that season according to the ex-post performance measures used to define star players. For
instance, if teams have idiosyncratically high revenues over a particular season and then
used these revenues to develop player talents over that season, then we should be worried
about reverse causality.
However, there are two reasons why reverse causality should not be too worrisome in this
context. First, we would have to believe that a team is able to spend current revenues in
such a way as to make a marginal player into a star player. In reality, it is more likely that a
player’s status as a star is a function of their innate ability, which is something that money
cannot buy. That said, to the extent that a player with potential talent on the margin
of being star quality can be identified, it might be possible to develop that player over a
season and turn him into a star. However, I would argue that this is more a function of the
coaching staff recognizing a player’s potential and devoting more time and attention to the
player, rather than the affect of any direct monetary expenditure. It is also unlikely that
current season revenues are used to incetivize coaches to develop talent as coaching staff
salaries are already established at the beginning of the season. Furthermore, to the extent
that any financial incentive to develop talent exists, the coaching staff’s incentive is likely
forward-looking: developing talent in the hopes to make the team better and negotiate a
higher wage in the future. The second reason why we should not be worried about reverse
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causality is that athletic program budgets are set in the fiscal year prior to the start of the
football or basketball season. So even if a team is generating a lot of revenues in the current
season, their operating budgets for that season will have already been set the year before.
Hence, it is difficult to see how idiosyncratically high revenues in the current season could
be directly used to influence player development in that season when the team’s budget has
been set the year before revenues were idiosyncratically high.
More concerning than reverse causality is the potential for omitted variables to bias the
estimates of a star player’s MRP. In the current context, it is likely that these omitted
variables would come in one of two forms: either from selection bias causing the error term
in Equation (2.1) to be correlated with the number of star players on the team (since we
cannot observe all the factors influencing selection to teams in the recruiting process) or
from excluding team-level variables that are potentially driving revenues. In either case, the
omitted variable bias is likely to bias the MRP estimates upward as it is difficult to imagine
variables that would be positively correlated with revenues and negatively correlated with
the number of star players.
Although I attempt to control for the recruiting process using the variables described in
Section 2.3, these variables are only rough proxies for a complicated two-sided decision pro-
cess that involves both individual players’ choice of team and a recruiter’s choice of players.
My data allows me to attempt to control for a player’s choice of team based on the empirical
evidence that exists on how recruits select schools. Although, the process for how recruiters
choose players, and in particular, how that choice is related to athletic program revenues
in not directly observable in my data. However, in order for a recruiter’s choice of players
to bias the estimates, it must be the case that recruiters have some skill in choosing star
players that will generate revenues above those generated by the average player on the team
and my data does allow me to look at this. I present evidence in Section 2.7 that suggests
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recruiters are not particularly good at choosing players that will generate significantly more
revenues than the average player on the team ex-ante. This result might help to alleviate
some concerns over omitted variables related to the recruiting process biasing the MRP
estimates.
In terms of team-level variables, the most obvious and important omitted variables in the
empirical specification that affect revenues are the number of games the team won and if the
team went to a bowl game or the NCAA tournament in the current season. As previously
discussed, since these variables are themselves outcomes of the number of star players on
the team that season, including them in the regression results in bias from bad control
variables. Therefore, estimates of a star player’s MRP will be severely biased, which could
potentially be larger than the omitted variable bias resulting from excluding them from the
regression. In the following section, I re-run the regression specification in Equation (2.1)
that includes contemporaneous wins and discuss how these estimates can be thought of as a
lower-bound on the magnitude of a star player’s MRP.72 I also present results from several
alternative empirical strategies that attempt to alleviate concerns over the bias introduced
by potential omitted variables in Sections 2.6,2.7, and 2.8.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Marginal Revenue Product of Football Stars
The results of the fixed effect estimation of Equation (2.1) for star football players are pre-
sented in Table 13.73 Marginal revenue product estimates are reported for all six measures
of star player. Recall that the All-American star measure includes all positions while the
72In unreported results, I also included indicators for bowl game and NCAA tournament appearances in
the current season with contemporaneous wins. The results are essentially unchanged and actually increase
the point estimates slightly.
73The estimates in this table and all other tables in Section 2.5 use the continuous measure of star players.
Estimates using the discrete measure of star players are similar and reported in Table 41 in Appendix A.7.
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other five measures consist solely of Quarterbacks, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers by
construction. Huber-White standard errors are computed, clustering by team, to account
for potential correlation in the error term within teams and are reported in parentheses.
The MRP estimates for all six measures of star player are statistically significant at the 5%
level or better. The within R-squared is around 77%, suggesting the included covariates
(after partialling out the fixed effects) explain a sizable portion of the variation in revenues.
Furthermore, the overall R-squared of around 97% suggests there is a lot of variation in
revenues accounted for by the unobserved heterogeneity being controlled for by team fixed
effects.
The first column in the table reports the estimation results using the All-American Team
measure of star and reveals that the MRP of an All-American player is just over $1.2 million
a year. In other words, having an additional All-American caliber football player on the
team generates, on average, just over $1.2 million of additional revenue for the team. The
regression results for Heisman finalists, reported in the second column, indicate that their
MRP is just over $2 million a year on average, while the third column reports the MRP of
a Heisman nominee is about $1.8 million a year on average. The fourth column reports the
MRP of a football player who is among the top 10 in touchdowns or yards while the fifth
column reports the MRP of a football player who is among the top 10 in touchdowns or
yards or a top 10 Quarterback in terms of their PER. The last column reports the MRP of
a football player who is a Running Back or Wide Receiver among the top 10 in touchdowns
or yards or a top 10 Quarterback in terms of their PER. In all three cases, the estimated
MRP of a star player according to these measures is just over $600, 000 on average.
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Individual Football Player Positions
A slight modification of Equation (2.1) allows me to estimate the MRP of star players in
specific football positions as follows
yi,t =
∑
pos
βposStarposi,t +Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + δc + δi + i,t (2.2)
where
∑
pos Star
pos
i,t = Stari,t and pos ∈ {QB,RB,WR, TE,OL,K, P,DB,LB,DL} for
the All-American star measure while pos ∈ {QB,RB,WR} for the other measures.74 The
MRPs of star players in each position (βpos) are jointly estimated using fixed effects and
the same controls Xit, as in Equation (2.1). The results of this fixed effect estimation are
reported in Table 14.
Estimates for the MRP of an All-American Quarterback are $4.6 million a year while a
Heisman nominated and Heisman finalist Quarterback are worth $2.2 and $3.5 million a
year on average. It is worth noting that all 14 All-American Quarterbacks in the data
were also Heisman finalists so the reason that All-American Quarterbacks are worth more
than Heisman finalists might simply be because they are mechanically more rare in the
data. Also, a Quarterback among the top 10 in touchdowns and yards is worth just over
$1 million a year on average. All-American Wide Receivers are worth $2.9 million a year
on average while the MRPs for the rest of the positions across star measures were not sta-
tistically different from zero.
It might be surprising that the MRP estimates for Running Backs are not statistically
significant in Table 14. This might be due to the fact, as Wesseling (2014) observes, that
Running Backs are being devalued in college football due to an increase in college teams
74The positions abbreviations indicate: Quarterback (QB), Running Back (RB), Wide Receivers (WR),
Tight Ends (TE), Offensive Linemen (OL), Kickers (K), Punters (P), Defensive Backs (DB), Linebackers
(LB), and Defensive Linemen (DL).
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emphasizing dual-threat quarterbacks operating out of a spread offense. He also reports that
there is a general sense that Running Backs are not emphasized as much in college football
as they are in the NFL. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical significance for positions other
than Quarterbacks and Wide Receivers does not mean that star players in other positions
are not generating large revenues for their schools. It simply means that the econometric
specification cannot detect the effect. One downside of the fixed effect regression is that
including fixed effects (in this case, team, year and conference) can also remove “good”
variation that would help to identify the true effect. It might be the case that there is just
not enough variation in the revenues data after controlling for these fixed effects to pick up
the true effect of a star Running Back or Offensive Lineman on revenues when trying to
jointly estimate multiple parameters.
2.5.2 Marginal Revenue Product of Basketball Stars
The estimates of star basketball player MRP from a fixed effects estimation of Equation
(2.1) are reported in Table 15 for all eight measures of star player.75 As with the football
regressions, Huber-White standard errors are computed, clustering by team, and reported
in parentheses. The MRP estimates for all eight measures of star player are statistically
significant at the 5% level or better, with the exception of players ranked among the Top 10
points scorers, which are only significant at the 10% level. The within R-squared is around
67%, suggesting that the covariates explain a large portion of the variation in program
revenues while the overall R-squared of around 97% suggests that the unobserved team
characteristics controlled for by the fixed effects explain a lot of the variation in revenues.
The first column in Table 15 reports that the MRP of players who were named the NCAA
Tournament’s most outstanding player of the year, or won the Naismith Award, or won
75Estimates using the discrete measure of star player are similar and reported in Table 42 in Appendix
A.7.
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the Wooden Award is just over $1 million a year. That is, having an additional player on
your basketball team that is good enough to be awarded one of these honors generates, on
average, just over $1 million of additional revenues for the team. The results in the second
column for players voted to the All-American first team indicate their MRP is over $654, 000
on average with the MRP for All-Americans in the third column just over $345, 000. Turning
to the NBA draft measures, the fourth column reports the MRP of a player drafted into the
NBA is just over $200, 000 while the MRPs of top 5 and top 10 NBA draft picks (columns
5 and 6) are around $400, 000. The previous studies that use instrumental variables report
MRP estimates of NBA drafted players of just over $1 million. However, this nearly five-fold
discrepancy might be a consequence of the use of weak instruments in previous studies as
a low correlation between the instrument(s) and the endogenous variable can cause a large
upward bias in the point estimates.76 The last column reports that the MRP of a player who
was among the top 10 or 20 point scorers in a season is just over $300, 000 a year on average.
Table 15 also reports the estimates for coach quality and NCAA tournament performance
that are of interest. For instance, each additional career NCAA tournament appearance
a coach has (up to and including the prior season) is worth around $53, 000 a year to
their current team and highly significant across all eight specifications. The variable
NCAATournt−1 indicates if the team appeared in the NCAA tournament last season
while Champt−1 indicates if they won the tournament last season. The resulting estimates
from Equation (2.1) are that a previous appearance in the NCAA tournament generates
$160, 000− $170, 000 in revenues while winning the tournament generates $1.8− $2 million
in revenues on average for the team.
76One can show that in the univariate case, plimβˆIV = β +
corr(z,u)
corr(z,x)
σ(u)
σ(x)
where z is the instrument for
endogenous x and u is the error term in the regression.
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2.5.3 Lower Bound Estimates
The empirical strategy presented above potentially overstates the marginal contribution
to revenues from individual players for two reasons. First, while excluding contemporane-
ous team control variables avoids introducing a potentially large bias from including bad
controls, it also means the estimates for star player MRP will be partially capturing any
revenues generated by the rest of the team’s performance that is not being controlled for
otherwise. This is precisely the omitted variable bias that results from excluding con-
temporaneous wins, bowl game and NCAA Tournament appearances from the regression.
Secondly, estimating an individual star player’s MRP in a team sport is further compli-
cated by the fact that the skills of individual players interact. Since we cannot perfectly
separate team from player and cannot identify cross-complementarities among players, the
star player’s MRP will include some indirect contributions to revenues coming from other
players making the star player better and vice-versa.
Although identifying player complementarities is extremely difficult, including contempo-
raneous wins into the regression is straightforward. Including contemporaneous wins might
result in a reasonable “lower-bound” for the MRP estimates reported in the previous sec-
tions for two reasons. First, since wins are positively correlated with football program
revenues, including them will reduce the upward omitted variable bias in the current MRP
estimates. Second, if wins are explicitly controlled for, then any impact on revenues that
star players have through channels other than a star’s contribution to the team winning
will be captured in the MRP estimates. It is reasonable to think that winning is one of
the most, if not the most, important factor for teams to generate revenue. Likewise, if star
players have any ability to generate revenues for their teams, a significant portion of this
effect is likely to come through their ability to produce wins. Hence, any residual effect that
star players have on revenue after controlling for wins can be thought of as a “lower-bound”
on the magnitude of a star player’s MRP. However, including contemporaneous wins into
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the regression comes with a large caveat. As previously discussed, since wins are themselves
an outcome of the number of star players on the team, including contemporaneous wins in
the regression is a bad control variable. Therefore, estimates of a star player’s MRP will
be severely biased. This means that finding no effect of star players on athletic program
revenues does not tell us much and that we can only really analyze results where both the
coefficients on wins and star players are significant.
With this caveat in mind, Tables 16 and 17 reports the results for football stars of the fixed
effects estimation of Equations (2.1) and (2.2) with the single modification that contempo-
raneous wins are included. From the tables, we see that the MRP for All-Americans (all
positions, Quarterbacks and Wide Receivers), Heisman finalists and Heisman nominees are
statistically significant and, while lower than the baseline estimates in Tables 13 and 14,
still rather large. This suggests that star players have a sizable impact on revenues in ways
unrelated directly to their contribution to producing wins for the team. If we view the
estimates in Tables 16 and 17 as reasonable lower bounds, then All-Americans are worth
$926k− $1.2 million, All-American Quarterbacks are worth $4− 4.6$ million, All-American
Wide Receivers are worth $2.7−2.9$ million, Hesiman finalists are worth $1.5−$2.1 million
and Heisman nominees are worth $1.2 − $1.8 million. While these lower bound estimates
are similar in economic magnitude to the baseline estimates that omit wins, it is also worth
noting that the coefficient estimates across all six measures of star player in Tables 13 and
16 are not statistically different from each other.
The results for basketball stars when contemporaneous wins are included are reported in
Table 18 with only All-American first team players statistically significant at the 5% level.
The MRP estimates for award winners, drafted players, top 10 draft picks and top 20 points
scorers are all statistically significant at the 10% level. As with football, the MRP estimates
including wins are lower than the baseline estimates in Table 15 but still quite large, sug-
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gesting that star basketball players also influence revenues in ways unrelated to their ability
to produce wins. Taking these estimates as lower bounds, we see that award winners are
worth $967k−$1.1 million, All-American first team players are worth $562k−655k, drafted
players are worth $165k − $204k, top 10 draft picks are worth $314k − $403k and top 20
points scorers are worth $261k − $320k. These lower bound estimates are very similar in
magnitude to the baseline estimates and all eight star player measures in Tables 15 and 18
are not statistically different from each other.
In unreported results, I included indicators for bowl game and NCAA Tournament appear-
ances for the current season along with contemporaneous wins. The results are essentially
unchanged from those in Tables 16 and 18 and in fact, produce slightly higher MRP esti-
mates for both football and basketball stars than when only including wins.77 If we believe
that a large portion of any potential omitted variables bias is coming through the omission
of contemporaneous wins, it is somewhat reassuring that the lower-bound estimates are
not drastically different in magnitude or statistically different than the baseline estimates.
However, even though I have argued that including contemporaneous wins might give us a
reasonable lower-bound on the MRP estimates, it is important to note that these estimates
might still be biased upward if any omitted variables remains. While including wins might
take care of a large portion of the omitted variables bias, there is still potential for omitted
variables bias in these lower-bound estimates. As discussed above, one potential source
of this bias might be my inability to perfectly control for the recruiting process with the
observable measures available in my data.
2.5.4 Discussion
Huma and Staurowsky (2012) report that the average full athletic scholarship is worth ap-
proximately $23, 204. While this does not capture the true marginal cost of a star college
77These results are available upon request.
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athlete, the difference between the marginal revenue products in Tables 13 and 15 and the
value of a full athletic scholarship gives a decent approximation of the economic rents being
captured by universities under the NCAA rules restricting payment.78 Furthermore, com-
paring the size of these rents with the average salaries for NFL and NBA players who are
able to sell their services in a more competitive labor market gives a sense of the economic
significance of the rents being captured.
The average salary for an NFL player in 2014 was $1, 673, 277.79 This figure is roughly
similar in magnitude to the MRP estimates for All-American players ($926k−$1.2 million),
which includes players in all positions that are likely to be good enough to be picked up
by a professional football team. Furthermore, the average salary in 2014 for NFL Quarter-
backs, Running Backs, and Wide Receivers collectively ($2, 058, 698) was very similar to the
MRP estimates for Heisman finalists ($1.5− $2.1 million) and Heisman nominated players
($1.2−$1.8 million). Turning to individual positions, average salaries for NFL Quarterbacks
($4, 183, 581) in 2014 were in the range of the MRP estimates for All-American Quarter-
backs ($4 − $4.6 million) while the average salaries for NFL Wide Receivers ($1, 743, 160)
was lower than the MRP estimates for All-American Wide Receivers ($2.7−$2.9 million).80
These results indicate that the rents of star college football players being captured by uni-
versities are economically significant considering they are similar, on average, to the wage
these star players might earn if they were allowed to be paid according to their marginal
productivity.
78See Getz and Siegfried (2012) for a discussion of the difficulty associated with accounting for revenues
and expenses in academic institutions. Also, the true marginal cost of fielding a star player might be much
larger than the cost of athletic scholarships. For instance, if star players require more attention or are more
difficult to manage than average player on the team, this marginal cost of an additional star player will not
be captured in the cost of an athletic scholarship.
79The data for 2014 NFL player salaries were collected from http://www.sportscity.com/nfl/salaries/ and
the nominal 2014 values were deflated to real 2012 USD using the consumer price index for all urban
consumers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
80The data for 2014 NFL player salaries by position were collected from http://www.sportscity.com/
nfl/salaries/ and the nominal 2014 values were deflated to real 2012 USD using the consumer price index
for all urban consumers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics. Sports Illustrated (2013) reports
average (nominal) 2014 salaries of simlar magnitudes for Quarterbacks ($3, 840, 017) and Wide Receivers
($1, 803, 338).
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The average salary for an NBA player in 2014 was $4, 390, 800.81 Hence, the average NBA
salary is just over four times the magnitude of the largest MRP estimates in Table 15 and
roughly 21 times the size of the MRP estimate for college players drafted into the NBA.
The size of this latter discrepancy might be surprising given the fact that the MRP estimate
is for college players that were drafted to play in the NBA. However, I would only expect
the average salary for NBA players and the average MRP of college players drafted into
the NBA to be similar if consumers of sports entertainment view college and professional
basketball as reasonably close substitutes and/or if the markets for college and professional
basketball are similar. There are several reasons why this might not be the case. For in-
stance, there are far more regular season games and far fewer teams in the NBA compared
to the NCAA.82 Also, the average NBA team has much more lucrative televisions contracts
and the NBA is consumed internationally, whereas there is virtually no demand for NCAA
basketball outside of the United States. All these factors allow NBA teams to generate
much larger revenues than NCAA teams, which is likely why there are large discrepancies
in the relative values “paid” to their inputs to production (players).83
Even though the player generated rents being captured by institutions are large, reasonable
counter-arguments against the exploitative nature of this arrangement could be made. For
instance, playing football or basketball in college gives players time to grow and mature
both physically and mentally; it also allows them to learn the technical aspects of the game
and improve their skills. These features of playing for a college team prepare athletes to
81The data for 2014 NBA player salaries were collected from http://www.sportscity.com/nba/salaries/
and include all teams excpet the New Orleans Hornets and the Portland Trailblazers, for which these data
were not available. The nominal 2014 average salary was $4, 527, 385, however for comparison with the
estimates, this nominal value has been deflated to real 2012 USD using the consumer price index for all
urban consumers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
82There are 32 professional NBA teams that played 82 regular season games in the NBA 2013–2014 regular
season while there are 351 Division 1 men’s college basketball teams that typically play 30 regular season
games.
83Of course, in the case of the NBA the amount paid is the player’s actual salary, while the maximum
amount paid to college players would be (approximately) their MRP if they were allowed to sell their labor.
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enter into a potentially lucrative labor market as professional athletes. Furthermore, their
commitment to a college team is not a binding contract for the entire four years of an
undergraduate education as players that have developed their skills enough have the option
of leaving college early to pursue a professional career. One could view these forgone rents
as an implicit “tax” or licensing fee that athletes pay for access to the potentially lucrative
professional sports labor market. However, Brown (2012) shows that for the 2004–2005 sea-
son, only around one-third of college football players in his sample will earn NFL incomes
large enough to offset the rents forgone by these players.
There are other reasons why we might not want to compensate college athletes beyond
scholarships of in-kind transfers to cover basic costs and tuition. For instance, in my data,
only about 9% of Division 1 FBS college football players are drafted into the NFL while
only about 1% of Division 1 men’s college basketball players are drafted into the NBA. Keep
in mind, these are just players that are drafted and does not account for players that were
drafted, then subsequently cut from their NFL or NBA team’s full roster. Given that the
chances of making it into professional football or basketball’s labor market from college are
so small, we might worry about students’ unrealistic expectations distorting their human
capital allocation decision. That is, a student’s unrealistic aspirations might cause them
to tradeoff athletics over academics when deciding on what college to attend or to allocate
more time to athletics than academics once in college. Paying college athletes might only
serve to further encourage this distorted allocation of human capital as the additional fi-
nancial incentive might persuade a student on the margin to make the above tradeoff.
Overall, the purpose of this empirical analysis is to focus on the size of the rents being
captured by institutions to help inform the larger debate as to if this practice is exploitative.
Regardless of one’s position on the fairness of the arrangement, the analysis does seem to
indicate that rents generated by the very best college football and basketball players being
109
captured by NCAA member institution are both economically and statistically significant.
2.6 Robustness
Given the panel nature of the data, there are several econometric methods that could
have been used to control for unobserved team characteristics, fixed effects being only
one. For example, a random effects model could have been used to estimate Equation
(2.1). Although the additional assumption needed that the time-constant unobserved team
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the number of star players on a team is very unlikely
to hold, I estimated the random effects model and report the results of a Hausman Test.
For the models with each of the six different measures of star football players and eight
measures of star basketball players, the Hausman Test strongly rejected the null hypothesis
that the coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator are equal to those estimated
using fixed effects (Prob > χ2 = 0.0000 in all cases).84 Hence, the fixed effect specification
appears to be the appropriate one. In what follows, I present the results of a first difference
estimation of Equation (2.1) as well as a lag revenue model and compare these results with
the MRP estimates for star players in Ta bles 13 and 15. For basketball, I present an
additional robustness check and report fixed effects estimates for the subsample of Division
1 men’s basketball teams that also have Division 1 FBS football programs.
2.6.1 First Difference Model
An alternative way to account for unobserved team characteristics in Equation (2.1) is to
transform it using first differences
∆yi,t = η∆Stari,t + ∆Xi,tγ + θi + ∆δt + ∆δc + ∆i,t (2.3)
84The value of the χ2 test statistic was at or above 40 for all six football star measure regressions and 61
for all eight basketball star measure regressions.
110
and estimate the first difference estimator ηˆ. The first difference model requires a weaker
exogeneity assumption than the fixed effects estimator in that i,s only has to be uncorre-
lated with the covariates for s = t, t−1. If there is any feedback from i,t to Stari,t that goes
farther back than one period, the first difference estimator will be consistent whereas the
fixed effect estimator will not. Given this, I can compare the fixed effect and first-difference
estimators to see if they are similar. If the differences in these two estimates cannot be
attributed to sampling error, we should worry about the validity of the strict exogeneity
assumption in the fixed effect estimation.
For football, the first difference estimation of Equation (2.3) is reported in Table 19. Com-
paring the first difference estimates with the fixed effect estimates in Table 13 we see that
the estimates are fairly close to each other, particularly for star measures 1 and 3-6. It is
reasonable to conclude that these differences are likely attributable to sampling error since
the first-difference estimator uses 10% less observations than the fixed effect estimator and
these first-difference estimates are not statistically different from the fixed effect estimates.
Furthermore, recall that there are only 46 Heisman finalists in the full sample, which is
by far the smallest category. Therefore, this measure is likely to be the most sensitive to
sample size as it becomes increasingly difficult to detect any true effect of star players the
fewer number of stars we observe. This may be why the estimates for Heisman finalists are
not estimated as precisely in the first difference regression and the disparity between them
and the fixed effect estimates are the largest. In fact, the estimates that are the closest to
the fixed effects estimates (4-6) are the star player measures with the largest number of star
players. For basketball, the first difference estimation of Equation (2.3) is reported in Table
20. Comparing the first difference estimates to the fixed effect estimates in Table 15 we
see that the estimates are very close to each other, both in terms of size and statistical sig-
nificance with the first-difference and fixed effects estimates not statistically different from
each other. Therefore, as is the case with football, it seems reasonable to conclude that
any differences between first-difference and fixed effects estimates are likely attributable to
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sampling error.
Ultimately, the fixed effects model is my preferred specification for three reasons. First,
I prefer to estimate the star player’s MRP from a larger sample of observations and 10%
of the observations are lost using the first-difference estimator. Second, if the exogeneity
assumption holds contemporaneously and for one-period lag—which seems plausible after
controlling for one and two year lags of Stari,t, Winsi,t, and the other controls—then the
fixed effects estimator might be better because its inconsistency shrinks to zero at rate 1/T ,
which is not the case for the first difference estimator. Lastly, under the null hypothesis that
the model in Equation (2.1) is correctly specified, the fixed effect and first-difference esti-
mators will differ only because of sampling error if T ≥ 3. Then because the first-difference
estimates are relatively close to the fixed effect estimates and statistically indistinguishable,
I take this as evidence supporting the validity of the strict exogeneity assumption of the
fixed effect model. However, this does not provide a formal test ruling out the potential for
omitted variables because it might still be the case that omitted variables are biasing the
fixed effects and first-difference estimates in the same way. Although, in order for this to be
the case, the omitted variables that we should be worried about are those that are correlated
with the number of star players in t and t− 1 due to the weaker exogeneity assumption of
the first-difference estimator. This information is useful because it means that the omitted
variables that are likely to cause the most concern are those that are endogenous with at
most a one-period lag.
This could partially alleviate concerns discussed earlier regarding omitted variables associ-
ated with a team’s recruiting process. Since the recruiting process takes place more than
one year before these players are designated as stars, the results discussed in this section
might imply that team fixed effects and the included controls for recruiting effort are largely
sufficient to minimize concerns over omitted variables related to a team’s recruiting effort.
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As previously discussed, the other source of omitted variables are team-level variables that
are potentially driving revenues with contemporaneous wins being an obvious one. While I
do control for numerous macro-level and team-level variables that could influence a team’s
revenues over t − 1 and t − 2, I can never entirely rule out omitted variables bias in the
fixed effect framework of Section 2.4. That the difference between the fixed effects and first-
difference estimators is likely due to sampling error, coupled with the fact that including
contemporaneous wins does not drastically change the fixed effect MRP estimates, seems
to provide reasonable evidence that the estimates are not grossly biased due to omitted
variables.
2.6.2 Lag Revenues Model
One could argue that past football and basketball program revenues influence future rev-
enues and that omitting lagged values of revenues in Equation (2.1) is a potential source of
model misspecification or omitted variables bias. If so, a model for football or basketball
program revenues might look like this
yi,t = β1Stari,t + β2yi,t−1 + β3yi,t−2 +Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + i,t (2.4)
where Xi,t contains the same control variables as before. The main differences between
this model and Equation (2.1) is the inclusion of one and two years of lagged football or
basketball program revenues and the exclusion of conference and team fixed effects. It is
important to exclude these fixed effects because, as Nickell (1981) points out, OLS estimates
of a dynamic panel model that includes fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity
can be severely biased due to correlation between the fixed effects and the lag dependent
variable built into the specification.85
85Judson and Owen (1999) further show that this bias is inversely related to T and that the bias is
problematic even with T as large as 30.
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I estimate the model in (2.4) using OLS and present the results in Tables 21 and 22. The
coefficient on lagged football program revenues is highly significant for all six measures of
star player, indicating that an additional dollar of football program revenues in the previous
year is associated with around 63 cents of additional revenue in the current year. Likewise
the coefficient on lagged basketball program revenues is highly significant for all eight mea-
sures of star player, indicating that an additional dollar of basketball program revenues in
the previous year are associated with around 44 cents of additional revenue in the current
year.
For football, the robustness of the fixed effects results are encouraged by the fact that the
estimates of star player MRP for measures (1,4-6) under the lag model are close and statis-
tically indistinguishable to the fixed effects estimates in Table 13. However, the estimates
for Heisman finalists and Heisman nominees under the lag model are quite different and not
statistically significant (although still statistically indistinguishable from their fixed effect
estimates). This is likely due to the fact that I am unable to control for athletic conference
fixed effects in the lag model and a few conferences produce the majority of Heisman nomi-
nees and finalists. For instance, out of the thirteen conferences in the data from 2003-2012,
four of them produced just over 64% of Heisman nominees and almost 82% of Heisman
finalists.86 A similar feature of the data exists for All-Americans with the same four con-
ferences producing almost 77% of All-American players.87. Similarly, for basketball the
robustness of the fixed effects estimates are supported by the fact that the estimates for all
eight measures of star player MRP under the lag model are very close and not statistically
different from the fixed effects estimates in Table 15.
Although the lag model of Equation (2.4) might seem appealing, it is difficult to come
up with an economic reason for why past football and basketball program revenues would
86Those conferences were The Big 12, The Big Ten, The PAC-10 and the SEC.
87By contrast, these same four conferences only produce 43% of the star players measures (3-6).
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influence current football program revenues in ways not being controlled for in the fixed
effect regressions. However, it is easy to come up with examples of unobserved team char-
acteristics that might be correlated with the number of star players on a team that also
influence football and basketball program revenues. For instance, a team’s geographic lo-
cation, athletic legacy, and “sporting culture” are likely correlated with the number of star
players on those teams and affect their ability to generate revenues. Likewise, because some
athletic conferences generate both more revenues and star players, it is important to be able
to control for both team and conference fixed effects, which cannot be done under the lag
model specification. Hence, the fixed effect model is still preferred while the lag model
results provide evidence that the fixed effect estimates are fairly robust to this alternative
model specification.
2.6.3 Basketball Programs With Division 1 FBS Football Programs
The above analysis estimating star basketball player MRP includes 282 of the 351 men’s
Division 1 basketball teams. However, many of these teams come from small schools whose
basketball programs probably do not generate large revenues. One might argue that it
makes more sense to focus on the Division 1 basketball teams of schools that also field a
Division 1 FBS football program. The rational behind this idea is that using a sample
where the majority of programs are from smaller schools might result in smaller estimates
of a player’s MRP because basketball programs at schools that also have an FBS football
program tend to be big-name programs. These big-name athletics programs tend to be
housed at larger, more recognized universities and are able to generate higher revenues.
While the school fixed effects and other control variables included in the analysis should
account for this, it is useful as a robustness check to look at the subsample containing only
these big-name schools to see if the MRP estimates change significantly.
Table 23 reports summary statistics for 119 Division 1 men’s basketball teams whose insti-
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tutions also fielded Division 1 FBS football teams over the sample period 2003–2012. The
differences between this subsample and the full sample statistics in Table 9 are immediately
obvious with average basketball program revenues almost twice as high and the average
undergraduate population larger by nearly 7,000 students. This subsample of teams also
tends to perform better, winning two more games on average, going to the NCAA tourna-
ment more often and performing better in the tournament. The fixed effect estimates from
Equation (2.1) of the MRP for star players on Division 1 basketball teams that also field a
FBS football team are reported in 24. Comparing these estimates with those from the full
sample of teams in Table 15 reveals very similar results both in terms of magnitude and
statistical significance.
It is worth noting that the majority of star players in the data come from one of the big-
name teams in the subsample. For example, 60% of players drafted into the NBA come
from one of these teams along with 77% top 5 and 66% top 10 draft picks. Likewise, 89%
of Award Winners, 78% of All-American first team members and 76% of All-Americans
come from basketball teams whose institutions also have an FBS football team. Therefore,
it is not too surprising that the MPR estimates between the subsample and the full sample
are quite close. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the MRP estimates do not change much
when considering this subsample of the data.
2.7 Ex-Ante Star Player Measures
The empirical analysis so far has focused on definitions of star players that rely on ex-post
measures of player performance. One advantage of my data is that it allows me to define
ex-ante measures that designate a player as a star based on how players are expected to
perform in college before signing with a college team. These measures are based on the Ya-
hoo! Sports Rivals.com rankings, which aggregates information from professional recruiting
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analysts, high school, and college coaches about high school football and basketball players’
expected performance at the collegiate level. To the extent that the Rivals.com rankings are
a good proxy for the information set of college recruiters looking to recruit top high school
talent, estimating the MRP of ex-ante star college players is interesting for two reasons.
First, since the previous analysis of ex-post star players seems to indicate that they generate
significant revenues for their teams, it is interesting to see if college recruiters are able to
identify players beforehand that will generate significant revenues for the team. This ability
(or inability) has important implications for how we might compensate college athletes if
they were to be compensated beyond the current arrangement. Second, the ability of college
recruiters to identify players ex-ante that will generate significantly more revenues than the
average player for the school is important for questions concerning omitted variables related
to the recruiting process biasing the MRP estimates of ex-post stars. That is, if recruiters
can identify talented players ex-ante that will generate significantly more revenues than the
average player for the school and since these players are likely to become ex-post stars play-
ers, then the MRP estimates will be biased as unobserved variables related to the recruiting
process will be correlated with both revenues and the number of ex-post star players on a
team.
Recall the six measures of ex-ante football star and the single measure of ex-ante basketball
star in Table 12 discussed in Section 2.3. Ideally, these ex-ante measures would result in
the same frequency of star players as the ex-post measures to facilitate comparison of the
estimates. The frequencies in Table 12 compared with those in Tables 10 and 11 reveal that
the ex-ante measures are slightly more permissive, however, the most restrictive definitions
of ex-ante star player were used given how Rivals.com ranks football and basketball recruits.
Equation (2.1) is used to estimate the MRP of ex-ante star players using fixed effects, where
the only modification from the empirical analysis in Section 2.4 is that the regression is run
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over the sample 2005 − 2012 and Starsi,t are defined to be one of the ex-ante star player
measures in Table 12.
2.7.1 Results
The estimates for ex-ante star football and basketball player MRPs from a fixed effects es-
timation of Equation (2.1) are reported in Tables 25 and 26. Huber-White standard errors
are computed, clustering by team, and reported in parentheses. For football, the MRP esti-
mates for all ex-ante measures of star player are not statistically significant while the MRP
estimates for ex-ante basketball stars are only statistically significant at the 10% level. It is
worth reiterating that the MRP estimates from Equation (2.1) using fixed effects measure
the marginal revenue generated by a star player on a team relative to the average player
on that team and the ex-ante estimates in Tables 25 and 26 have the same interpretation.
Therefore, these results suggest that there is no statistical evidence that recruiters are able
to identify players who will generate more revenues than the average player on the team.
To be clear, these results do not say that recruiters cannot identify revenue generating
talent ex-ante. For example, suppose that the average basketball player at Duke generates
$300, 000 in revenues while the average player at the University of Utah only generates
$50, 000. The results imply that even if Duke’s recruiters can sign players that will generate
higher revenues, neither Duke’s nor Utah’s recruiters can identify star players ex-ante that
will generate more revenues than what the average player on each team would generate.
Keep in mind, this conclusion relies on the assumption that the information aggregated by
Rivals.com is a reasonable approximation of the information set that recruiters have when
recruiting players to their teams. One implication of these results is that if the NCAA
were to allow athletes to be paid for their athletic ability, then universities should prefer a
compensation scheme that puts less weight on up-front compensation and more weight on
a performance bonus, paid after a player’s ability to generate revenues is revealed.
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Expected and Unexpected Star Players
From the previous section, there appears to be little evidence in football and weak evidence
in basketball that college recruiters can identify players ex-ante that will generate signifi-
cantly more revenues than the average player for their college teams. While this might help
assuage concerns of omitted variable bias associated with recruiting effort, this result holds
on average and does not rule out the possibility that certain recruiters might be able to
identify players ex-ante that will generate more revenues than the average player on their
team. Furthermore, if players that were expected to be good ex-ante turn out to be star
players ex-post and if these players generate significantly more revenues than the average
player relative to unexpected stars, we might still worry about omitted variables bias in
recruiting. Therefore, it is useful to decompose the ex-post measures of star player into
their “expected” and “unexpected” components.
For football, I define “expected” stars to be ex-post star players that were also designated
as a Top Rivals star ex-ante. These are players that college recruiters expected to be star
college players that turned out to be stars according to the relevant ex-post measure. I
choose to use only the Top Rivals ranking for football because this is the ex-ante measure
that is most analogous to the ex-post measures in Table 10, both in terms of the criteria
defining star players and in the relative frequency of these players in the data. Then “un-
expected” stars are just the ex-post star players that were not designated as Top Rivals
stars ex-ante. These are players that college recruiters did not expect to be star college
players that turned out to be stars ex-post. Likewise, for basketball, I define expected stars
to be ex-post star players that were also designated as a Rivals.com 5 Star recruit with
unexpected stars being ex-post star players that were not designated as a Rivlas.com 5 Star
recruit.
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Equation (2.1) is used to estimate the MRP of expected and unexpected star players us-
ing fixed effects, where the only modification from the empirical analysis in Section 2.4
is that the regression is run over the sample 2005 − 2012 and Starsi,t is decomposed
into its mutually exclusive components ExpectedStarsi,t and UnexpectedStarsi,t where
Starsi,t = ExpectedStarsi,t +UnexpectedStarsi,t. Table 27 reports the MRP for expected
and unexpected football stars with Huber-White standard errors, clustered by team, re-
ported in parentheses. Immediately from the table it is apparent that the MRPs of unex-
pected stars are statistically significant for all measures of star player except for Heisman
finalists. The fact that the MRP of expected stars are not statistically significant for all
but All-American and Heisman finalists might give one pause. However, this is likely due
to the fact that there are far fewer expected than unexpected stars across all measures and
there might just not be enough power to identify the effect for expected stars when jointly
estimating the two coefficients. The results for basketball are reported in 28 with the MRP
of unexpected stars being statistically significant at the 5% level for All-American first team
and drafted players with top draft picks and top 20 points scorers significant at the 10%
level. As with football, the fact that the MRP of expected stars are not statically significant
for many of the star measures is likely due to lack of power coming from few observations.
The fact that unexpected football and basketball stars tend to significantly impact revenues
helps mitigate concerns that skilled players who turn into stars are being selected by top
recruiters ex-ante and this selection is biasing the MRP estimates. Furthermore, F-stats
and p-vales reported at the bottom of Tables 27 and 28 reveal that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coefficient estimates for expected and unexpected stars are statistically
different from each other for almost all star measures.88 Simply put, it appears there is
88The lone exception is the MRP estimates for expected and unexpected basketball players that were in the
top 20 point scorers. Looking at the individual data reveals that there are two well known NBA basketball
players that were Rivals.com 5 star rated and top 20 points scorers in college: James Harden and Chris
Humphries. Since there are only nineteen expected stars in this category this estimate is likely sensitive to
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no statistical difference between a star’s impact on team revenues who was expected to be
a star and one who was a surprise. Although concerns over omitted variables biasing the
MRP estimates through recruiting’s selection process cannot completely be ruled out, these
results are encouraging for the MRP estimates of ex-post stars.
2.8 Alternative Empirical Strategies
Although the empirical strategy presented thus far attempts to account for omitted vari-
ables as well as possible, we can never be completely sure that the MRP estimates presented
above have a causal interpretation. When thinking about methods for inferring causality,
one immediately looks for sources of exogenous variation in the number of star players un-
related to team revenues. In the current context, it is natural to think about using injuries
and suspensions as potential sources of exogenous variation as these are plausibly random
events that affect in the number of star players in a given season.
While injuries and suspensions are not identified directly in my data, I can use the per-
centage of games played by each player in my individual-level data to narrow down the
search for injuries and suspensions. To this end, for each measure of ex-post star football
and basketball player, I collected a list of players that were designated as stars in year t
and played no more than half of their team’s games in year t + 1. Then for each of these
players, I manually searched their player biographies on the websites of their respective
athletic programs to determine if the low games-played percentage was due to injury or
suspension. Having identified star players that played no more than 50% of games in the
outliers. That is, the fact that expected stars in this category are statistically different than unexpected
stars and much larger than the composite estimate in Table 15 might really be due to the “Harden” and
“Humphries” effect if they happen to be extremely valuable to their college teams realative to the average
unexpected star in that category. The reason we do not see this same pattern in the top 10 points scorers
measure is likely beacuse these two players are not included in that measure, which just suggests that top
points scorer might just be a fairly noisy measure of quality as it pertains to players ability to generate
revenues.
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subsequent season due to injury or suspension, I then determined which of these injuries or
suspensions were “season ending.” I define a season ending injury or suspension as being
one that causes a player to miss at least the last-half of the season and rule out players that
were “plagued by injury.” For instance, I do not count a player who was injured for part
of the season, then came back from injury to play the remaining games, even if they ended
up playing only 40% of games that season. The reason I do this is that I want the injury
or suspension to cleanly end a star player’s contribution to team output. For example, I do
not want to count players that were injured, then came back from injury to help their team
into the NCAA tournament or a bowl game as this will muddy any identification strategy
using injured players to estimate a star player’s effect on revenues.
Table 29 reports the number of injured star players I was able to identify in the data. As
seen in the table, there are shockingly few season ending injuries.89 This low number of
identified injuries does not appear to be due to missing data. For instance, checking my
team and individual-level data reveals that very few players and no teams are missing the
number of games played, which would cause my initial screening to potentially miss a num-
ber of injuries. Furthermore, in manually searching for the biographies of the screened list
of players, I did not encounter anyone that I could not find a biography for, which makes
sense given these are all star players. The likely explanation for the low number of identified
injuries is simply that season ending injuries are not extremely common events, which is
compounded by the fact that stars players are very rare in the first place. Despite the lim-
ited number of injuries and suspensions in the data, I use this source of exogenous variation
to supplement my previous estimates of star player MRP using instrumental variables and
a generalized difference-in-difference approach.
89Including players who had seasons “plagued by injury” does not add a significant number of injured stars
to the data. Therefore, I continue with season ending injuries and suspensions because these potentially
provide cleaner identification of the effect of interest.
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2.8.1 Instrumental Variables
An instrumental variables framework appears to be the method of choice in dealing with
potential exogeneity in the literature that attempts to estimate the MRP of star college ath-
letes. However, as already discussed, there are issues with the validity of the instruments
used in the literature, particularly with satisfying the exclusion restriction and the problem
with weak instruments. Although there is no guarantee that using injuries will provide a
better instrument, I use the number of injured star players last season as an instrument
for the number of star players in the current season.90 This instrument should satisfy the
exclusion restriction required for the instrumental variables estimator as it is plausible to
assume the number of injured stars last year should only affect the team’s current revenues
through its effect on the number of star players in in the current year.
I use this instrument to exactly identify the number of star players (Stari,t) in an instru-
mental variables estimation of star player MRP in Equation (2.1). All the control variables
used in the fixed effects analysis mentioned in Section 2.4 are included as well as team,
conference and year fixed effects. The instrumental variable regression results for football
are reported in Table 30. Immediately we see that none of the estimates are statistically
significant with the exception of the All-American estimates, which are significant at the
10% level. If one believes that the instrumental variables estimates captures the “true ef-
fect” in a way that the OLS fixed effects estimates do not, then one might be tempted to
conclude that star football players do not generate revenues for their teams. However, I
would argue that these results should not be taken very seriously for two reasons.
First, the instrument is, for the most part, very weak since almost every F-statistic from
the first stage regressions (reported at the bottom of the table) are less than ten.91 Further-
90In the remainder of the paper, when I refer to injuries, I am referring to injuries and suspensions.
91The full first stage results are reported in Table 55 of Appendix A.7.
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more, even though the F-statistics for the instrument in the case of All-Americans appears
quite strong, in this context, it might be misleading. The reason is that since there are
so few injured stars, the instrument is going to contain mostly zeros. Likewise, there are
very few star players so the variable Starsi,t will also contain mostly zeros. Therefore, the
instrument might be “highly predictive” overall because it correctly “predicts” when there
are no star players even though it might almost never predict the number of star players
for non-zero values of injured players and star players.
Second, since any omitted variables are likely to be positively correlated with both the
number of star players and a team’s revenues, we would expect the instrumental variables
estimates to be lower than the OLS estimates reported in Table 13. Even if we think that
the instrument is valid for All-Americans, the MRP estimate using instrumental variables is
larger than the MRP estimate for All-Americans using OLS. For the instrumental variable
estimator βˆIV , one can show that in the univariate case plimβˆIV = β +
corr(z,u)
corr(z,x)
σ(u)
σ(x) where
z is the instrument for endogenous x and u is the error term in the regression. Recall that
there are very few star players, which means that Starsi,t contains mostly zeros. Hence,
there is not a lot of variation in the endogenous variable, which will bias βˆIV up as σ(x) is
very small.
For completeness, the instrumental variable results for basketball are reported in Table 31
for the only two measures of star player that had any injuries.92 Recall there was only
one injured star player in the top 10 and 20 points scorers, and in the former case, the
instrument happens to be collinear with some of the control variables in the regression,
which is why there is no estimate for this measure. The instrumental variable estimates for
basketball should not be taken seriously for the same reasons that the football estimates
are suspect. Overall, the instrumental variables approach does not seem feasible given the
92The full first stage results for basketball are also reported in Table 57 of Appendix A.7.
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limited number of injuries and suspensions in the data. It is likely that we would need
to observe many more seasons of player data to get enough star players and injuries or
suspensions if we are to reliably identify the true effect when using them as instrumental
variables.
2.8.2 Difference In Difference
Although the instrumental variables approach was not entirely feasible, I can use the loss
of a star player due to injury or suspension to estimate star player MRP in a generalized
Differences-In-Differences framework for multiple events. Consider the following model for
a single event
yi,t = β(di × pt) + αi + δt + i,t
where yi,t are revenues for team i in year t, di is an indicator for team i being treated in
that particular event and pt is an indicator for treatment having occurred by period t. Also
included are team (αi) and year (δt) fixed effects. Losing a star player due to injury from
one season to the next is one event and this event can affect different teams at different
times. Following ? I create a sample for each event and stack these samples, identifying each
separate season (two adjacent years) as a cohort. This stacked data can then be represented
by the following model
yict = βdict + αic + δtc + ict (2.5)
where c denotes the cohort and dict, the interaction between treatment and the post-
treatment period, with β the difference-in-difference estimator. The fixed effect αic controls
for the treatment within each cohort while δtc controls for post-treatment within each cohort.
For the difference-in-difference estimator β to have a causual interpretation, the treatment
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must be random, which seems plausible in this context. However, the additional parallel
trends assumption needed for identification is that absent treatment, the change in team
revenues for a team that loses a star due to injury would not have been different than the
change in revenues for the teams that do not lose a star due to injury. The advantage of
the multiple events framework is that it allows different teams to be treated at different
points in time and the more events we have, the harder it is to argue that a particular set
of treated teams is driving the result. That is, we would need to come up with a compelling
story as to why the parallel trends assumption is violated for each unique event.
I will define a team as being treated in two ways. First, if the team had exactly one star
player in year t, lost that player due to injury in t + 1 and had zero star players in year
t+ 1. The second definition is identical to the first, except the treated team can have zero
or one star players in year t+ 1, that is, I allow the star to be replaced by exactly one other
star player. The control group of teams are those that had exactly one star player in year
t, did not loose a star player due to injury, and had exactly one star player in year t + 1.
This definition of treatment and control groups is very restrictive. The consequence of this
restriction is that only three measures of star football players (TDYds, PERTDsYDs, and
TopPER) and two measures of star basketball players (Top 10 and 20 points scorers) have
any treated teams in the sample. Furthermore, the number of treatment events is quite
small, which attenuates some of the strengths of this multiple event approach. However,
even though these definitions are restrictive, they help the identification strategy in two way.
First, the parallel trends assumption is more likely to hold as I have defined treatment and
control teams. The reason is that, as currently defined, the difference-in-difference regression
will only be comparing teams that had exactly one star player in a season. Teams that have
a lot of star players are likely much different than teams that have very few star players,
particularly in terms of revenues. Hence, it is more plausible that the trends in revenues
before and after treatment between the treated and untreated teams are similar in making
this restriction since I will not be comparing teams that have a lot of star players with
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those that have few. Second, these definitions of treatment and control provide the cleanest
possible identification for the impact on revenues caused by the loss of a star player and
will not be confounded by the team having a lot of other star players, gaining star players,
or loosing multiple star players in a year.
Gaining Versus Losing a Star Player
Since the differences-in-differences estimator is identified in a completely different way than
the OLS estimates using fixed effects, it might be useful to compare the estimates of a
star player’s MRP under each method. However, the two methods produce MRP estimates
with slightly different interpretations. The differences-in-differences method will estimate
the team revenue lost when a team loses a star player due to injury while the OLS method
using fixed effects or first-differences assumes gaining and losing a star player is symmetric
in terms of its effect on revenues. Therefore, if we want to compare the estimates from
using these two methods, it will be useful to know if there is any difference in the impact
on team revenues between gaining and losing a star player under the OLS framework. To
answer this, consider the following model
∆yi,t = η1∆Stari,t × 1{∆≥0} + η2 |∆Stari,t| × 1{∆<0} + ∆Xi,tγ + θi + ∆δt + ∆δc + ∆i,t
(2.6)
which is identical to the first-difference model of Equation (2.3) with the exception that the
change in the number of star players (∆Stari,t) is decomposed into its non-negative and
negative domains with an indicator function.93
The estimation results of Equation (2.6) for football are reported in Table 32 along with
93Note that the indicator function splits the number of star players into its non-negative and negative
domains using the discrete measure of star player rather than the continuous measure. Also, the absolute
value is taken over the negative domain to help improve the interpretation of the coefficient estimates in
Tables 32 and 33.
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F-statistics for the null hypothesis that the MRPs of gaining and losing a star player are the
same in absolute value. For all star player measures aside from Heisman finalists, the MRP
of gaining versus losing a star player are of similar magnitude (in absolute value) and the
F-statistics imply that they are not statistically different from each other. The asymmetry
in the MRP estimates for Heisman finalists is interesting, particularly because the MRP
of losing a Heisman finalist is not negative (though statistically insignificant). This makes
sense if gaining a Heisman finalist is extremely valuable for the team and if these players
tend to have an affect on revenues after they leave the school. This idea is supported by the
fact that lagged Heisman finalists have large MRP estimates that are highly statistically
significant in the previous first-difference and fixed effects regressions. Table 33 reports the
estimation results of Equation (2.6) for basketball. For all eight star player measures, the
MRP estimates for gaining and losing a star are not statistically different from each other.
Since these results indicate that the impact on revenues of gaining and losing a star football
or basketball player is symmetric, we can reasonably compare the differences-in-differences
MRP estimates in the next section with our previous OLS estimates for star player MRP.94
Difference In Difference Results
The differences-in-differences estimates for losing a star football player due to injury from
Equation (2.5) are reported in Table 34.95 Standard errors are clustered by cohort-athletic
conference because teams more often play teams in their own conference and if one team
94With the exception of Hesiman finalists, however, this measure is not included in the differences-in-
differences analysis since there were no treated teams in the sample under this definition of star football
player.
95The differences-in-differences regressions were run without additional control variables, which allows
me to use a slightly larger sample from 2000-2012. In theory, if the treatment is truly random, adding
controls would only increase the precision of the estimates and should not change the point estimates. In
unreported results, adding additional controls does tend to change the estimates, though not drastically so
in most cases. Although the treatment is plausibly random, the likely reason for this is that there are so few
observations that adding several additional controls makes it more difficult for the regressions to esimate
the coefficients of interest precisely. Therefore, the limited statistical power in these regressions makes it
difficult to distinguish between the point estimates changing due to concerns over the random treatment
assumption versus the demands on the estimates imposed by additional controls. The results reported in
Tables 34 and 35 with controls included are available upon request.
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has a star player injured, it will likely enhance the prospects of its competitors, which could
lead to them winning more often and generating higher revenues. Panel A of the table
reports the results under the definition of treatment that restricts treated teams to having
zero star players in year t+ 1, while Panel B contains the results from the more permissive
definition of treatment allowing for zero or one star players in year t+ 1.
The first thing to notice that these regressions contain very few observations leading to
unreliable standard errors. Furthermore, there are very few treatments that survive under
the current definitions of treatment and control groups. Hence, the lack of statistically sig-
nificant MRP estimates is likely due to low power, rather than the difference-in-difference
estimates revealing that star players do not have an impact on revenues. Much like the in-
strumental variable estimates, the scarcity of injured star players in the data makes it very
difficult for the differences-in-differences estimator to detect the true effect of star players
on revenues if it does indeed exist. In spite of the low power, these estimates might provide
a useful comparison since these estimated coefficients are identified in a completely differ-
ent way than the OLS estimates using fixed effects and first-differences. For instance, the
point estimates in the second and third column of Panel A all lie within the 95% confidence
intervals of the MRP estimates for their counterparts estimated under fixed effects and
first-differences including the MRP for losing a star player in Tables 13, 19 and 32. Under
the slightly more permissive treatment definition in Panel B that contains a few more ob-
servations and treatment events, the MRP estimates in all three columns lie within the 95%
confidence intervals of their counterpart estimates in the aforementioned tables. We see a
similar pattern for the differences-in-differences estimates for losing a star basketball player
due to injury in Table 35. The MRP estimates for both measures of star player in both
panels are within the 95% confidence interval of the MRP estimates for their counterparts
estimated under fixed effects and first-differences including the MRP for losing a star player
in Tables 13, 19 and 32. However, we should be even more cautious regarding the basketball
results due to the fact that there are under one hundred observations in these regressions
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and only two or three treatment events.
Although the differences-in-differences estimates suffer from very low power, the identifica-
tion strategy itself does allow for casual interpretation in a way that is free of the omitted
variables worries of the previous fixed effects estimates. Hence, it is somewhat comforting
that the differences-in-differences estimates of player MRP give similar results to the MRP
estimates for star players using fixed effects. However, we should be cautious in reading
too much into these results as the support is very weak given how few injured star players
we observe in the data. As with the case using instrumental variables, we would need to
observe many more seasons of player data to get enough star players and injuries in order to
have enough statistical power for the difference-in-difference approach to provide definitive
results.
2.9 Scully Method
In Section 2.5, I presented some evidence that star players generate revenues for their uni-
versities through more than just their ability to help the team win games. To provide
further insight into a star player’s ability to generate revenues through mechanisms other
than wins, I estimate the MRP for all eight star basketball player measures using the Scully
Method.96 Recall that the Scully Method assumes the only channel through which star
players can influence revenues is through their contribution to producing wins. In contrast,
the Direct Method I employ above implicitly assumes that star players can impact revenues
for reasons unrelated directly to their ability to produce wins. Hence, if most of the star
player’s ability to impact revenues comes through their contribution to team wins, we would
expect the estimates under the Scully Method and the Direct Method to be of comparable
96The Scully Method is only employed for basketball as it requires computing an individual player’s share
of a team’s wins, which is very difficult to do in football. This is why the Scully Method is really only used
in the context of basketball and baseball where computing a player’s share of wins is more feasible.
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magnitudes and statistical significance.
The first step in the Scully Method is to compute a player’s marginal productivity, which in
this context is a player’s contribution to team wins. Sports Reference provides an estimate
of the number of wins contributed by a player due to his offense and defense, so I use their
measure for win shares here.97 The marginal product for star players is then calculated
by simply taking the average of the win shares for star players across teams and years.
The second step involves estimating the marginal revenue. Given the following model of
basketball revenues
yi,t = ηWinsi,t +Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + δc + δi + i,t (2.7)
where Xi,t contains the same control variables as before. The only difference between this
model and Equation (2.1) is that I have replaced Starsi,t with Winsi,t. Hence, the co-
efficient η is interpreted as the additional revenue associated with and an additional win.
I used fixed effects to estimate the revenue model in Equation (2.7) and report just the
estimate for η in the top panel of Table 36. The marginal products, computed as described,
are reported in the second panel of the table for the eight measures of star players. The
bottom panel of Table 36 reports the marginal revenue product using the Scully Method,
which is just the marginal revenue estimates multiplied by the marginal products for each
star measure.
The Scully Method estimates in Table 36 imply that the MRP of star players ranges from
just under $100, 000 to as much as $150, 000 depending on the star measure used. For
instance, the Scully Method estimates for the MRP of players drafted in the NBA is $99, 321,
which is very close to the estimate of $91, 030 reported by Lane et al. (2014) for the same
97Please see http://www.sports-reference.com/cbb/about/ws.html for details on how they compute the
win share for each player.
131
measure of star player using the Scully Method. However, the more interesting comparison
is between the estimates using the Scully Method and the MRP estimates from the Direct
Method in Table 15. The MRPs from the Scully Method are only about 14% to 49% of the
MRP estimated from the Direct Method (depending on which star measure considered).
On balance, this suggests that a significant portion of a star basketball player’s ability
to generate revenues for their university comes through mechanisms other than the star
player’s ability to produce wins.
2.10 Media Exposure
There are many ways that a star football or basketball player might influence university
revenues that are not directly tied to their ability to win games. For instance, Texas A&M
Foundation President Ed Davis had this to say about the meteoric rise in recognition of
Johnny Manziel, Texas A&M’s star Quarterback from 2012–2013 and the first Freshman
ever to win the Heisman Trophy:
In an era where we are in, effectively, in the news everywhere and you have a
young man like our Quarterback who has been a media magnet and you have
the success you have, I do think that euphoria does spill over into success in
fundraising.98
While Mr. Davis is specifically referring to fundraising for the university, we might think
that football and basketball program revenues more generally can be influenced by a star
player’s media exposure. Consider the following model
yi,t =β1Stari,t + β2Stari,t ×NewsHitsi,t + β3NewsHitsi,t +Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + δc + δi + i,t
(2.8)
98Allen Reed, “Texas A&M breaks fundraising record with $740 million in donations,” The Eagle, Septem-
ber 17, 2013.
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which is identical to Equation (2.1) with the addition of (NewsHitsi,t), measuring the
number of news media pieces about the football or basketball team, and its interaction
with the number of star players on the team. This interaction term captures the impact on
revenues of an additional news mention when the team has at least one star player. With
this modification, the MRP of a star player is now given by β1 +β2×NewsHits, and since
NewsHits is a continuous variable, I will report the MRP for star players at several points
in the distribution of news mentions.
The number of times a team is mentioned in the news could also be thought of as a proxy for
unobservables involving a university’s long term investment in their football or basketball
program. This is plausible if we believe that a concerted effort by the university to improve
the standing of their team is proxied for by their news media presence. Hence, the model in
Equation (2.8) allows me to indirectly assess the argument made by Harvey Perlman that
athletic programs generate revenues due to long term investments in the program and the
passion or excitement associated with the team. There is, however, another large caveat
here. When interpreting the estimation results of Equation (2.8) it is important to note
that team news mentions (NewsHits) is a bad control since it is also an outcome of the
number of star players. Hence, the statistical significance of the MRP estimates should be
viewed with caution. However, as long as the bad control is biasing the estimate in the
same way for teams across the distribution of news mentions, then the trend of star player
MRP as a function of news mentions is still informative.
With this caveat in mind, fixed effects estimates of a star football and basketball player’s
MRP from Equation (2.8) are presented in Figures 3 and 4 for several points in the distribu-
tion of news mentions. For football, since touchdowns and yards generate more excitement
and are more salient to fans than more technical measures of ability like the PER, I choose
133
to focus just on star measures 1–4.99 The striking takeaway from Figure 3 is the MRP
of a star football player tends to decrease the more frequently a team is mentioned in
the news.100 For example, getting an additional star player is likely to be worth less for
Nebraska (90th percentile) than for Idaho, Ohio, or Utah State (10th percentile) because
Nebraska often has good players and has built a formidable football program and fan base
that always generates a lot of revenues. Whereas for Idaho, Ohio, or Utah State, getting an
additional star player can be quite valuable for the team; both through the star improving
the team’s performance and in producing revenues through increased media exposure and
generating excitement for the team.
For basketball, I focus on star measures 1–3 and include NBA drafted players as these
are likely to be the types of star players generating the most excitement and be the most
salient to basketball fans.101 The results for basketball in Figure 4 are more mixed than
is the case with football. The MRP for drafted players decreases the more frequently a
team is mentioned in the news wile the MRP under the other three measures is flat or
slightly increasing. However, the MRP estimates for drafted players are the only ones that
are statistically significant. Overall, the results from controlling for (and interacting) a
team’s media exposure for basketball and football suggest there might be something to Mr.
Perlman’s argument if we believe that news mentions are a proxy for university investment
into the success of their athletic programs. However, in spite of this observation, it seems
clear from the previous MRP estimates in Tables 13 and 15 that star players generate a
significant amount of revenues each year for their teams on average.
99The star measures 5 and 6 only differ from 4 in how star Quarterbacks are defined and the estimation
results for these measures are available upon request.
100Although the MRP of star players under measure 4 tends to increase, the estimates are not statistically
different from zero for any number of news mentions.
101The estimation results for the other basketball star measures are available upon request.
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2.10.1 Star Player Media Exposure By Position
Equation (2.8) can be slightly modified to estimate the MRP of star players in specific
football positions as follows
yi,t =
∑
pos
(
βpos1 Star
pos
i,t + β
pos
2 Star
pos
i,t ×NewsHitsi,t
)
+ β3NewsHitsi,t (2.9)
+Xi,tγ + θit+ δt + δc + δi + i,t
where pos ∈ {QB,RB,WR}. I limit this analysis to just these three positions since these
are the major offensive positions that are likely to the most salient to the fans, hence
generating the most excitement.102 It is worth reiterating that because of the bad control
issue, the point estimates should be interpreted with caution, however, the trend in star
player MRPs along the news distribution is still informative. Fixed effects estimates of a
star football player’s MRP by position from Equation (2.8) are presented in Figures 5 and
6 for several points in the distribution of news mentions. The MRPs of star Quarterbacks
and Running Backs tend to decrease the more frequently a team is mentioned in the news.
The same is true for All-American and Heisman nominated Wide Receivers. However,
the trend is increasing for Wide Receivers that were Heisman finalists or among the top
10 in touchdowns or yards. For the former case this might be because Wide Receivers
are infrequently nominated for the Heisman relative to other positions, only four of which
were Heisman finalists.103 Hence, these four players might really be so much better than
an average Wide Receiver that they would generate higher revenues for any team, even
augmenting revenues for well known teams. Likewise, a Wide Receiver among the top 10 in
touchdowns or yards might also augment revenues through generating bigger, more exciting
plays with longer and more spectacular receptions. Although potentially interesting, these
102Also, the only measure of star that includes any positions other than these three is the All-American
measure and the MRP for All-Americans in other positions were not statistically significant in the prior
analysis.
103Over the sample 2003-2012, only 11% of players nominated for the Heisman are Wide Receivers while
28% were Running Backs and 51% were Quarterbacks. The four Wide Receiver Heisman finalists are Justin
Blackmon, Larry Fitzgerald, Marqise Lee and Michael Crabtree.
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speculations require further investigation. Overall, the position specific regressions give
results similar to the aggregate star regressions in the previous section, implying that having
a star player is worth less for teams that are more frequently mentioned in the news.
2.11 Conclusion
The NCAA has long prevented college athletes from being paid directly for their athletic
ability. This practice has been defended under the guise of amateurism, which seems at
odds with the public perception that college athletes generate millions of dollars in revenues
for their universities and receive little in return. Increasingly, the NCAA’s claims of am-
ateurism appear anachronistic as the business of collegiate athletics has begun to appear
indistinguishable from a professional sports organization. This observation has led many
people to question the fairness of restricting payment to players, which has pointedly mani-
fest itself in a series of recent lawsuits. One recent lawsuit claims that the NCAA’s practice
of price-fixing collegiate players’ compensation violates U.S. anti-trust laws under the Sher-
man Act. Central to this claim is that the NCAA restricts an athletes compensation to
grant-in-aid, limiting competition and capturing the rents that should rightfully go to play-
ers who generate millions of dollars a year in revenues for their universities. This argument
implies that if a competitive labor market for college players existed, they would be able
to capture a large proportion of these rents as players would be compensated according to
their marginal revenue product. In order to inform the debate, this paper provides esti-
mates for a college football and basketball player’s marginal revenue product by examining
the contribution of star players to athletic program revenues.
Overall, I find the marginal revenue product of a Division 1 FBS college football player
is just over $1.2 million for All-American players, while the marginal revenue product of
Heisman finalists and Heisman nominees are $2.1 and $1.8 million respectively. Also, the
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marginal revenue product is around $600, 000 for football players ranked among the top 10
by performance statistics. Looking at individual positions, I find marginal revenue prod-
ucts for star Quarterbacks ranging from $1 to $4.6 million a year on average and $2.9
million for star Wide Receivers. For basketball, I find that players who won the Wooden
Award, Naismith Award, or were named the most outstanding player in the NCAA Tour-
nament are worth up to $1.1 million a year while players named to the All American First
Team are worth up to $654, 000. Also, players that were drafted, a top 5 or top 10 NBA
draft pick, or were in the top 10 or 20 points scorers in a season are worth up to around
$200, 000−$400, 000 a year. These findings suggest that star football and basketball players
are worth a significant amount to the institutions whose teams they play for, which gives
us some insight into the magnitude of the economic rents generated by star players that are
being captured by universities with Division 1 football and basketball programs.
In response to claims of unfairness, some have argued that the reason top collegiate ath-
letics programs generate significant revenues is a function of the university’s long term
investment in these programs, fan enthusiasm, and alumni excitement for the team rather
than individual player efforts. To indirectly asses this claim, I use the number of times a
football or basketball team is mentioned in the news media as a measure of excitement for
the team. In addition, this measure is likely a reasonable proxy for a university’s long term
investment in their football or basketball programs. Incorporating this measure into the
analysis reveals that star football and basketball players tend to be worth less to teams who
are more frequently mentioned in the news. This result provides some tentative support
to the counter-argument, however, even in light of this observation it seems clear that star
football and basketball players generate a significant amount of revenues each year for their
universities. Ultimately, the normative question whether college athletes should be com-
pensated beyond what the current NCAA rules allow must be decided by the players, fans,
and institutions that make college athletics possible. This paper provides a quantitative
analysis to aid and inform that discussion.
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Table 8
College Football Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for varibles used in the regression analysis over the sample period 2003-2012.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 10% 90%
Football Program Revenues† 23,662,588 19,671,888 2,392,553 111,329,618 5,346,434 54,708,011
Wins 6.59 3.03 0 14 2.00 11.00
Number of Bowl Games 5.55 2.88 0 10 1.00 9.00
Number of Bowl Games Won 2.79 2.00 0 8 0.00 6.00
Strength of Schedule 0.58 4.24 -10.89 9.68 -5.48 5.74
Points Allowed Per Game 25.87 6.82 8.20 47.60 17.30 35.15
Yards Allowed Per Game 371.98 57.33 183.60 526.10 298.85 450.05
Passing Yards Allowed Per Game 220.33 34.83 111.50 340.40 175.85 266.40
Passing TDs Allowed Per Game 1.52 0.49 0.40 3.30 0.90 2.20
Rushing TDs Allowed Per Game 151.65 39.39 43.40 276.80 102.60 207.10
Rushing Yards Allowed Per Game 1.49 0.61 0.20 4.10 0.80 2.30
Avg. Distance From Good Players‡ 1,022 271 747 1,833 801 1,529
Undergraduate Population 19,985 8,708 2,672 59,382 8,962 31,552
Per-Capita Personal Income† 39,615 4,911 29,081 56,713 34,086 46,221
Growth in Per-Cap. Personal Inc. 1.24 2.52 -11.26 10.22 -1.88 4.04
City Population 336,022 622,655 12,731 3,857,799 28,756 750,663
State Population 10,723,073 9,462,480 503,453 38,041,430 2,712,335 24,801,761
Number of News Articles 1,025 994 0 7,368 213 2,332
Observations 1,040
Number of Teams 104
†: Real 2012 U.S. Dollars. ‡: Miles.
Table 9
College Basketball Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for varibles used in the regression analysis over the sample period 2003-2012.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 10% 90%
Basketball Program Revenues† 3,927,306 4,623,809 165,471 44,093,915 882,557 9,982,928
Wins 16.70 6.48 0 38 8 25
NCAA Tournament Appearances 0.74 0.94 0 4 0 2
NCAA Tournament Round 2 0.68 1.03 0 5 0 2
NCAA Tournament Sweet 16 0.44 0.88 0 5 0 2
NCAA Tournament Elite 8 0.14 0.49 0 3 0 0
NCAA Tournament Final 4 0.07 0.29 0 2 0 0
NCAA Tournament Final 0.04 0.20 0 2 0 0
NCAA Tournament Winner 0.04 0.24 0 2 0 0
Teams in Athletic Conference 10.95 1.97 4 16 8 13
AP Ranked Teams in Conference 1.04 1.62 0 7 0 3
NCAA Tournament Teams in Conference 2.45 2.15 0 11 1 6
Final Four Teams in Conference 0.17 0.43 0 2 0 1
Strength of Schedule 0.46 5.20 -13.38 12.04 -6.04 7.66
Avgerage Distance From Good Players‡ 991 303 704 1,880 744 1,638
Undergraduate Population 13,602 9,349 1,157 59,382 3,182 26,408
Per-Capita Personal Income† 41,525 6,140 29,081 60,748 34,670 51,441
Growth in Per-Capita Personal Income 1.25 2.34 -11.26 10.22 -1.76 3.93
City Population 507,864 1,357,731 328 8,336,697 13,864 817,159
State Population 11,032,143 9,384,200 503,453 38,041,430 2,783,785 24,309,039
Number of News Articles 273 407 0 3,946 35 705
Observations 2,820
Number of Teams 282
†: Real 2012 U.S. Dollars. ‡: Miles.
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Table 10
College Football Star Player Measures
This table reports the number of star players and their relative frequency in the data over the sample period 2003-2012
for six different measures of star players: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3)
Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star
Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or
yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. The column %Plyrs denotes the frequency
of star players (N/Total Number of Player-Years). The column %Pos denotes the frequency of star players relative
to the total number of player-years in positions eligible for that particular star measure given how the star player
measures are defined. So for star measures (2-6) the relevant denominator is the total number of player-years for
Quarterbacks, Running Backs and Wide Receivers while the denominator for (1) includes all player-years since all
positions are eligible to be designated an All American player. The numbers in parentheses denote the percentage of
players designated as a star player relative to the total number of players in their position.
Aggregated By Position
Star Measure N % Plyrs %Pos QB RB WR TE OL K P
(1) AA Team 256 0.45 0.45 11 27 26 11 47 10 10
(0.37) (0.42) (0.31) (0.35) (1.43) (0.52) (0.91)
(2) HF 46 0.08 0.26 28 14 4
(0.94) (0.22) (0.05)
(3) HN 88 0.15 0.50 50 27 11
(1.67) (0.42) (0.13)
(4) TDsYds 471 0.83 2.65 137 158 176
(4.58) (2.48) (2.10)
(5) PERTDsYds 514 0.98 2.90 180 158 176
(6.02) (2.48) (2.10)
(6) PER 435 0.77 2.45 131 158 176
(3.38) (2.48) (2.10)
LB DB DL
(1) AA Team 31 42 41
Continued (0.37) (0.39) (0.44)
Table 11
College Basketball Star Player Measures
This table reports the number of star players and their relative frequency in the data over the sample period 2003-
2012 for eight different measures of star players: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA
Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4)
NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top
20 Points Scorers. The column % All Plyrs denotes the frequency of star players (N/Total Number of Player-Years).
Star Measure N % All Players
(1) Award Winners 19 0.05
(2) All American First Team 49 0.12
(3) All Americans 105 0.27
(4) NBA Drafted 420 1.06
(5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick 43 0.11
(6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick 83 0.21
(7) Top 10 Points Scorers 90 0.23
(8) Top 20 Points Scorers 178 0.45
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Table 12
Ex-Ante Star Player Measures
This table reports the number of ex-ante star players and their relative frequency in the data over the sample period
2005-2012. Top Rivals is the number of players with a Rivals.com ranking of 6.1, High Rivals is the number of players
with a Rivals.com ranking of 6.0 or better, and 5 Star is the number of players with a 5-star Rivals.com ranking. The
measures denoted with an “OP” are identically defined but are restricted to the offensive positions of Quarterback,
Runningback and Wide Reciever. The column % Plyrs denotes the frequency of star players (N/total number of
player-years), where the denominator in the case of the “OP” measures only includes the total number of player-years
for offensive positions.
Football Star Measure N % Players
Top Rivals 565 1.15
High Rivals 1,355 2.76
5 Star 663 1.35
Top Rivals OP 246 1.71
High Rivals OP 522 3.63
5 Star OP 292 2.03
Basketball Star Measure N % Players
5 Star 422 1.34
140
Table 13
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
fixed effects regression estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman
Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive
touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or
yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star
Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating
(PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating
alone. The full estimation results are reported in Table 38 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 1246194.1∗∗∗ 2110456.4∗∗ 1772393.3∗∗∗ 635939.4∗∗ 620915.0∗∗ 634448.8∗∗
(371109.5) (933544.5) (557169.9) (273501.0) (258687.2) (283630.8)
Starst−1 784531.3∗ 1541987.4∗∗ 2125693.1∗∗∗ 463500.0∗∗ 482399.8∗∗ 629070.6∗∗∗
(407013.3) (746867.3) (613806.8) (209543.1) (199374.2) (222252.8)
Starst−2 549369.2 -211988.4 135553.5 2163.8 131353.3 156726.8
(409714.8) (625430.4) (497226.6) (191799.8) (217898.7) (230384.4)
Winst−1 -33715.1 2350.5 -65521.4 17886.1 10689.7 2674.8
(105185.3) (95311.6) (101668.3) (102868.0) (101990.9) (101220.6)
Winst−2 47950.9 102288.3 84403.1 94650.6 77305.9 74126.7
(56749.6) (61649.3) (62019.0) (66211.5) (68658.6) (65450.8)
CoachCareert−1 2571657.5 1933681.0 2473963.0 1252014.5 1252673.2 1423088.7
(2077061.6) (2066798.6) (2083839.1) (2063261.0) (2066246.2) (2077016.9)
BowlGamet−1 862673.1∗ 696357.4 805688.7∗ 612201.2 626535.5 622163.7
(463602.8) (443760.2) (457479.2) (458303.6) (455531.3) (452238.2)
BowlWint−1 -367095.4 -228156.7 -186535.8 -379685.7 -393601.2 -391951.8
(417701.8) (426506.3) (401965.8) (424937.9) (427281.8) (427480.3)
Distance -24893.5 -26074.5 -25418.8 -20941.5 -20871.2 -21590.8
(16516.5) (17347.0) (17021.0) (17282.3) (17333.0) (17225.4)
PerCapPI 184142.6 257071.2 271520.4 218391.4 212482.4 204275.8
(319267.5) (335018.5) (322485.3) (329132.8) (328377.7) (322979.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.773 0.775 0.779 0.774 0.774 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 14
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players by Position. This
table reports fixed effects regression estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue
product from Model (2.2) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD
at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by
team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans,
(2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touch-
downs or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is
how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone. One and two year lags for star players are included, but not reported here,
please see Table 39 in Appendix A.7 for the full results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDYds PER
Star QB 4608930.9∗∗∗ 3471509.8∗∗ 2214355.5∗∗ 1019893.4∗∗ 924894.5∗∗ 850420.6∗
(1164765.0) (1351570.5) (934112.1) (478396.0) (392270.5) (481015.0)
Star RB 301788.4 608943.1 1048518.4 488427.7 421584.8 444569.6
(631539.7) (1309714.5) (915890.6) (429620.5) (414200.9) (418953.7)
Star WR 2905696.8∗∗ -767266.6 2472387.2 464649.9 423843.9 576679.4
(1405377.0) (3344772.8) (1949165.7) (536098.5) (544325.4) (516914.8)
Star TE 1276488.1
(1060995.6)
Star OL 1817052.2
(1902022.5)
Star K -1413320.6
(917291.1)
Star P 2254073.1
(2391757.8)
Star LB 1343434.9
(1161464.0)
Star DB 900250.4
(809392.0)
Star DL -152692.0
(1029483.9)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1Y and 2Y Star Lags Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.784 0.777 0.782 0.774 0.775 0.776
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players - Wins Included.
This table reports fixed effects regression estimates of a star football player’s marginal
revenue product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real
2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been
clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1)
All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in
pass efficiency rating alone. The full estimation results are reported in Table 43 in Appendix
A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 926451.1∗∗ 1522818.2∗ 1177237.5∗∗ 273485.5 256650.6 277127.5
(402026.1) (889228.6) (544071.6) (305633.1) (292662.4) (304313.0)
Wins 274939.7∗∗∗ 348969.4∗∗∗ 351564.9∗∗∗ 353074.9∗∗∗ 354350.2∗∗∗ 359789.8∗∗∗
(74995.2) (79970.3) (78791.9) (97875.9) (98355.4) (91981.8)
Winst−1 -7345.1 23825.2 -49181.1 42722.7 35500.1 26959.1
(106403.2) (96990.4) (101631.9) (104352.5) (103815.1) (102155.3)
Winst−2 111438.2∗ 149553.4∗∗ 133762.7∗∗ 143999.7∗∗ 128650.6∗ 124482.8∗
(61823.0) (65103.8) (65590.4) (69353.3) (71157.5) (67503.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.779 0.781 0.785 0.780 0.780 0.780
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 17
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players by Position - Wins
Included. This table reports fixed effects regression estimates of a star football player’s
marginal revenue product from Model (2.2) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues
are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have
been clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1)
All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in
pass efficiency rating alone. The full estimation results are reported in Table 44 in Appendix
A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDYds PER
Star QB 4002896.6∗∗∗ 2613205.7∗ 1338255.8 426270.7 344168.7 381371.0
(1144409.0) (1322656.6) (921253.7) (504839.4) (424145.3) (479613.7)
Star RB -71395.5 287602.6 822523.3 164893.3 117441.0 127832.2
(626403.8) (1260993.0) (914857.0) (446548.7) (437817.1) (441013.1)
Star WR 2671726.0∗ -430341.1 2275417.0 250983.5 230554.0 272862.4
(1379730.4) (3370752.1) (1911482.0) (534304.1) (543821.9) (521004.1)
Star TE 709435.3
(1101329.7)
Star OL 1441320.6
(1894931.1)
Star K -1713721.1∗
(943726.6)
Star P 2240380.6
(2448445.7)
Star LB 1100736.3
(1199072.9)
Star DB 514531.4
(879917.8)
Star DL -343706.0
(1057113.1)
Wins 273964.8∗∗∗ 330986.2∗∗∗ 357280.0∗∗∗ 347714.3∗∗∗ 345097.5∗∗∗ 352589.0∗∗∗
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(73651.1) (76827.9) (76999.7) (99527.1) (99837.8) (91104.1)
Winst−1 -26800.7 29252.4 -68389.3 38309.6 32381.0 3188.5
(107121.3) (98462.6) (104010.1) (108974.8) (108002.9) (107336.9)
Winst−2 105240.5∗ 144613.5∗∗ 129268.5∗ 144210.0∗ 117311.1 114024.1
(62154.1) (66425.7) (67525.4) (75426.6) (80101.5) (72453.8)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.790 0.783 0.788 0.780 0.781 0.782
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 19
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
first-difference estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from Model
(2.3) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency.
Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six
different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists
(voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for
Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks
are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or
touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. The
full estimation results are reported in Table 46 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
∆Starst 948869.0∗∗∗ 1469685.8∗ 1445711.1∗∗∗ 779553.1∗∗∗ 748806.3∗∗∗ 750360.7∗∗∗
(349418.3) (828796.5) (506010.5) (235433.4) (225132.4) (254279.4)
∆Starst−1 709250.0∗ 1649626.2∗∗ 2120098.8∗∗∗ 573737.5∗∗∗ 590639.4∗∗∗ 739697.0∗∗∗
(402677.7) (674256.7) (569801.0) (207958.1) (208535.9) (223208.1)
∆Starst−2 163983.3 49332.1 194599.5 -55141.1 76767.2 220992.2
(352823.6) (576912.1) (441350.4) (156582.1) (180291.6) (192410.0)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 936 936 936 936 936 936
R2 0.145 0.155 0.169 0.168 0.165 0.162
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 21
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
OLS estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.4) over the
sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard
errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six different
measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th
place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards.
The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs
and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured
with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards
while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. The full estimation results
are reported in Table 48 in Appendix A.7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 1079047.5∗∗∗ 1238360.9 1133259.8∗ 688562.2∗∗∗ 682939.7∗∗∗ 653164.6∗∗∗
(289289.4) (896004.8) (578029.1) (215182.7) (207103.7) (236700.4)
Revenuest−1 0.634∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0469) (0.0466) (0.0463) (0.0465) (0.0468)
Revenuest−2 0.0682 0.0772 0.0802 0.0779 0.0783 0.0789
(0.0633) (0.0603) (0.0600) (0.0604) (0.0602) (0.0604)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 23
College Basketball Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for varibles used in the regression analysis on the subset of institutions with
both Division 1 men’s basketball and Division 1 FBS football programs over the sample period 2003-2012.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 10% 90%
Basketball Program Revenues† 6,755,197 5,698,829 436,805 44,093,915 1,343,627 14,287,537
Wins 18.71 6.54 3 38 10 27
NCAA Tournament Appearances 0.90 1.00 0 4 0 2
NCAA Tournament Round 2 1.08 1.23 0 5 0 3
NCAA Tournament Sweet 16 0.76 1.06 0 4 0 2
NCAA Tournament Elite 8 0.29 0.68 0 3 0 1
NCAA Tournament Final 4 0.13 0.40 0 2 0 1
NCAA Tournament Final 0.07 0.25 0 1 0 0
NCAA Tournament Winner 0.08 0.36 0 2 0 0
Teams in Athletic Conference 11.65 1.69 8 16 9 14
AP Ranked Teams in Conference 1.95 1.78 0 7 0 4
NCAA Tournament Teams in Conference 3.72 2.31 1 11 1 7
Final Four Teams in Conference 0.31 0.54 0 2 0 1
Strength of Schedule 4.19 4.10 -8.78 12.04 -1.77 8.53
Avgerage Distance From Good Players‡ 1,000 291 722 1,833 762 1,578
Undergraduate Population 20,084 8,856 1,826 59,382 9,096 31,746
Per-Capita Personal Income† 39,781 5,275 29,081 60,748 34,193 46,603
Growth in Per-Capita Personal Income 1.21 2.51 -11.26 10.22 -1.94 4.04
City Population 370,786 917,482 12,004 8,336,697 28,704 668,877
State Population 10,732,329 9,224,355 503,453 38,041,430 2,723,421 24,309,039
Observations 1,190
Number of Teams 119
†: Real 2012 U.S. Dollars. ‡: Miles.
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Table 25
Marginal Revenue Product of Ex-Ante Star College Football Players. This table
reports fixed effects estimates of an ex-ante star football player’s marginal revenue product
from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2005-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an
annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) Top Rivals.com Recruits
(Rivals.com rating of 6.1), (2) High Rivals.com Recruits (Rivals.com rating of 6 or better),
(3) Rivals.com Five Star Rated Recruit. The last three measures (4-6) are the same as (1-3)
except isolated to only the Offensive Positions (OP) of Quarterback, Running Back, and
Wide Receiver. The full estimation results are reported in Table 51 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Riv High Riv 5 Star Top Riv OP High Riv OP 5 Star OP
Stars 291572.2 100964.3 452130.7 844171.8 208951.9 829356.5
(475612.5) (258900.2) (489486.5) (735283.7) (515711.0) (739502.1)
Starst−1 88005.2 -238273.1 447989.4 -478993.5 -315699.6 -366974.8
(359552.0) (263211.1) (287902.5) (422948.6) (293817.5) (405187.3)
Starst−2 477074.7 437018.8 138076.7 174979.9 638371.0 -227883.6
(652932.0) (388483.6) (505997.3) (794618.4) (558654.2) (708797.3)
Winst−1 90967.2 85302.2 61987.1 108444.2 108437.7 93652.0
(102195.1) (93046.1) (102009.4) (95976.1) (92164.1) (96464.9)
Winst−2 25800.3 40110.4 18517.3 62339.0 58695.5 68866.7
(70556.3) (72178.3) (67634.0) (66038.7) (69015.4) (64484.4)
CoachCareert−1 68154.7 139515.6 49078.6 -793740.5 -715548.8 -655175.2
(1985339.3) (2033843.8) (2013093.7) (2029059.8) (2018001.2) (2026444.9)
BowlGamet−1 470586.9 509647.8 546839.3 402070.1 411870.6 450003.5
(434039.5) (411079.8) (443868.3) (448999.1) (424706.8) (434029.7)
BowlWint−1 -368951.0 -373960.5 -355865.7 -276082.9 -342034.9 -248283.7
(462170.7) (448379.6) (459427.9) (443369.3) (442506.3) (451776.9)
Distance -62052.5∗∗ -62379.8∗∗ -56486.6∗ -59148.7∗ -60412.0∗∗ -58522.0∗
(31220.9) (30441.2) (32607.0) (29997.7) (29340.7) (30238.3)
PerCapPI 278907.1 258284.5 242587.2 164184.5 206456.1 169113.4
(355905.3) (348088.1) (347007.7) (365438.6) (369615.6) (360989.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 832 832 832 832 832 832
Within R2 0.745 0.744 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.748
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.977 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.977
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 26
Marginal Revenue Product of Ex-Ante Star College Basketball Players. This
table reports fixed effects estimates of an ex-ante star basketball player’s marginal revenue
product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2005-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at
an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for the ex-ante star measure using the Rivals.com Five Star Rated Recruits are
reported. The full estimation results are reported in Table 52 in Appendix A.7.
(1)
5 Star
Stars 317810.8∗ (172843.9)
Starst−1 -153329.7 (111547.7)
Starst−2 275291.1∗∗∗ (98460.6)
Winst−1 1000.3 (5259.5)
Winst−2 8061.1 (5549.4)
CoachCarTournt−1 72803.8∗∗∗ (25416.2)
NCAATournt−1 222111.5∗∗ (96680.5)
Champt−1 2081114.0∗∗ (813929.5)
Distance -427.9 (1880.0)
Team Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes
N 2256
Within R2 0.641
Adjusted R2 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 27
Marginal Revenue Product of Expected and Unexpected Star College Football
Players. This table reports fixed effects estimates of the marginal revenue products of
expected and unexpected star football players from Model (2.1) over the sample period
2005-2012. Star players are measured according to one of six ex-post performance metrics:
(1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating alone. The number of star players on a team are then decomposed
into “expected” and “unexpected” star players. Expected stars are those who are stars as
measured by ex-post performance who were also top Rivals.com recruits (rated as a 6.1 by
Rivals.com). Unexpected stars are those who are stars as measured by ex-post performance
who were not rated as a top Rivals.com recruit. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. The full
estimation results are reported in Table 53 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Expected Stars 2720071.0∗∗∗ 3734700.3∗∗∗ 2168631.6 1554102.7 1465080.5 1117334.7
(922689.4) (1100931.1) (1435615.8) (1100580.6) (985100.7) (1021568.3)
Unexpected Stars 1105101.6∗∗∗ 1744591.8 1710230.3∗∗∗ 598792.6∗∗ 582975.9∗∗ 610990.1∗∗
(371108.2) (1114123.8) (609148.3) (273821.4) (259170.2) (281788.8)
Starst−1 768413.4∗ 1443313.9∗ 2117296.5∗∗∗ 463260.7∗∗ 481265.2∗∗ 631606.8∗∗∗
(410486.8) (793151.1) (619475.5) (206689.1) (197573.7) (222658.0)
Starst−2 562101.1 -272997.7 122207.5 4177.3 130089.2 155496.2
(412305.3) (637024.6) (500808.9) (191223.5) (215417.6) (228011.4)
Winst−1 -32711.4 3947.3 -65568.7 18878.6 10558.2 2806.8
(105049.4) (96470.6) (101804.2) (103449.3) (102256.7) (101503.3)
Winst−2 41883.4 104381.9∗ 85021.8 94179.9 77280.7 74368.0
(56659.1) (61508.8) (61971.4) (65550.6) (67989.5) (65025.5)
CoachCareert−1 2590453.4 1959475.8 2491360.8 1370681.5 1347287.4 1466239.9
(2063239.9) (2062362.3) (2079642.2) (2052005.7) (2057270.6) (2071838.5)
BowlGamet−1 859515.7∗ 702657.6 807492.9∗ 619397.3 639135.4 625602.6
(462473.7) (444804.2) (455981.4) (457832.0) (452720.1) (451378.9)
BowlWint−1 -382303.9 -234871.3 -185765.7 -384303.1 -397112.6 -391574.2
(420180.1) (427313.7) (403261.7) (422752.6) (426789.8) (427719.2)
Distance -25887.2 -26121.9 -25630.8 -21458.9 -21585.4 -22095.6
(16511.1) (17388.0) (17055.4) (17326.9) (17406.1) (17307.2)
PerCapPI 177110.4 246154.4 270217.5 220570.6 215235.2 207043.5
(317008.1) (332009.2) (321752.5) (327971.9) (327810.2) (322773.5)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.774 0.775 0.779 0.774 0.774 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
F-Stat 3.155 1.592 0.0847 0.743 0.799 0.257
P-Value 0.0787 0.210 0.772 0.391 0.373 0.613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 29
Injured Star Players
This table reports the number of star players that had season ending injuries or suspensions in the data over the
sample periods 2000-2012 and 2003-2012. Injuries or suspensions are deemed to be “season ending” if they caused a
player to miss the last half of the season (or more). Injured or suspended stars are those that were designated stars
in year t and suffered a season ending injury in year t+ 1 (or in the offseason if they took a medical redshirt in year
t+ 1).
Number of Injuries
Football Star Measure 2000-2012 2003-2012
(1) All-Americans 3 3
(2) Heisman Finalists 1 1
(3) Heisman Nominees 2 2
(4) Top 10 TDs or YDs 12 8
(5) Top 10 TDs or YDs or PER 12 8
(6) Top 10 TDs or YDs (Top 10 QB by PER only) 12 8
Number of Injuries
Basketball Star Measure 2000-2012 2003-2012
(1) Award Winners 0 0
(2) All American First Team 0 0
(3) All Americans 0 0
(4) NBA Drafted 0 0
(5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick 0 0
(6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick 0 0
(7) Top 10 Points Scorers 2 1
(8) Top 20 Points Scorers 3 1
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Table 30
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
instrumental variable estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman
Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive
touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how
star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone. The F-statistics and corresponding p-values from the first stage regression are
reported at the bottom of the table. The first stage estimation and full estimation results
are reported in Tables 55 and 56 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 3352048.8∗ 31016231.2 4461936.1 -325897.0 -451761.8 -638610.6
(2029944.2) (63869507.7) (4631794.7) (1761384.2) (1925194.5) (3548987.3)
Starst−1 1145799.4∗∗ 4683159.5 2482640.5∗∗∗ 336907.6 315453.9 374615.7
(449170.6) (7042909.1) (774044.5) (307185.4) (356973.7) (740135.0)
Starst−2 939580.0∗∗ 5721367.3 719271.2 -182067.4 -72906.5 -115251.2
(466323.3) (13159114.6) (1104045.3) (392099.1) (414365.1) (786394.5)
Winst−1 -84306.6 -178687.0 -89140.2 47064.3 43107.9 40095.6
(107624.2) (440717.8) (102550.1) (106177.7) (109552.0) (139836.1)
Winst−2 65369.0 143180.8 82589.2 100274.1 85756.2 85903.6
(66246.3) (154561.8) (64187.3) (67170.6) (68894.9) (74135.2)
CoachCareert−1 3085225.6∗ 4644883.5 2880010.4 1544703.0 1627646.1 1628212.6
(1709751.7) (6796621.5) (1757220.8) (1694773.6) (1751238.6) (1720642.1)
BowlGamet−1 941503.6∗∗ 505151.5 769309.4∗ 554650.7 578689.7 602101.5
(451919.7) (962634.1) (438882.7) (448386.7) (445757.8) (441982.9)
BowlWint−1 -339821.8 116548.9 -107854.0 -366926.5 -352897.6 -328632.0
(344562.8) (1019531.5) (362519.6) (336782.8) (345584.6) (382430.0)
Distance -22733.9 -40357.4 -25887.6∗ -23063.5 -22641.2 -22712.3
(14176.4) (41881.0) (13796.1) (14421.4) (14316.8) (14327.6)
PerCapPI 169103.1 821280.9 339000.2 195442.0 196669.3 195767.3
(231400.6) (1327571.9) (255842.7) (232845.0) (232035.0) (232387.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.755 0.0766 0.769 0.766 0.764 0.762
FS F-Stat 14.81 0.273 7.944 9.458 7.346 2.607
FS p-value 0.000129 0.602 0.00494 0.00217 0.00687 0.107
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 31
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players. This table reports
instrumental variable estimates of a star basketball player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for two different measures of star player are reported: (1) Top 10 Points Scorers and (2)
Top 20 Points Scorers. The F-statistics and corresponding p-values from the first stage
regression are reported at the bottom of the table. The first stage estimation and full
estimation results are reported in Tables 57 and 58 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2)
PTS 10 PTS 20
Stars -2060650.7 (4712952.1)
Starst−1 -14324.8 (109625.6) -341069.3 (742329.6)
Starst−2 109321.6 (110055.9) -482453.9 (1119310.9)
Winst−1 5621.2 (5236.7) 11295.1 (14340.6)
Winst−2 11545.7∗∗∗ (4428.7) 20542.6 (19901.9)
CoachCarTournt−1 54048.2∗∗∗ (11019.9) 62527.3∗∗∗ (24077.2)
NCAATournt−1 164567.1∗∗ (73133.0) 205250.6 (125761.7)
Champt−1 1802254.2∗∗∗ (322007.8) 1391137.2 (1020610.9)
Distance -1348.6 (1768.0) -1580.6 (2201.1)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2820 2820
Within R2 0.667 0.533
FS F-Stat . 0.876
FS p-value . 0.349
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
160
Table 32
Marginal Revenue Product of Gaining Versus Losing a Star College Football
Player. This table reports first-difference estimates of the marginal revenue product asso-
ciated with gaining or losing a star football player from Model (2.6) over the sample period
2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in
parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star
player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above),
(3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two
measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide
Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5)
being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while
(6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. F-statistics and corresponding
p-values for the null hypothesis that gaining a star and losing a star are statistically equiv-
alent are reported at the bottom of the table. The full estimation results are reported in
Tables 59 in Appendix A.7.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
∆Starst×GainStars 767259.7∗ 2591514.5∗∗ 1541978.3∗ 764154.7∗∗ 732774.2∗∗ 751373.8∗∗
(409898.9) (1012532.7) (822193.9) (340852.0) (318469.5) (349115.1)
|∆Starst|×LoseStars -971939.3∗ 343956.3 -1333385.4∗ -814791.5∗∗∗ -771677.6∗∗∗ -747472.0∗∗∗
(501617.8) (1150132.4) (802480.9) (265015.4) (252527.0) (281734.2)
∆Starst−1 612304.6∗ 887716.4 2065735.2∗∗∗ 580330.8∗∗∗ 586439.8∗∗∗ 722016.3∗∗∗
(346843.1) (900151.3) (757039.8) (205986.1) (208918.3) (217054.1)
∆Starst−2 213627.3 -364581.0 213379.7 -40878.9 90550.3 227177.4
(354136.4) (755705.8) (548891.4) (172334.5) (189095.0) (207782.0)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 936 936 936 936 936 936
R2 0.145 0.160 0.169 0.168 0.166 0.162
F-Stat 0.0884 4.703 0.0252 0.0142 0.00972 0.0000817
P-Value 0.767 0.0324 0.874 0.905 0.922 0.993
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 34
Marginal Revenue Product of Losing a Star College Football Player Due to In-
jury. This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the marginal revenue product
associated with losing a star football player due to injury from Model (2.5) over the sample
period 2000-2012. The control group is defined to be teams that had exactly one star player
in year t and exactly one star player in year t+1. The treatment goup in Panel A is defined
to be teams that had exactly one star player in year t that had a season ending injury in
t+ 1 and zero star players in t+ 1. The treatment group in Panel B is defined to be teams
that had exactly one star player in year t that had a season ending injury in t+ 1 and zero
or one star player in t+ 1. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard
errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for three different
measures of star player are reported: (1) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards, (2-3)
are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The
difference between (1,2,3) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (2) being a Top 10
Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (3) is a Top 10
Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. The number of treatments are reported at the
bottom of each panel in the table.
Panel A
(1) (2) (3)
TDYds PERTDsYds TopPER
Lose Star -1417026.7 -1026420.7 -1029946.9
(2848835.0) (2126490.2) (2023918.2)
Team-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 186 172 160
Treatments 3 3 3
R2 0.993 0.995 0.996
Panel B
(1) (2) (3)
TDYds PERTDsYds TopPER
Lose Star -1091500.4 -650645.3 -793007.5
(3030460.0) (2322512.8) (2033321.2)
Team-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
N 190 176 166
Treatments 5 5 6
R2 0.993 0.995 0.996
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 35
Marginal Revenue Product of Losing a Star College Basketball Player Due
to Injury. This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the marginal revenue
product associated with losing a star basketball player due to injury from Model (2.5) over
the sample period 2000-2012. The control group is defined to be teams that had exactly
one star player in year t and exactly one star player in year t + 1. The treatment goup in
Panel A is defined to be teams that had exactly one star player in year t that had a season
ending injury in t + 1 and zero star players in t + 1. The treatment group in Panel B is
defined to be teams that had exactly one star player in year t that had a season ending
injury in t+1 and zero or one star player in t+1. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for two different measures of star player are reported: (1) Top 10 Points Scorers and (2)
Top 20 Points Scorers. The number of treatments are reported at the bottom of each panel
in the table.
Panel A
(1) (2)
PTS 10 PTS 20
Lose Star -254948.5∗∗∗ -194976.8
(51918.1) (506034.7)
Team-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 44 94
Treatments 2 2
R2 0.996 0.993
Panel B
(1) (2)
PTS 10 PTS 20
Lose Star -254948.5∗∗∗ -587166.6
(51918.1) (541189.0)
Team-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year-Cohort Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 44 96
Treatments 2 3
R2 0.996 0.993
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 3
This figure plots the marginal revenue product of star college football players from Model
(2.8) for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by the number of media articles
mentioning the football team, over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012
USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors bands for the marginal effect are computed
using the delta method at the 5% significance level. Estimates for four different measures
of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or
above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The full
estimation results used in these figures are reported in Tables 62 and 63 in Appendix A.7.
166
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Award Winners
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
All American First Team
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
All Americans
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
NBA Drafted
Figure 4
This figure plots the marginal revenue product of star college basketball players from Model
(2.8) for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by the number of media ar-
ticles mentioning the basketball team, over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are
real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors bands for the marginal effect are
computed using the delta method at the 5% significance level. Estimates for four differ-
ent measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award
Winner, or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First
Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, and (4) NBA Drafted Players. The full
estimation results used in these figures are reported in Tables 68 and 69 in Appendix A.7.
167
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
All Americans (QB)
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Heisman Finalists (QB)
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Heisman Nominees (QB)
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Top 10 TDs or Yds (QB)
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
All Americans (RB)
-10.0
-5.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Heisman Finalists (RB)
-6.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Heisman Nominees (RB)
-4.0
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
M
ar
gin
al 
Re
ve
nu
e 
Pr
od
uc
t (
$ 
M
illo
ns
)
1st 5th 10th 25th 50th Mean 75th 90th 95th 99th
Team News Article Percentiles
Top 10 TDs or Yds (RB)
Figure 5
This figure plots the marginal revenue product of star college football Quarterbacks and
Running Backs from Model (2.9) for various percentiles of media exposure, as mea-
sured by the number of media articles mentioning the football team, over the sam-
ple period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Stan-
dard errors bands for the marginal effect are computed using the delta method at
the 5% significance level. Estimates for four different measures of star player are re-
ported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heis-
man Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The full estimation
results used in these figures are reported in Tables 64, 65 and 67 in the Appendix A.7.
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Figure 6
This figure plots the marginal revenue product of star college football Running Backs
and Wide Receivers from Model (2.9) for various percentiles of media exposure, as mea-
sured by the number of media articles mentioning the football team, over the sam-
ple period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Stan-
dard errors bands for the marginal effect are computed using the delta method at
the 5% significance level. Estimates for four different measures of star player are re-
ported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heis-
man Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The full estima-
tion results used in these figures are reported in Tables 64 and 66 in Appendix A.7.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Derivation of the Stochastic Discount Factor
A.1.1 Solving the Representative Agent’s Problem
We derive the general form for the stochastic discount factor. Suppose investors have
preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989) where the preference parameters γt and ψt are
allowed to vary over time. Let θt =
1−γt
1− 1
ψt
. Then the investor in this economy solves the
following portfolio allocation problem
Vt(Wt) = max{Ct,ht}
[
C
1−γt
θt
t + δ
(
Et
[
Vt+1(Wt+1)
1−γt]) 1θt ] θt1−γt (A.1)
s.t.
Ct + P
′
tht+1 = d
′
tht + P
′
tht ≡Wt (A.2)
where Pt refers to a n×1 vector of asset prices per share at date t that offers a real dividend
stream of dt+j , an n×1 vector with j = (1, . . . ,∞), and ht is an n×1 vector of asset holdings
at the end of period t− 1, which includes the risk-free asset. We can rewrite equation A.2
as
(Wt − Ct)Ra,t+1 = Wt+1 (A.3)
where Wt − Ct = P ′tht+1 is the amount of capital invested in the asset market and
Ra,t+1 =
P ′t+1ht+1 + d′t+1ht+1
P ′tht+1
=
Wt+1
Wt − Ct (A.4)
is the return on the agent’s asset portfolio, which in this economy is just the gross return
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on the asset that pays aggregate consumption as dividend. Given that the value function is
homogeneous of degree one in Wt and the linearity of Wt+1 in (Wt, Ct), we conjecture the
solution Vt = φtWt. Using this conjecture and plugging (A.3) into Equation (A.1) gives
φtWt = max{Ct,ht}
[
C
1−γt
θt
t + δ(Wt − Ct)
1−γt
θt
(
Et
[
(φt+1Ra,t+1)
1−γt]) 1θt ] θt1−γt .
We can decompose the investor’s problem into two parts
φtWt = max
Ct∈[0,Wt]
[
C
1−γt
θt
t + δ [(Wt − Ct)µ∗]
1−γt
θt
] θt
1−γt
(A.5)
µ∗ = max
ht∈Rn+,htι′=1
(
Et
[
(φt+1htR
′
t+1)
1−γt]) 11−γt (A.6)
Where ht and Rt+1 are 1 × N vectors of portfolio weights and returns with ι′ a N × 1
column vector of ones. Equation (A.5) is the investor’s consumption choice problem, while
Equation (A.6) is the investor’s portfolio choice problem. We will first solve the investor’s
consumption problem for an arbitrary µ∗ and then use the result to find the solution to the
portfolio choice problem. Since Equation (A.5) is homogenous of degree one, we conjecture
the following solution to the optimal consumption policy
C∗t = BtWt
where Bt is the consumption wealth ratio. Using this conjecture in Equation (A.5) gives
φ
1−γt
θt
t = max
Bt∈[0,1]
[
B
1−γt
θt
t + δ [(1−Bt)µ∗]
1−γt
θt
]
(A.7)
The first order condition of this equation yields
B
1−γt
θt
−1
t = δ [(1−Bt)µ∗]
1−γt
θt
−1
µ∗ (A.8)
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Using equations (A.7) and (A.8) we obtain
φt = B
1
1−ψt
t
hence
φt+1 = B
1
1−ψt+1
t+1 (A.9)
which is an invertible function of φt+1, which we can use to solve the investor’s portfolio
choice problem by plugging Equation (A.9) into Equation (A.6) to get
µ∗ =
(
Et
[(
B
1
1−ψt+1
t+1 Ra,t+1
)1−γt]) 11−γt
where Ra,t+1 = h
∗
tR
′
t+1 is the gross return of the optimal portfolio. We can then use this
with Equation (A.8) that comes from the optimal consumption decision to get
(
Bt
1−Bt
)− 1
ψt
= δ
(
Et
[(
B
1
1−ψt+1
t+1 Ra,t+1
)1−γt]) 1θt
Rearranging this expression gives the following Euler equation
1 = δθtEt
( Bt
1−Bt
) θt
ψt
B
1−γt
1−ψt+1
t+1 R
1−γt
a,t+1
 (A.10)
From the budget constraint (A.3) and the fact that Ct = BtWt, we know
Bt
1−Bt =
Ct
Wt
Wt
(Wt − Ct) =
Ct
Wt+1
Ra,t+1 =
Ct
Ct+1
Ct+1
Wt+1
Ra,t+1 = Bt+1
Ra,t+1
Gt+1
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plugging this into Equation (A.10) and rearranging gives
1 = δθtEt
(Bt+1Ra,t+1
Gt+1
) θt
ψt
B
1−γt
1−ψt+1
t+1 R
1−γt
a,t+1

1 = δθtEt
[
G
− θt
ψt
t+1 B
θt
ψt
+
1−γt
1−ψt+1
t+1 R
θt
ψt
+1−γt
a,t+1
]
(A.11)
Let ξt,t+1 ≡ θt − 1−γt1− 1
ψt+1
and notice that
θt
ψt
+ 1− γt = 1− γt
ψt − 1 + (1− γt) =
(1− γt)(1 + ψt − 1)
ψt − 1 =
(1− γt)ψt
ψt − 1 = θt
and after a few algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that
θt
ψt
+
1− γt
1− ψt+1 = θt −
1− γt
1− 1ψt+1
= ξt,t+1
So the Equation (A.11) becomes
Et
[
δθtG
− θt
ψt
t+1 B
ξt,t+1
t+1 R
θt
a,t+1
]
= 1
Factoring out a Ra,t+1 then gives
Et
[
δθtG
− θt
ψt
t+1 B
ξt,t+1
t+1 R
θt−1
a,t+1Ra,t+1
]
= 1
Hence, the general form for the stochastic discount factor is given by
Mt+1 = δ
θtG
− θt
ψt
t+1 B
ξt,t+1
t+1 R
−(1−θt)
a,t+1 (A.12)
Notice that when time variation in the preference parameters is shut down so that γt = γ
and ψt = ψ for all t we have ξt,t+1 = 0 and this stochastic discount factor collapses to the
usual one under standard Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences.
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A.1.2 Equilibrium Stochastic Discount Factor and Pricing Equations
Note that Equation (A.12) is derived only from information about the agent’s preferences
and budget constraint. Given the assumed Lucas endowment economy, we know there is a
single non-durable consumption good Ct with total supply given by the process C = {Ct}.
Equity in this economy is simply a claim to the endowment process and is the only asset
held in non-zero net supply. Let this asset be the first element in vector P ′t above and nor-
malize the number of shares in this economy to 1. Hence, the equilibrium in this economy
is the price process P = {Pt} and consumption allocation C such that the goods market
and asset market clears. Specifically, the P such that Ct = d
′
te1 and h
′
t = e1 for t ≥ 1 where
e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
′.
Let Pk,t and Dk,t be the price and dividend (respectively) of asset k. Define the dividend
growth rate of asset k as λk,t+1 =
Dk,t+1
Dk,t
. Lastly, let Zk,t =
Pk,t
Dk,t
be the price dividend
ratio of asset k. Notice that in the Lucas endowment economy, in equilibrium the budget
constraint (A.2) reduces to Wt = Ct + Pt, hence
Bt =
Ct
Wt
=
Ct
Ct + Pt
=
1
1 + PtCt
=
1
1 + Za,t
(A.13)
The gross return of asset k, is given by
Rk,t+1 =
Pk,t+1 +Dk,t+1
Pk,t
=
Zk,t+1 + 1
Zk,t
λk,t+1. (A.14)
We can now use Equations (A.13) and (A.14) along with Equation (A.12) to derive an
expression for the SDF in equilibrium:
Mt+1 = δ
θtZ1−θta,t G
−γt
t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−1 (A.15)
where ζt,t+1 =
1−γt
1− 1
ψt+1
. Given this expression for the SDF, in equilibrium, we have the
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following Euler equation
Et [Mt+1Rk,t+1] = 1 (A.16)
which is the pricing equation for any arbitrary asset k with gross return Rk,t+1. We can
now derive expressions for the price-dividend ratio and excess returns for an arbitrary asset
k as well as the risk-free rate in terms of observables. Substituting equations (A.14) and
(A.15) into Equation (A.16), and keeping in mind that ζt,t+1 is a non-linear function of
expressions not in the information set at time t, gives
Zk,t = δ
θtZ1−θta,t Et
[
G−γtt+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−1(Zk,t+1 + 1)λk,t+1
]
(A.17)
which gives us an expression for the price-dividend ratio of any arbitrary asset k. Using the
Euler equation along with Equation (A.14) and the formula for covariance, it can be shown
that the conditional risk-free gross return satisfies
Et[Rf,t+1] =
1
Et[Mt+1]
(A.18)
and the conditional excess return on asset k satisfies the following expression
Et[Rk,t+1 −Rf,t+1] = Z−1k,tEt [(Zk,t+1 + 1)λk,t+1]− (Et[Mt+1])−1 (A.19)
Equations (A.17)-(A.19) allow us to compute price-dividend ratios, as well as moments for
the risk-free rate and equity premium in terms of observables.
A.2 Equivalent Representation of the Equilibrium SDF
This appendix shows how the equilibrium stochastic discount factor implied by the model
can be equivalently expressed as a function of prices multiplied by the usual stochastic
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discount factor under standard Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences where the parameters
are allow to be time varying. Recall the definitions of
θt =
1− γt
1− 1ψt
ζt,t+j =
1− γt
1− 1ψt+1
.
The equilibrium stochastic discount factor derived in Equation (A.15) can be written as
Mt+1 = δ
θtZ1−θta,t G
−γt
t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−1
= δθtZ1−θta,t G
−γt
t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
θt−1+ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtZ1−θta,t G
−γt
t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
θt−1(Za,t+1 + 1)ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG−γtt+1
(
Za,t+1 + 1
Za,t
)θt−1
(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG1−γt−θtt+1
(
Za,t+1 + 1
Za,t
Gt+1
)θt−1
(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG1−γt−θtt+1 R
θt−1
a,t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG
(1−γt)(1− 1
1− 1
ψt
)
t+1 R
θt−1
a,t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG
(1−γt)(
− 1
ψt
1− 1
ψt
)
t+1 R
θt−1
a,t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= δθtG
− θt
ψt
t+1 R
θt−1
a,t+1(Za,t+1 + 1)
ζt,t+1−θt
= M ezt+1(γt, ψt) · (Za,t+1 + 1)ζt,t+1−θt
Where M ezt+1(γt, ψt) is the equilibrium stochastic discount factor under the standard Epstein
and Zin (1989) preferences where the parameters γ and ψ are allowed to vary over time.
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A.3 Data
In this appendix we give a detailed description of the data used in calibrating the model.
A.3.1 Macroeconomy Variables
Real Consumption Growth
The data for real per capita chained (2009) consumption for 1929-2013 comes from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 7.1. The real consumption per capita level is is
computed by adding real expenditures on non-durable goods and services (Table 7.1, lines
16 and 17). All level series are converted to logs and first differences are taken to compute
growth rates.
Inflation Rate
The annual CPI for all urban consumers (NSA) for 1925-2013 is taken from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Inflation rates are calculated by taking log differences of the price indices.
A.3.2 Financial Market Variables
Interest Rates
The annual risk free rate from 1920-2013 is taken from the Global Financial Database
at https://www.globalfinancialdata.com/platform/Welcome.aspx. Specifically, we use the
yield on 90 day U.S. Government Treasury Bills with ticker symbol ITUSA3D. These nom-
inal rates are converted to real risk free rates by subtracting the inflation rate as calculated
above.
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Aggregate Stock Returns, Dividends and Price-Dividend Ratio
Value-weighted returns on the S&P 500 stock index from January 1926-December 2013 not
including dividends (VWRETX) and including dividends (VWRETD) are obtained from
the monthly CRSP update. The series VWRETX and VWRETD are used to compute
annual market returns, price-dividend ratios and dividend yields as follows.
Given the monthly data series
(1 + VWRETXt) =
Pt+1
Pt
(1 + VWRETDt) =
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
We initialize P0 = 1 and recursively update Pt = Pt−1(1 + VWRETXt) to construct the
market price series. To aggregate up to annual data, for year t we take the sum of dividend
levels from January until December over the corresponding year
Dt =
11∑
s=0
Dt−s for t > s
Then the annual market return for year t is just the price as of December 31st plus the
annual dividend, divided by the price level as of December 31st of the previous year. That
is
Rm,t =
Pt +Dt
Pt−12
Similarly, dividend growth rates and price-dividend ratios are calculated by
Gdt =
Dt
Dt−1
− 1
PDt =
Pt
Dt
.
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A.4 Numerical Solution Method
In this appendix, we outline the steps to implement and exactly solve the model numeri-
cally. Given the discrete state space S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}
• Obtain values for the consumption and dividend growth parameters
{µC , σ, ρ, µD, φD}
from the sample moments in Table 1 of the data. Then set values for consumption
and dividend growth states i ∈ S according to
gh = µC + σ
gl = µC − σ
G(s1) = gh
G(i) = gl for i ∈ {s2, s3, s4, s5}
λD(i) = µD + φD(G(i)− µC) for i ∈ S
• Given values for
{γ0, γelev, ψ0, ψdepr}
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set the values for risk aversion and the EIS parameter in states i ∈ S according to
γ(i) = γ0 for i ∈ {s1, s2, s4}
γ(i) = γelev for i ∈ {s3, s5}
θ(i) =
1− γ(i)
1− 1ψ(i)
for i ∈ S
ζ(i, j) =
1− γ(i)
1− 1ψ(j)
for i, j ∈ S
• Choose a value for belev, which is the conditional probability of transitioning from a
high to low growth state where risk aversion is elevated. Also, choose a value for and
bdepr, which is the conditional probability of transitioning from a high to low growth
state where the EIS parameter is depressed. Use these values and ρ to calculate the
transition matrix
Π =

1+ρ
2 [1− (b(1− d) + d)]
(
1−ρ
2
)
b(1− d)
(
1−ρ
2
)
d(1− b)
(
1−ρ
2
)
bd
(
1−ρ
2
)
1−ρ
2 [1− (b(1− d) + d)]
(
1+ρ
2
)
b(1− d)
(
1+ρ
2
)
d(1− b)
(
1+ρ
2
)
bd
(
1+ρ
2
)
1−ρ
2 0 (1− d)
(
1+ρ
2
)
0 d
(
1+ρ
2
)
1−ρ
2 0 0 (1− b)
(
1+ρ
2
)
b
(
1+ρ
2
)
1−ρ
2 0 0 0
(
1+ρ
2
)

and steady state probabilities
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pi =

1
2
(1−b)(1−d)(1−ρ)
2[(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)(b(1−d)+d)]
b(1−d)(1−ρ)
2[1+d−ρ(1−d)][(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)(b(1−d)+d)]
d(1−b)(1−ρ)
2[1+b−ρ(1−b)][(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)(b(1−d)+d)]
d
1+d−ρ(1−d) − d(1−b)(1−ρ)2[1+b−ρ(1−b)][(1−ρ)+(1+ρ)(b(1−d)+d)]

where b = belev and d = bdepr are written to save space.
• Solve the following system of nonlinear equations for the price-dividend ratio associ-
ated with the asset that pays consumption as dividend given by Equation A.17
Za(i) = δ
∑
j
Π(i, j)G(j)1−γ(i)(Za(j) + 1)ζ(i,j)
 1θ(i) i ∈ S, (A.20)
The values of {Za(i)}i∈S can be computed numerically from these equations via fixed-
point methods. However, care must be taken in numerical computations to effectively
check a proposed solution {Za(i)∗}i∈S since the above expression involves the sum of
potentially numerically large quantities (with potentially large exponents) that may
encounter the limits of machine precision. Note that the term inside the brackets can
be expressed equivalently as
∑
j
Π(i, j)G(j)1−γ(i)(Za(j) + 1)ζ(i,j) =
∑
j
Π(i, j)e(1−γ(i)) lnG(j)+ζ(i,j) ln(Za(j)+1).
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Let
Zmax(i) := max
j
{(1− γ(i)) lnG(j) + ζ(i, j) ln(Za(j) + 1)},
such that
Za(i) = δe
Zmax(i)
θ(i)
∑
j
Π(i, j)e[(1−γ(i)) lnG(j)+ζ(i,j) ln(Za(j)+1)−Zmax(i)]
 1θ(i) .
Then, the largest exponent inside the sum is always 1, which ensures that the sum can
always be stably computed for any candidate solution. Extremely small components
of the sum (those with small exponents) can potentially reach minimum machine
precision and become effectively numerically zero. However, the potential associated
approximation error will then be below any positive numerical tolerance that is se-
lected for evaluating convergence of a given fixed-point method. Then exponentiate
to derive the final result.
• Compute the discrete state SDF
M(i, j) = δθ(i)G(j)−γ(i)
[
Za(j) + 1
Za(i)
]θ(i)−1
i, j ∈ S, (A.21)
and for the same reasons as given above, to compute stably, we make the following
transformation and compute the exponent in the equivalent expression,
M(i, j) = e[θ(i) ln δ+(1−θ(i)) lnZa(i)−γ(i) lnG(j)+(ζ(i,j)−1) ln(Za(j)+1)],
and then exponentiate to compute the final result.
• Use equations (A.17) and (A.21) to solve the following system of linear equations
for the price-dividend ratio associated with the levered consumption asset (market
portfolio)
Zm(i) =
∑
j
Π(i, j)M(i, j)(Zm(j) + 1)λm(j) i ∈ S,
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• Compute the conditional gross return on the risk free asset
Rf (i) =
∑
j
Π(i, j)M(i, j)
−1 i ∈ S,
and then compute the conditional gross return on the market porfolio
Rm(i) = [Zm(i)]
−1∑
j
Π(i, j)(Zm(j) + 1)λm(j) i ∈ S,
From the equations computed in this section,all model implied moments reported in the
paper are straightforward to compute.
A.5 Procyclical Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
In this appendix, we formally prove the following Lemma
Lemma. If the discrete state, joint Markov process of st = (Gt, γt, ψt) is restricted over
states S = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5} so that preferences do not revert from irregular (γelev or ψdepr)
to regular (γ0 or ψ0) states until high consumption growth is realized, then pro-cyclicality
of the EIS parameter ψt implies that the EISt,t+1
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) (A.22)
is pro-cyclical where Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor and Gt+1 =
Ct+1
Ct
is aggregate
consumption growth.
Proof. Assume that the EIS parameter ψt is pro-cyclical in the sense that ψt tends to be
large when Gt > Gt−1 and tends to be small when Gt < Gt−1. Let st = (Gt, γt, ψt) be the
joint state of consumption growth Gt, risk aversion γt and the EIS parameter ψt at time t.
Denote the set of all potential realizations of state st by S˜ so that the pair {s˜t−1, s˜t} defines
183
a particular transition path between two arbitrary adjacent periods of the joint Markov
process from time t− 1 to t. Define the sets of transition paths
St = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 = ψt, ∀t}
∆t = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 6= ψt, ∀t}
Where St is the set of transition paths at time t such that the EIS parameter is constant
and ∆t is that set of transition paths at time t such that the EIS parameter is time varying.
Furthermore, define the following subsets of St
Sut = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 = ψt and Gt−1 < Gt, ∀t}
Smt = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 = ψt and Gt−1 = Gt, ∀t}
Sdt = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 = ψt and Gt−1 > Gt, ∀t}
and the following subsets of ∆t
∆ut = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 6= ψt and Gt−1 < Gt, ∀t}
∆mt = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 6= ψt and Gt−1 = Gt, ∀t}
∆dt = {{st−1, st} : ψt−1 6= ψt and Gt−1 > Gt, ∀t}
Let the notation {x˜, y˜} ∈ A → {z, w} ∈ B denote the realization of states {x˜, y˜} ∈ A
transitioning to any state {z, w} ∈ B. Given the model setup, there are sixteen cases to
check to ensure that all possible transitions paths for the state variable are considered:
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Case 1: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St → {st, st+1} ∈ St+1
In this case, the EIS parameter never changes, ψt−1 = ψt = ψt+1 = ψ and Equation (A.22)
gives
EISt−1,t = EISt,t+1 = ψ
So the cyclicality of the EIS is moot.
Case 2: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆dt+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St. So the EIS at time t− 1 is
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
)
However, since the EIS parameter did not change ψt−1 = ψt we know EISt−1,t = ψt. Now,
suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈ ∆dt+1. Given the equation for the
EIS
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
but since Gt > Gt+1 and by the pro-cyclicality of ψt it follows that ψt+1 < ψt and hence(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
> 0 so that
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t
=
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) + EISt−1,t
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
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since EISt−1,t > 0 this implies
EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t
< 1
EISt,t+1 < EISt−1,t
Therefore the pro-cyclicality of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 3: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆ut+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St. So the EIS at time t − 1 is again, just EISt−1,t = ψt. Now,
suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈ ∆ut+1 so that Gt < Gt+1, which by
the pro-cyclicality of ψt implies ψt+1 > ψt and hence
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
< 0. Notice that since
EIS is always positive that
EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t
> 0
and since Mt,t+1 ≥ 0 and Gt+1 ≥ 0 (the gross consumption growth rate) we have
0 <
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) + EISt−1,t
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
but since
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
)
< 0 and EISt−1,t > 0 we know
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) + EISt−1,t
(
1
ψt+1
− 1
ψt
)
< (1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1)
which implies
EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t
=
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) + EISt−1,t
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) > 1
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hence
EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t
> 1
EISt,t+1 > EISt−1,t
Therefore the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 4: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ St → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆mt+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt+1 = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 5: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt → {st, st+1} ∈ St+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
St+1. So we know EISt,t+1 = ψt and Gt−1 > Gt which implies ψt−1 > ψt so that
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
)
=
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) +
1
ψt
>
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt
(Mt−1,tGt) + 1ψt
= ψt = EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t > EISt,t+1
Therefore the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS.
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Case 6: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut → {st, st+1} ∈ St+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
St+1. So we know EISt,t+1 = ψt and Gt−1 < Gt which implies ψt−1 < ψt so that
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
)
=
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) +
1
ψt
<
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt
(Mt−1,tGt) + 1ψt
= ψt = EISt,t+1
EISt−1,t < EISt,t+1
Therefore the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 7: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆mt → {st, st+1} ∈ St+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 8: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆ut+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
∆ut+1. So we know Gt−1 < Gt and Gt < Gt+1 which by the cyclicality of the EIS parameter
implies ψt−1 < ψt and ψt < ψt+1. It follows that
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) > 1 +Mt,t+1Gt+11
ψt
(1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
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Now consider rewriting EISt−1,t as follows
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
) = 1 +Mt−1,tGt1
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) +
1
ψt
=
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt (Mt−1,tGt) + ψt−1
<
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) + ψt−1
=
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
Where the inequality follows from the fact that ψt−1 < ψt. Since EISt−1,t < ψt it follows
from above that EISt−1,t < EISt,t+1. Hence the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter
implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 9: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆mt+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt+1 = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 10: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆dt+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆ut and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
∆dt+1. So we know Gt−1 < gt and gt > gt+1 which by the cyclicality of the EIS parameter
implies ψt−1 < ψt and ψt > ψt+1. It follows that
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
) < 1 +Mt−1,tGt1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt−1
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) < 1 +Mt,t+1Gt+11
ψt
(1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
which implies
EISt−1,t
EISt,t+1
<
ψt−1
ψt
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and since ψt−1 < ψt it follows that
EISt−1,t
EISt,t+1
<
ψt−1
ψt
< 1
EISt−1,t < EISt,t+1
Therefore the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 11: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆mt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆mt+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the sets ∆mt+1 = ∅ and ∆mt = ∅.
Therefore, these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 12: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆mt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆ut+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 13: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆mt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆dt+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 14: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆dt+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
∆dt+1. So we know Gt−1 > Gt and Gt > Gt+1 which by the cyclicality of the EIS parameter
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implies ψt−1 > ψt and ψt > ψt+1. It follows that
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) < 1 +Mt,t+1Gt+11
ψt
(1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
Now consider rewriting EISt−1,t as follows
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
) = 1 +Mt−1,tGt1
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) +
1
ψt
=
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt (Mt−1,tGt) + ψt−1
>
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt−1 (Mt−1,tGt) + ψt−1
=
ψt−1ψt (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
Where the inequality follows from the fact that ψt−1 > ψt. Since EISt−1,t > ψt it follows
from above that EISt,t+1 < EISt−1,t. Hence the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter
implies pro-cyclical EIS.
Case 15: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆mt+1
Under the assumption restricting the joint Markov process, the set ∆mt+1 = ∅. Therefore,
these transition paths are irrelevant.
Case 16: {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt → {st, st+1} ∈ ∆ut+1
Consider any {s˜t−1, s˜t} ∈ ∆dt and suppose at time t that we transition to any {st, st+1} ∈
∆ut+1. So we know Gt−1 > Gt and Gt < Gt+1 which by the cyclicality of the EIS parameter
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implies ψt−1 > ψt and ψt < ψt+1. It follows that
EISt−1,t =
1 +Mt−1,tGt
1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt) +
(
1
ψt
− 1ψt−1
) > 1 +Mt−1,tGt1
ψt−1 (1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt−1
EISt,t+1 =
1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1
1
ψt
(1 +Mt,t+1Gt+1) +
(
1
ψt+1
− 1ψt
) > 1 +Mt,t+1Gt+11
ψt
(1 +Mt−1,tGt)
= ψt
which implies
EISt−1,t
EISt,t+1
>
ψt−1
ψt
and since ψt−1 > ψt it follows that
EISt−1,t
EISt,t+1
>
ψt−1
ψt
> 1
EISt−1,t > EISt,t+1
Hence the pro-cyclical nature of the EIS parameter implies pro-cyclical EIS. We have shown
that this holds for every possible transition path for the state variable st, therefore pro-
cyclicality of the EIS parameter ψt implies the EISt,t+1 is pro-cyclical.
A.6 Full Predictability Results
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Table 37
Full Predictability Results - Alternative Calibrations
This table reports predictability of excess returns, consumption and dividend growth over one, three and five year horizons at an annual frequency for the calibrations in Table 1. The data
sample is 1930-2013 and all coefficients and R-squared eestimates within each panel are jointly estimated using the GMM method of Hansen and Singleton (1982) and 5 Newey West lags for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The coefficient estimates are in units of basis points (e.g. β = 0.0001 is 0.01% or 1 basis point). Calibrations (1-3) are special
cases of the baseline calibration, shutting down time variation in risk aversion (b = 0), the EIS parameter (d = 0) or both (b = 0 and d = 0) and are otherwise identical to the baseline calibration.
Calibration (4) with ρC = 0 is an alternative calibration from the baseline that specifies consumption growth as an iid process. Calibrations (1b) and (2b) are alternative calibrations from the
baseline that best fit two special cases of the model when time variation in risk aversion (b = 0) or the EIS parameter (d = 0) is shut down.
Baseline Special Cases Best Fit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1b) (2b)
b = 0
Data b = 0 d = 0 d = 0 ρC = 0 b = 0 d = 0
Time Varying Risk Aversion N Y N Y N Y
Time Varying EIS Y N N Y Y N
βˆ 95% CI Rˆ2 95% CI β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2 β R2
ΠJj=1(1 + Rm,t+j − Rf,t+j) = α + βPDt + t+j
1Y -0.002 [-0.004, -0.000] 0.033 [-0.033, 0.098] -0.003 0.011 -0.020 0.058 0.001 0.000 -0.014 0.097 -0.004 0.011 -0.020 0.079
(0.001) (0.033)
3Y -0.007 [-0.012, -0.003] 0.128 [-0.029, 0.284] -0.006 0.015 -0.047 0.109 0.002 0.000 -0.024 0.129 -0.008 0.016 -0.048 0.152
(0.002) (0.080)
5Y -0.015 [-0.022, -0.008] 0.225 [0.032, 0.418] -0.007 0.013 -0.065 0.114 0.002 0.000 -0.028 0.111 -0.011 0.014 -0.066 0.165
(0.004) (0.099)
ΠJj=1∆Ct+j = α + βPDt + t+j
1Y 0.0001 [-0.0002, 0.0005] 0.009 [ -0.037, 0.056] 0.0000 0.000 0.0029 0.125 0.0050 0.221 0.0000 0.000 -0.0001 0.001 0.0023 0.118
(0.0002) (0.024)
3Y -0.0002 [-0.0009, 0.0006] 0.004 [-0.034, 0.043] 0.0000 0.000 0.0051 0.067 0.0088 0.119 0.0000 0.000 -0.0001 0.000 0.0041 0.064
(0.0004) (0.020)
5Y -0.0006 [-0.0016, 0.0003] 0.043 [ -0.081, 0.167] 0.0000 0.000 0.0058 0.040 0.0100 0.071 0.0000 0.000 -0.0002 0.000 0.0047 0.038
(0.0005) (0.063)
ΠJj=1∆Dt+j = α + βPDt + t+j
1Y 0.0013 [-0.0009, 0.0036] 0.029 [ -0.045, 0.102] 0.0000 0.000 0.0131 0.125 0.0226 0.221 0.0000 0.000 -0.0005 0.001 0.0100 0.118
(0.0011) (0.037)
3Y 0.0015 [-0.0020, 0.0051] 0.012 [ -0.038, 0.062] 0.0000 0.000 0.0231 0.067 0.0398 0.118 0.0000 0.000 -0.0008 0.000 0.0175 0.063
(0.0018) (0.025)
5Y 0.0014 [-0.0022, 0.0051] 0.011 [ -0.049, 0.072] 0.0000 0.000 0.0264 0.040 0.0456 0.070 0.0000 0.000 -0.0010 0.000 0.0201 0.037
(0.0018) (0.031)
PDt+1 = α + βΠ
J
j=1∆Ct+1−j + t+j
1Y -3.78 [-186.83, 179.28] 0.000 [-0.002, 0.002] -38.68 0.027 52.48 0.186 44.03 0.221 -17.79 0.006 -45.27 0.033 62.09 0.179
(93.40) ( 0.001)
3Y -35.69 [-109.63, 38.25] 0.012 [-0.037, 0.060] -21.83 0.049 18.54 0.133 13.47 0.119 -9.85 0.006 -23.81 0.052 22.10 0.130
(37.72) (0.025)
5Y -55.10 [-128.94, 18.75] 0.035 [ -0.060, 0.129] -14.72 0.048 10.66 0.095 7.10 0.071 -6.24 0.005 -15.88 0.050 12.77 0.093
(37.68) (0.048)
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A.7 Full Estimation Tables
Table 38
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
fixed effects estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.1)
over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency.
Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six
different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists
(voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for
Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks
are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or
touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 1246194.1∗∗∗ 2110456.4∗∗ 1772393.3∗∗∗ 635939.4∗∗ 620915.0∗∗ 634448.8∗∗
(371109.5) (933544.5) (557169.9) (273501.0) (258687.2) (283630.8)
Starst−1 784531.3∗ 1541987.4∗∗ 2125693.1∗∗∗ 463500.0∗∗ 482399.8∗∗ 629070.6∗∗∗
(407013.3) (746867.3) (613806.8) (209543.1) (199374.2) (222252.8)
Starst−2 549369.2 -211988.4 135553.5 2163.8 131353.3 156726.8
(409714.8) (625430.4) (497226.6) (191799.8) (217898.7) (230384.4)
Winst−1 -33715.1 2350.5 -65521.4 17886.1 10689.7 2674.8
(105185.3) (95311.6) (101668.3) (102868.0) (101990.9) (101220.6)
Winst−2 47950.9 102288.3 84403.1 94650.6 77305.9 74126.7
(56749.6) (61649.3) (62019.0) (66211.5) (68658.6) (65450.8)
CoachCareert−1 2571657.5 1933681.0 2473963.0 1252014.5 1252673.2 1423088.7
(2077061.6) (2066798.6) (2083839.1) (2063261.0) (2066246.2) (2077016.9)
CoachChange -219077.0 -141394.1 -167370.1 -90464.0 -71287.1 -78582.5
(319562.9) (307939.1) (305613.8) (316793.4) (317650.5) (315596.4)
BowlGamet−1 862673.1∗ 696357.4 805688.7∗ 612201.2 626535.5 622163.7
(463602.8) (443760.2) (457479.2) (458303.6) (455531.3) (452238.2)
BowlWint−1 -367095.4 -228156.7 -186535.8 -379685.7 -393601.2 -391951.8
(417701.8) (426506.3) (401965.8) (424937.9) (427281.8) (427480.3)
SOS 4271.7 14754.5 10927.6 43752.0 44927.4 43343.3
(53786.2) (57691.0) (55885.7) (57116.1) (56724.4) (56769.4)
TDPts -78863.2 -64150.4 -57364.1 -53461.7 -53654.6
(76314.7) (72631.8) (77264.9) (77646.9) (77439.7)
TDYds 1500386.6 1657437.3 950269.4 1025833.8 1087674.7
(2959422.3) (2991585.0) (3050531.6) (3049305.4) (3027356.8)
TDPassYds -1497058.4 -1654554.4 -948102.7 -1023268.2 -1085497.0
(2959896.7) (2992292.3) (3051440.0) (3050172.4) (3028225.1)
TDPassTDs -751663.0 -742934.7 -919743.8 -969915.2 -952002.9
(785910.7) (771658.0) (780685.2) (780771.1) (773783.8)
TDRushYds -1495327.3 -1653492.3 -946798.2 -1022720.0 -1084533.8
(2959229.5) (2991477.6) (3050698.3) (3049472.3) (3027495.9)
TDRushTDs 327305.5 260740.1 238916.9 246696.6 279805.0
(636022.6) (610659.0) (652031.6) (656716.1) (650560.1)
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HistWins -21868.4 -15778.1 -13973.0 -28041.5 -29499.3 -27052.4
(46763.7) (51021.9) (50663.7) (50885.8) (50808.9) (50762.5)
HistBowls -489220.2 -527785.0 -491664.8 -481393.7 -480626.9 -500249.5
(347974.5) (362683.0) (359855.6) (369600.2) (368296.9) (365399.9)
HistBowlWins 404944.6 396534.3 346237.0 477048.1 477640.9 455972.0
(431381.2) (438590.6) (435241.9) (454890.1) (453306.9) (445922.6)
Distance -24893.5 -26074.5 -25418.8 -20941.5 -20871.2 -21590.8
(16516.5) (17347.0) (17021.0) (17282.3) (17333.0) (17225.4)
UndergradPop -138243.3 -199825.2 -212833.2 -174896.7 -161813.5 -139273.3
(206439.8) (207066.6) (204399.3) (206220.2) (204779.1) (201240.2)
PerCapPI 184142.6 257071.2 271520.4 218391.4 212482.4 204275.8
(319267.5) (335018.5) (322485.3) (329132.8) (328377.7) (322979.3)
GrPerCapPI 20459.3 16687.3 7857.6 4989.6 11021.8 17480.4
(128637.6) (127462.8) (126174.2) (129573.2) (128469.5) (128432.2)
CityPop 12642171.7 -7324344.3 -7259534.8 4158844.5 5759898.7 2590694.1
(25034085.1) (29139427.5) (27668730.0) (30375296.5) (30644687.1) (30155684.9)
StatePop 10569.9 -122667.0 -170673.5 91495.6 102759.9 139855.1
(4089596.0) (4150891.0) (4208402.6) (4162556.3) (4199445.6) (4138946.2)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.773 0.775 0.779 0.774 0.774 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 39
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players by Position. This
table reports fixed effects estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.2) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman
Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive
touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or
yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star
Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating
(PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating
alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDYds PER
Star QB 4608930.9∗∗∗ 3471509.8∗∗ 2214355.5∗∗ 1019893.4∗∗ 924894.5∗∗ 850420.6∗
(1164765.0) (1351570.5) (934112.1) (478396.0) (392270.5) (481015.0)
Star RB 301788.4 608943.1 1048518.4 488427.7 421584.8 444569.6
(631539.7) (1309714.5) (915890.6) (429620.5) (414200.9) (418953.7)
Star WR 2905696.8∗∗ -767266.6 2472387.2 464649.9 423843.9 576679.4
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(1405377.0) (3344772.8) (1949165.7) (536098.5) (544325.4) (516914.8)
Star TE 1276488.1
(1060995.6)
Star OL 1817052.2
(1902022.5)
Star K -1413320.6
(917291.1)
Star P 2254073.1
(2391757.8)
Star LB 1343434.9
(1161464.0)
Star DB 900250.4
(809392.0)
Star DL -152692.0
(1029483.9)
Star QBt−1 2607322.5 1616299.2 2736083.1∗∗∗ 521386.4 612889.9 1334497.5∗∗
(2006577.4) (1059789.0) (826011.0) (524194.5) (486862.9) (626311.7)
Star RBt−1 421282.0 995844.6 804851.1 514506.9 527243.5 527565.3
(1348817.2) (1496832.9) (1143632.9) (452007.8) (446920.2) (447038.5)
Star WRt−1 2163652.1 527242.2 3184923.0 376250.6 323235.6 300713.9
(1341206.1) (3141604.3) (2157792.0) (411840.5) (422264.0) (394164.2)
Star TEt−1 1581637.5
(1089486.2)
Star OLt−1 -779066.9
(1958113.3)
Star Kt−1 -2275590.3∗
(1169638.9)
Star Pt−1 845999.7
(1355701.1)
Star LBt−1 -222293.2
(841733.8)
Star DBt−1 1410565.2
(1061535.3)
Star DLt−1 -877913.4
(1144656.4)
Star QBt−2 222676.6 970598.2 1242415.4∗ 283381.3 844437.1 1215640.2∗
(1646554.8) (844426.8) (630114.6) (531849.9) (595708.5) (622824.9)
Star RBt−2 -291669.7 -1886976.8 -1752297.4∗ -291948.0 -272552.0 -248493.1
(1031439.8) (1441911.8) (927098.0) (455772.0) (448109.3) (436319.5)
Star WRt−2 984218.9 -1581986.8 165715.1 29221.4 -129764.1 -115558.6
(860688.3) (2279872.5) (1416804.7) (394391.0) (404670.7) (378890.5)
Star TEt−2 2402861.2
(1891760.7)
Star OLt−2 -593484.6
(1731323.7)
Star Kt−2 -1486708.5
(1444019.2)
Star Pt−2 -1225415.9
(1463157.4)
Star LBt−2 938578.5
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(1402728.0)
Star DBt−2 1134369.4
(940905.3)
Star DLt−2 412546.1
(1213959.7)
Winst−1 -52336.9 11531.0 -81840.9 11875.8 7538.6 -23485.3
(106419.9) (97070.3) (104071.1) (106889.6) (105521.7) (106066.1)
Winst−2 38390.7 99251.1 79031.0 95108.3 65122.9 63821.0
(57716.3) (63047.3) (64175.8) (71878.1) (77026.1) (70326.5)
CoachCareert−1 3213553.8 1835760.3 2627403.3 1319614.2 1355460.9 1706857.8
(2134175.4) (2025476.9) (2079157.4) (2120277.5) (2104740.1) (2143148.5)
CoachChange -231065.5 -121945.0 -163568.0 -85606.8 -81523.4 -108553.3
(307360.7) (303639.0) (311992.4) (314014.5) (315913.8) (312753.5)
BowlGamet−1 777880.6∗ 658882.5 835970.0∗ 639978.7 660592.3 700971.8
(438856.7) (448743.3) (467343.8) (463505.2) (457427.3) (459879.4)
BowlWint−1 -308446.0 -240996.5 -151007.2 -379342.0 -406487.8 -382459.2
(401160.9) (432680.8) (400402.2) (426606.3) (429053.6) (427362.6)
SOS 19470.9 14867.5 20330.5 42959.8 39048.9 42425.0
(52473.9) (59897.4) (57990.2) (57924.7) (57893.6) (58254.1)
TDPts -76570.0 -70043.3 -54291.3 -45022.7 -54743.2
(76028.0) (72883.5) (78084.4) (77528.8) (77546.7)
TDYds 1351330.1 1601607.0 965753.3 1097500.7 1484895.8
(2992151.0) (2980740.9) (3003318.5) (3003149.9) (3007275.4)
TDPassYds -1347939.7 -1598624.7 -963620.0 -1094602.7 -1483540.0
(2992470.3) (2981402.8) (3004145.8) (3003977.1) (3008135.5)
TDPassTDs -794188.3 -729846.2 -945375.5 -1040211.1 -930344.2
(789236.0) (773235.5) (773754.7) (772104.6) (762462.3)
TDRushYds -1345858.4 -1597042.7 -962289.6 -1094454.2 -1482186.1
(2992074.7) (2980555.7) (3003419.3) (3003282.3) (3007327.0)
TDRushTDs 302388.4 298673.9 216929.3 193897.5 330587.5
(635163.7) (619666.6) (657399.7) (655205.6) (658114.3)
HistWins -23758.9 -24106.9 -24122.7 -30798.3 -37716.8 -34010.9
(49766.3) (51678.6) (51016.7) (51136.4) (51501.7) (51445.5)
HistBowls -515923.9 -474251.6 -452495.4 -456432.9 -452180.6 -480332.2
(368178.1) (361817.6) (361365.3) (363918.4) (358918.6) (358232.0)
HistBowlWins 466421.6 445286.4 440893.7 490069.0 510823.1 465463.3
(448103.8) (433391.5) (446533.0) (455338.5) (449406.3) (441247.3)
Distance -21569.8 -23639.4 -22686.0 -21075.3 -20994.4 -23309.0
(17363.9) (17401.6) (16776.1) (17260.4) (17163.4) (17294.5)
UndergradPop -161144.1 -193149.6 -240074.6 -180239.3 -169777.3 -120250.4
(213332.5) (207897.3) (211872.7) (208366.3) (206100.6) (200985.9)
PerCapPI 85935.8 247697.6 259538.2 209177.1 196049.1 192825.7
(294998.2) (337534.0) (326460.5) (331948.0) (332823.7) (328663.7)
GrPerCapPI 9221.3 14574.6 952.0 1340.5 9013.6 30709.9
(126126.2) (128483.3) (125401.1) (130548.6) (130146.6) (131524.1)
CityPop -9218094.6 -1782102.5 -11199866.7 6515370.4 10912586.8 5272433.8
(26430954.7) (30818562.4) (28836276.3) (29774863.2) (31018994.5) (30524539.7)
StatePop -869332.4 -115674.4 -53742.7 -21432.8 80254.8 386332.3
(3675206.2) (4211033.9) (4277078.3) (4184630.6) (4261748.9) (4226497.2)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.784 0.777 0.782 0.774 0.775 0.776
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 40
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players. This table reports fixed effects estimates of a star basketball
player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different measures of star
player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player,
(2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6)
NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stars 1087765.3∗∗ 654710.8∗∗∗ 345336.8∗∗ 204304.3∗∗ 382382.2∗∗ 402533.9∗∗ 310260.3∗ 319721.4∗∗
(493080.3) (194042.4) (171755.6) (88775.4) (191897.4) (192852.0) (181824.4) (145587.1)
Starst−1 217558.3 12327.7 88669.0 -11202.2 186547.7 -5263.1 14561.2 30787.2
(374357.0) (291240.1) (177561.3) (88077.2) (294223.2) (228566.6) (102755.7) (81964.0)
Starst−2 205491.5 149084.8 207909.7 224483.7∗∗ 252300.1 106031.9 174220.5 80851.8
(336928.1) (215135.9) (157622.5) (100847.0) (245098.3) (202592.1) (113390.1) (85780.5)
Winst−1 5500.7 4737.6 4803.9 6675.7 4912.5 5211.9 5529.2 4768.9
(4740.8) (4654.8) (4704.4) (4620.0) (4565.3) (4611.5) (4768.7) (4879.6)
Winst−2 11700.8∗∗∗ 11033.7∗∗ 10379.1∗∗ 7470.9 11046.7∗∗∗ 11099.0∗∗∗ 10877.3∗∗ 10851.1∗∗
(4346.4) (4372.0) (4388.4) (4631.2) (3932.6) (4106.4) (4501.2) (4605.0)
CoachCarTournt−1 53036.4∗∗∗ 53587.8∗∗∗ 52917.5∗∗∗ 53109.5∗∗∗ 53300.7∗∗∗ 54220.0∗∗∗ 54132.1∗∗∗ 52295.5∗∗∗
(16309.4) (16423.3) (16448.0) (16397.5) (16396.1) (16327.9) (16345.8) (16446.8)
CoachCareert−1 -90371.2 -43852.9 -58691.2 -95287.7 -94945.2 -91601.0 -78380.4 -72456.0
(296260.8) (292797.7) (296030.0) (291734.8) (294358.8) (294552.7) (295056.3) (293596.7)
CoachChange 2584.2 -283.6 5442.5 5694.5 2596.8 2906.3 -2338.9 -1447.5
(61633.1) (61697.9) (61112.9) (61636.3) (61858.0) (61534.7) (61566.3) (61742.1)
NCAATournt−1 166471.4∗∗ 169729.4∗∗ 164773.6∗∗ 170940.6∗∗ 166791.3∗∗ 159770.3∗∗ 159670.5∗∗ 159186.5∗∗
(75438.0) (74536.1) (74413.7) (76855.4) (73208.1) (75031.2) (74594.7) (75231.3)
Round2t−1 -69474.9 -60521.7 -58626.8 -62519.4 -60851.5 -60525.5 -57685.2 -55454.7
(127587.9) (124549.9) (129013.3) (129844.1) (129323.9) (127547.7) (128474.2) (127233.5)
Sweet16t−1 269822.6 259114.3 259282.3 311046.4∗ 280034.6 271213.4 303302.1∗ 287229.0∗
(175423.2) (183746.1) (180748.2) (171514.0) (180879.1) (180337.0) (175339.2) (173614.7)
Elitet8t−1 -139996.8 -144637.5 -92711.7 -21008.0 -120372.0 -100366.0 -118801.8 -125168.0
(455596.0) (460315.9) (475971.8) (438282.8) (467622.7) (476086.8) (453607.7) (452016.7)
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Final4t−1 343911.0 347028.2 372391.9 380139.1 356001.9 414610.1 391677.7 391363.2
(375468.1) (380341.5) (371678.6) (386948.9) (412695.7) (412792.3) (392998.6) (391782.5)
Finalt−1 -38560.7 32290.4 -66063.7 26618.6 -128696.6 -52997.7 -26463.4 -17221.9
(260301.5) (340616.9) (299234.9) (284129.2) (314746.0) (338112.3) (267654.3) (272431.6)
Champt−1 1766340.3∗∗ 1900785.4∗∗∗ 1899835.5∗∗∗ 2040793.9∗∗∗ 1793747.7∗∗ 1773651.1∗∗ 1822732.5∗∗∗ 1868723.7∗∗∗
(862499.7) (574563.6) (657183.3) (647180.9) (752011.7) (736771.7) (617623.3) (618632.4)
NSchlsConf 1597.9 643.3 1146.6 2727.7 3598.7 2535.8 5855.1 4328.0
(40495.4) (40249.6) (40056.5) (40557.4) (40108.9) (40223.5) (40202.9) (40285.7)
NSchlsConfAP -42507.0 -44208.6 -46226.4 -38351.2 -37726.9 -41862.1 -42184.5 -39373.7
(40012.1) (41527.4) (41211.3) (40894.9) (41784.2) (42282.7) (40775.5) (40345.1)
NSchlsConfTourn 5588.9 5151.3 4908.0 82.42 6918.3 6162.2 6446.4 7143.4
(39038.3) (38721.0) (38681.8) (38758.1) (38824.8) (38620.2) (39511.7) (39339.0)
NSchlsConfFF -98339.8 -93396.3 -84183.4 -86897.0 -92170.3 -93787.2 -87031.1 -87327.8
(82336.8) (80792.0) (81503.3) (84174.2) (80721.6) (81051.3) (81299.2) (81085.9)
SOS 3171.8 2104.8 2277.8 1250.6 1571.2 1381.6 1359.0 388.3
(12225.5) (12177.8) (12320.2) (12193.9) (12160.8) (12107.1) (12256.3) (12319.4)
HistWins -3339.3 -3489.0 -3692.1 -3790.9 -3766.7 -3604.8 -3403.5 -3287.8
(2979.9) (2973.0) (2975.3) (2986.8) (3011.8) (3032.5) (2976.1) (2966.4)
HistNCAATrn -24692.0 -21625.1 -20544.8 -38894.2 -29861.0 -26729.9 -27267.5 -34361.8
(59605.9) (60731.5) (60426.8) (59135.1) (60123.9) (59840.0) (60473.9) (59837.3)
HistRound2 -70516.4 -48324.9 -46896.5 -60332.6 -65835.0 -71370.7 -62074.7 -66508.5
(111100.2) (112854.9) (112528.5) (112171.3) (112792.9) (112505.2) (112727.3) (112997.5)
HistSweet16 -105085.4 -108151.2 -90631.1 -56679.8 -77141.0 -70457.7 -96033.2 -100927.8
(146123.0) (146471.2) (141988.0) (137944.0) (142556.4) (142982.6) (150636.9) (149967.4)
HistElite8 122918.1 137631.2 151930.7 161923.4 127612.1 122314.2 98892.1 102881.1
(189428.4) (194172.7) (195132.2) (189286.0) (189005.4) (191677.5) (195406.0) (197563.2)
HistFinal4 288728.2 373800.4 405548.9 407783.7 314072.8 298481.2 319478.5 290306.4
(312376.9) (314445.6) (316790.0) (324777.9) (316427.1) (320106.9) (323484.2) (320863.9)
HistFinal 66589.0 215159.0 219301.6 148310.0 230876.8 215724.5 165225.1 178414.5
(604624.8) (590013.9) (591344.3) (577803.6) (565544.9) (570762.7) (589264.2) (593520.2)
HistChamp -761595.7 -830886.5 -794815.5 -751941.5 -790368.2 -803171.5 -793072.3 -834846.1
(864712.3) (807223.6) (802713.0) (785328.2) (792108.8) (815147.9) (796655.2) (805341.5)
Distance -1186.9 -1003.1 -1076.7 -1295.0 -1243.4 -1145.3 -1390.8 -1233.8
(1555.8) (1564.4) (1548.8) (1571.5) (1593.4) (1568.2) (1542.9) (1532.9)
UndergradPop -51238.0 -48681.8 -50053.8 -46757.0 -48358.0 -47220.9 -44490.3 -45640.1
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(39268.9) (38035.4) (38894.5) (39404.7) (38536.3) (39037.6) (38722.6) (38021.5)
PerCapPI 12632.5 10041.7 9382.0 2916.0 14931.7 14857.1 9983.7 9889.4
(41123.9) (40759.8) (39747.8) (40061.4) (40497.9) (40544.8) (40065.8) (40667.4)
GrPerCapPI 7602.4 9374.4 10665.1 11437.5 8135.4 10325.6 8650.5 10131.3
(15679.9) (15709.6) (15623.5) (15874.9) (15719.9) (15875.1) (15642.0) (15693.4)
CityPop 861614.4 918168.3 918507.3 882563.6 1056439.6 1089678.8 813444.8 790469.6
(1896441.6) (1857321.6) (1871040.8) (1896670.6) (1849183.3) (1837110.6) (1861156.0) (1887477.5)
StatePop 6654.2 59037.8 34208.8 77296.1 106871.3 103832.1 71506.4 90510.5
(431937.2) (407988.3) (416686.1) (429759.3) (421011.7) (421270.8) (417325.0) (424944.7)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Within R2 0.670 0.669 0.668 0.672 0.668 0.669 0.668 0.669
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 41
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players - Discrete Measure.
This table reports fixed effects estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue prod-
uct from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at
an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for six different discrete measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans,
(2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touch-
downs or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is
how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 1062929.4∗∗∗ 2051659.7∗∗ 1766358.2∗∗∗ 634777.4∗∗ 605809.7∗∗ 616670.4∗∗
(323298.3) (936657.7) (551921.2) (267899.3) (251991.4) (276390.5)
Starst−1 551891.3 1518086.1∗∗ 2103329.1∗∗∗ 458333.2∗∗ 461327.5∗∗ 600524.1∗∗∗
(344300.2) (734827.8) (605137.5) (206375.5) (194273.4) (216799.7)
Starst−2 417832.9 -188455.0 146703.1 11668.6 132517.0 157749.8
(356129.9) (627577.9) (492218.2) (190181.8) (215776.6) (229355.4)
Winst−1 -27231.2 4158.1 -63777.2 17081.4 12992.2 5601.4
(102417.3) (95379.8) (101454.9) (102893.8) (101681.6) (100957.0)
Winst−2 50873.3 101411.6 83395.9 92623.3 76577.5 73520.9
(55157.2) (61689.7) (62012.1) (66321.5) (68893.6) (65860.7)
CoachCareert−1 2599678.9 1924428.4 2466749.7 1261797.4 1240299.6 1401226.6
(2050449.2) (2066560.1) (2082921.4) (2063484.7) (2066252.3) (2076842.8)
CoachChange -245813.1 -141586.6 -165120.8 -88634.3 -70796.1 -79297.9
(315570.1) (308000.0) (305454.2) (317248.1) (317641.2) (315323.7)
BowlGamet−1 820920.0∗ 692397.0 799736.1∗ 612761.4 623940.8 618465.1
(455566.7) (444160.5) (457270.3) (458518.9) (455447.5) (452236.2)
BowlWint−1 -376924.5 -230265.1 -189103.1 -377017.8 -394140.6 -394020.0
(417213.6) (426427.8) (402269.7) (424689.0) (427523.6) (427710.5)
SOS -1020.0 15138.6 10712.1 43312.5 44019.0 42589.3
(53829.9) (57707.7) (55873.3) (57100.1) (56750.4) (56801.0)
TDPts -79692.7 -64547.0 -57311.2 -54110.8 -54274.2
(76474.7) (72613.3) (77176.8) (77629.0) (77468.0)
TDYds 1477484.4 1660810.1 942337.3 1019783.3 1064622.9
(2959529.3) (2991096.3) (3051166.1) (3049731.0) (3028266.1)
TDPassYds -1474201.8 -1657996.1 -940199.3 -1017197.3 -1062440.4
(2960015.2) (2991817.4) (3052074.1) (3050604.2) (3029137.3)
TDPassTDs -743696.4 -738882.2 -917040.1 -963800.8 -945139.4
(787166.5) (771871.2) (779775.7) (779646.5) (773119.8)
TDRushYds -1472448.7 -1656916.2 -938883.9 -1016670.8 -1061482.2
(2959334.5) (2990992.1) (3051322.6) (3049885.4) (3028393.5)
TDRushTDs 334096.9 266543.4 240959.6 250649.9 282785.4
(637357.3) (610804.1) (651548.9) (656370.7) (650819.4)
HistWins -21083.1 -15825.1 -13798.1 -28203.2 -29254.9 -26796.9
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(47988.5) (50993.9) (50685.3) (50918.2) (50876.8) (50815.9)
HistBowls -489901.2 -527450.6 -491419.9 -480458.5 -478263.0 -497763.5
(349342.7) (362670.6) (360016.5) (369729.0) (368490.3) (365953.0)
HistBowlWins 353130.0 393628.9 344570.4 478785.4 473072.5 451164.3
(432565.7) (438187.4) (434839.1) (455271.2) (452625.0) (445541.7)
Distance -25335.8 -26158.5 -25508.0 -20780.2 -21008.9 -21732.2
(16575.0) (17366.9) (17033.4) (17285.8) (17352.2) (17245.3)
UndergradPop -144432.9 -198322.5 -211986.9 -175075.8 -161411.3 -138610.3
(209157.6) (207117.2) (204483.3) (206386.0) (204727.8) (201382.8)
PerCapPI 207362.8 258319.9 271139.1 218118.8 212022.8 204415.4
(316857.0) (335339.6) (322526.2) (328745.0) (328520.8) (323380.0)
GrPerCapPI 14993.7 16218.1 7780.2 5990.2 12818.8 19304.6
(127251.5) (127386.3) (126064.8) (129406.3) (128288.8) (128293.9)
CityPop 10299203.0 -7124452.5 -6802474.5 4040661.5 5240369.1 2240536.0
(27464918.6) (29198594.3) (27623484.5) (30326624.6) (30749121.4) (30342188.7)
StatePop 132676.4 -120170.4 -170546.6 128098.0 120093.6 159464.1
(4062267.6) (4156206.6) (4210051.3) (4153424.0) (4193018.9) (4134860.8)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.772 0.775 0.779 0.774 0.774 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 42
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players - Discrete Measure. This table reports fixed effects
regression estimates of a star basketball player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012.
Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for eight different measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the
NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA
Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stars 1035975.5∗∗ 634754.2∗∗∗ 327818.2∗ 192254.3∗∗ 421983.3∗∗ 411124.2∗∗ 309455.9∗ 318445.0∗∗
(481752.9) (192764.6) (168625.4) (83649.3) (179149.7) (180324.0) (182795.1) (145860.5)
Starst−1 194461.6 8473.9 82188.9 -14549.2 174676.9 -10149.0 13162.1 28743.7
(371341.1) (286415.5) (172535.2) (84974.2) (283398.5) (220033.8) (103503.4) (81866.8)
Starst−2 206669.7 153881.9 209186.9 220039.8∗∗ 213156.7 89265.3 175345.3 80635.9
(331762.9) (211748.9) (154025.7) (99184.1) (241205.9) (198312.6) (114327.3) (85592.8)
Winst−1 5529.0 4776.0 4846.5 6757.3 5020.8 5292.8 5551.4 4781.9
(4742.3) (4657.2) (4705.6) (4625.8) (4575.1) (4615.9) (4769.6) (4884.2)
Winst−2 11716.4∗∗∗ 11029.5∗∗ 10361.0∗∗ 7532.0 11243.5∗∗∗ 11273.8∗∗∗ 10862.3∗∗ 10847.6∗∗
(4345.4) (4363.2) (4380.1) (4648.0) (3962.6) (4142.3) (4503.1) (4608.4)
CoachCarTournt−1 53083.7∗∗∗ 53626.0∗∗∗ 52935.3∗∗∗ 53162.8∗∗∗ 53551.0∗∗∗ 54305.4∗∗∗ 54136.9∗∗∗ 52288.7∗∗∗
(16306.9) (16414.4) (16429.4) (16371.7) (16406.8) (16332.7) (16346.1) (16445.8)
CoachCareert−1 -91166.2 -44805.8 -60914.1 -98085.3 -102776.2 -96296.4 -78484.9 -72669.6
(296381.7) (292904.9) (296076.0) (291984.2) (294665.7) (294914.5) (295065.4) (293573.0)
CoachChange 2452.8 -275.9 5554.8 5264.0 2777.8 3317.3 -2090.3 -1125.0
(61637.2) (61708.8) (61113.2) (61690.5) (61809.2) (61528.5) (61564.1) (61732.9)
NCAATournt−1 165707.5∗∗ 169176.5∗∗ 164988.3∗∗ 170940.9∗∗ 164945.1∗∗ 158050.6∗∗ 159541.2∗∗ 159117.0∗∗
(75465.7) (74520.5) (74402.0) (76866.8) (73251.8) (75267.2) (74623.5) (75248.3)
Round2t−1 -69038.3 -60268.4 -58272.1 -62077.8 -61318.3 -62271.0 -57981.5 -55552.3
(127659.3) (124653.9) (129193.8) (130187.3) (129248.8) (127873.6) (128511.4) (127258.0)
Sweet16t−1 270800.3 259998.1 261608.6 312686.6∗ 275681.2 268020.4 303088.9∗ 287116.1∗
(175680.1) (183635.0) (180615.3) (172649.6) (180518.7) (180901.5) (175329.3) (173623.7)
Elitet8t−1 -136884.7 -142804.7 -89478.4 -17143.5 -121840.4 -102216.9 -119136.7 -124414.5
(455690.1) (460409.7) (475193.2) (438530.6) (466560.9) (474973.5) (453659.7) (452048.6)
204
Final4t−1 351632.7 349480.6 375530.9 386899.2 346330.2 413008.0 391612.5 390373.4
(375564.4) (379766.1) (371722.8) (384616.4) (402529.2) (407865.3) (392964.8) (391150.8)
Finalt−1 -33963.4 39289.0 -55952.2 37131.6 -123554.7 -48175.6 -26776.1 -16368.9
(260029.9) (339254.4) (300001.4) (278665.9) (315417.5) (338183.6) (267683.9) (272701.7)
Champt−1 1771496.1∗∗ 1903215.4∗∗∗ 1905184.0∗∗∗ 2042126.6∗∗∗ 1764883.6∗∗ 1724465.6∗∗ 1822491.5∗∗∗ 1870786.0∗∗∗
(865166.8) (578110.3) (658356.3) (631771.2) (718556.6) (693729.8) (617872.8) (619292.9)
NSchlsConf 1680.8 639.0 1194.2 2868.0 3573.5 2461.5 5811.9 4360.0
(40505.5) (40251.9) (40054.1) (40551.9) (40084.7) (40195.2) (40192.6) (40279.9)
NSchlsConfAP -42734.3 -44607.2 -46004.7 -38223.3 -38457.1 -42033.7 -42350.7 -39586.9
(40109.3) (41520.7) (41206.0) (40966.0) (41838.3) (42272.5) (40773.7) (40344.1)
NSchlsConfTourn 5858.7 5287.9 4848.0 108.4 7872.5 6481.5 6310.0 7005.5
(39021.4) (38716.5) (38703.8) (38766.4) (38727.4) (38561.1) (39525.1) (39340.4)
NSchlsConfFF -98040.1 -93344.4 -84333.1 -87580.2 -93536.6 -94346.8 -87021.4 -87438.7
(82226.0) (80789.9) (81426.7) (84212.0) (80549.9) (80884.2) (81286.1) (81080.8)
SOS 3152.0 2133.5 2240.6 1193.0 1270.5 1198.2 1344.2 422.6
(12216.2) (12176.0) (12321.9) (12233.1) (12124.3) (12112.0) (12256.3) (12316.6)
HistWins -3347.5 -3497.9 -3697.7 -3774.6 -3765.0 -3546.1 -3401.1 -3286.6
(2980.6) (2973.2) (2974.4) (2987.0) (3014.2) (3033.0) (2975.9) (2966.2)
HistNCAATrn -24491.9 -21700.5 -20750.6 -38853.0 -29547.2 -26788.5 -27276.6 -34331.5
(59651.6) (60763.3) (60443.4) (59183.4) (60076.5) (59758.3) (60474.4) (59840.7)
HistRound2 -70874.2 -48177.2 -46950.6 -60957.0 -66607.8 -72361.7 -62110.5 -66557.2
(111145.0) (112891.4) (112680.7) (112134.6) (112869.7) (112441.7) (112727.4) (112991.8)
HistSweet16 -103854.7 -108188.9 -89588.0 -57247.4 -77118.8 -71718.5 -96102.1 -100915.3
(146105.9) (146550.0) (142043.5) (137908.8) (142331.8) (143020.5) (150629.0) (149977.7)
HistElite8 122300.6 138398.8 153850.8 162086.9 124354.5 121118.3 98796.8 103269.6
(189441.3) (193896.8) (194892.6) (188380.6) (189793.4) (191902.8) (195405.5) (197614.7)
HistFinal4 289465.5 377790.8 406189.7 415666.3 305769.2 293215.8 319416.5 291240.3
(311958.6) (315873.5) (316946.9) (325441.4) (315849.6) (318912.6) (323489.2) (320987.7)
HistFinal 76384.6 218851.3 222528.8 147453.3 233731.0 220428.5 165220.1 177643.2
(604034.9) (589117.3) (590556.8) (578323.8) (564666.0) (569304.5) (589247.0) (593586.4)
HistChamp -757015.4 -831763.7 -795219.9 -747316.1 -787152.8 -807170.5 -793168.3 -835264.3
(866337.1) (807261.1) (802923.5) (786097.6) (798581.3) (818616.4) (796598.1) (805453.0)
Distance -1192.0 -1013.8 -1077.2 -1318.0 -1227.4 -1162.8 -1394.8 -1237.0
(1555.5) (1563.9) (1550.0) (1570.9) (1585.9) (1563.3) (1543.0) (1533.2)
UndergradPop -51259.9 -48763.9 -50143.6 -46632.0 -48126.5 -47259.7 -44468.6 -45673.7
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(39268.3) (38059.1) (38903.2) (39431.3) (38392.1) (38942.3) (38719.0) (38026.7)
PerCapPI 12579.7 10218.0 9573.1 2809.1 15049.7 14994.5 10002.1 9902.9
(41141.5) (40770.1) (39744.4) (40066.6) (40472.4) (40552.3) (40072.0) (40656.6)
GrPerCapPI 7613.0 9297.5 10574.9 11407.1 8066.5 10435.9 8614.0 10130.2
(15682.7) (15716.1) (15620.1) (15868.6) (15725.1) (15893.2) (15639.5) (15687.9)
CityPop 863023.6 917742.1 917852.3 871686.9 1066028.3 1094021.0 814208.2 792952.1
(1895758.1) (1857622.1) (1872259.8) (1899514.2) (1848478.2) (1837561.0) (1861378.2) (1888037.6)
StatePop 8894.7 57700.6 32295.7 88462.9 109731.0 108940.9 71209.5 89252.1
(431382.2) (408344.6) (417235.3) (430550.1) (420068.0) (420439.0) (417406.2) (424929.5)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Within R2 0.669 0.669 0.668 0.672 0.668 0.669 0.668 0.669
Adjusted R2 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 43
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players - Wins Included.
This table reports fixed effects estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue prod-
uct from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at
an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2)
Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touch-
downs or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is
how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 926451.1∗∗ 1522818.2∗ 1177237.5∗∗ 273485.5 256650.6 277127.5
(402026.1) (889228.6) (544071.6) (305633.1) (292662.4) (304313.0)
Starst−1 714289.9∗ 1384924.8∗ 2087051.6∗∗∗ 407647.8∗ 420308.5∗∗ 550044.6∗∗
(401453.2) (717023.7) (612357.0) (212809.1) (202678.8) (222842.6)
Starst−2 553711.2 -166349.4 64077.5 -26593.6 90578.7 135176.5
(402675.8) (622212.6) (497332.3) (189135.5) (214063.2) (225604.2)
Wins 274939.7∗∗∗ 348969.4∗∗∗ 351564.9∗∗∗ 353074.9∗∗∗ 354350.2∗∗∗ 359789.8∗∗∗
(74995.2) (79970.3) (78791.9) (97875.9) (98355.4) (91981.8)
Winst−1 -7345.1 23825.2 -49181.1 42722.7 35500.1 26959.1
(106403.2) (96990.4) (101631.9) (104352.5) (103815.1) (102155.3)
Winst−2 111438.2∗ 149553.4∗∗ 133762.7∗∗ 143999.7∗∗ 128650.6∗ 124482.8∗
(61823.0) (65103.8) (65590.4) (69353.3) (71157.5) (67503.3)
CoachCareert−1 2244305.0 1661061.4 2206707.1 1168961.9 1186148.5 1286603.7
(1998891.1) (1991400.9) (2009452.1) (1976103.4) (1976750.1) (1986751.7)
CoachChange -55083.8 -29198.8 -62648.6 -12324.3 -3541.0 -514.7
(305421.8) (297499.9) (294240.4) (306141.2) (307776.3) (306411.0)
BowlGamet−1 801635.7∗ 723398.0 845546.6∗ 622907.4 641113.7 646112.5
(461419.2) (439903.5) (452157.6) (451821.9) (451479.1) (448383.8)
BowlWint−1 -271550.9 -176341.5 -129392.2 -301405.2 -305649.5 -296419.7
(407506.8) (407253.4) (387193.3) (409197.9) (412077.7) (410269.2)
SOS 45560.8 29477.5 26287.0 50658.7 52705.6 52385.9
(55548.3) (58009.3) (56205.9) (57307.7) (57051.7) (57041.7)
TDPts 74672.2 84785.5 83866.3 82976.3 84887.9
(83567.8) (81452.0) (86434.4) (85962.2) (84937.7)
TDYds 1158166.3 1305509.4 730781.6 747587.8 901059.4
(2889808.5) (2907281.6) (2956665.7) (2962185.4) (2943115.8)
TDPassYds -1161127.5 -1308425.5 -733965.1 -750574.5 -904544.3
(2890623.5) (2908321.2) (2957886.9) (2963352.7) (2944318.7)
TDPassTDs -1075468.6 -1071795.9 -1155084.1 -1160122.2 -1157127.4
(763016.7) (750287.5) (762421.5) (760016.8) (754203.0)
TDRushYds -1152505.8 -1300663.4 -725911.2 -742927.7 -896492.5
(2889549.7) (2907052.7) (2956597.9) (2962143.3) (2943083.3)
TDRushTDs -90349.1 -133409.4 -133326.8 -104657.9 -71493.2
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(641483.0) (619525.5) (654339.3) (657695.1) (652923.5)
HistWins 13532.2 9949.9 10333.7 -360.7 -1775.8 329.2
(49402.3) (52154.6) (51783.3) (53120.3) (53010.1) (52579.7)
HistBowls -501296.9 -512727.8 -478500.4 -468326.5 -465992.1 -476874.5
(346434.2) (356643.2) (354552.6) (363926.7) (363195.1) (360418.9)
HistBowlWins 436554.0 376816.3 339666.7 415866.6 418814.4 410279.0
(433675.7) (438859.6) (433828.8) (453364.7) (453213.5) (445523.7)
Distance -24424.5 -26603.5 -26341.1 -22643.4 -22404.8 -22828.6
(16134.2) (16540.2) (16341.6) (16320.0) (16408.3) (16331.7)
UndergradPop -76567.4 -129901.7 -145432.6 -115893.4 -103678.5 -83662.8
(204645.5) (205740.9) (202726.9) (206019.8) (205628.7) (202931.6)
PerCapPI 225222.2 265734.4 275442.6 228780.8 226346.0 222839.1
(308465.8) (325624.8) (315066.1) (321018.5) (320216.1) (315866.4)
GrPerCapPI -6672.3 -2557.0 -8119.6 -8332.0 -4664.3 -2066.0
(127053.0) (125048.5) (124119.7) (127343.9) (126199.2) (125789.1)
CityPop 10267321.2 -10874167.3 -10852029.7 -1933163.1 -704208.1 -2967084.0
(25803325.3) (31029740.9) (28743940.4) (32277043.2) (32708796.7) (32309187.1)
StatePop -548663.0 -266620.9 -270917.6 -11510.8 659.7 28459.8
(3848678.8) (3889121.5) (3939800.6) (3874431.7) (3903313.8) (3860861.2)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.779 0.781 0.785 0.780 0.780 0.780
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 44
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players by Position - Wins
Included. This table reports fixed effects regression estimates of a star football player’s
marginal revenue product from Model (2.2) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues
are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have
been clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1)
All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDYds PER
Star QB 4002896.6∗∗∗ 2613205.7∗ 1338255.8 426270.7 344168.7 381371.0
(1144409.0) (1322656.6) (921253.7) (504839.4) (424145.3) (479613.7)
Star RB -71395.5 287602.6 822523.3 164893.3 117441.0 127832.2
(626403.8) (1260993.0) (914857.0) (446548.7) (437817.1) (441013.1)
Star WR 2671726.0∗ -430341.1 2275417.0 250983.5 230554.0 272862.4
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(1379730.4) (3370752.1) (1911482.0) (534304.1) (543821.9) (521004.1)
Star TE 709435.3
(1101329.7)
Star OL 1441320.6
(1894931.1)
Star K -1713721.1∗
(943726.6)
Star P 2240380.6
(2448445.7)
Star LB 1100736.3
(1199072.9)
Star DB 514531.4
(879917.8)
Star DL -343706.0
(1057113.1)
Wins 273964.8∗∗∗ 330986.2∗∗∗ 357280.0∗∗∗ 347714.3∗∗∗ 345097.5∗∗∗ 352589.0∗∗∗
(73651.1) (76827.9) (76999.7) (99527.1) (99837.8) (91104.1)
Star QBt−1 2611597.4 1490620.9 2684710.6∗∗∗ 425406.8 515950.5 1172038.1∗
(1955824.1) (1053164.0) (814824.0) (516100.8) (483480.0) (602783.9)
Star RBt−1 323916.9 895299.9 810298.9 455126.4 463177.9 456263.1
(1239196.0) (1503292.4) (1132294.3) (448895.1) (446222.7) (446421.7)
Star WRt−1 2038881.9 509920.8 3318746.5 361750.8 300917.1 264215.1
(1315882.4) (2867703.5) (2131557.1) (405450.3) (419007.1) (386977.8)
Star TEt−1 1447442.1
(1094682.6)
Star OLt−1 -777566.8
(1822117.5)
Star Kt−1 -2374622.5∗
(1315189.9)
Star Pt−1 538349.8
(1336473.7)
Star LBt−1 -282106.8
(846489.4)
Star DBt−1 1334047.2
(1070753.7)
Star DLt−1 -970607.7
(1124523.7)
Star QBt−2 518013.2 877899.6 1180250.7∗ 139692.4 665871.4 1118972.1∗
(1592941.8) (845853.0) (651010.3) (524457.7) (601209.9) (618899.0)
Star RBt−2 -366207.2 -1709926.3 -1882554.0∗∗ -271338.9 -257297.4 -253156.5
(989744.5) (1443421.8) (924455.5) (447091.1) (440654.0) (431273.5)
Star WRt−2 879686.7 -1207240.5 152284.6 33209.9 -116997.9 -114984.8
(854836.2) (2292921.4) (1344609.2) (370415.3) (386422.3) (358751.9)
Star TEt−2 2437961.3
(1905816.6)
Star OLt−2 -416375.1
(1585694.0)
Star Kt−2 -1459077.4
(1402101.4)
Star Pt−2 -1134644.3
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(1464326.1)
Star LBt−2 978819.0
(1382759.7)
Star DBt−2 984002.7
(947930.2)
Star DLt−2 475560.2
(1186928.7)
Winst−1 -26800.7 29252.4 -68389.3 38309.6 32381.0 3188.5
(107121.3) (98462.6) (104010.1) (108974.8) (108002.9) (107336.9)
Winst−2 105240.5∗ 144613.5∗∗ 129268.5∗ 144210.0∗ 117311.1 114024.1
(62154.1) (66425.7) (67525.4) (75426.6) (80101.5) (72453.8)
CoachCareert−1 2894797.6 1593888.0 2401403.5 1200533.5 1256494.9 1522845.0
(2051077.1) (1957219.9) (2002934.8) (2040956.1) (2024867.2) (2060175.3)
CoachChange -58782.0 -16192.1 -55150.5 -12145.5 -20256.5 -31704.9
(292807.9) (294118.4) (301118.6) (304540.2) (307027.6) (304636.3)
BowlGamet−1 722329.3 694577.7 873857.2∗ 646693.4 675347.4 720120.6
(436796.3) (443767.6) (462884.6) (457642.8) (454049.7) (456172.4)
L1BowlWin -206651.2 -187959.4 -66582.0 -302569.4 -315833.4 -285164.0
(388881.0) (413549.1) (382501.4) (410367.2) (413683.8) (409427.2)
SOS 61314.5 29729.7 35534.6 49401.1 47400.9 51349.7
(54809.0) (60470.8) (58149.0) (58117.8) (58254.0) (58426.1)
TDPts 68144.8 78120.9 83385.3 83494.4 78923.6
(83815.0) (81707.3) (87131.1) (86458.3) (85837.7)
TDYds 1044767.3 1292737.8 714811.7 754280.4 1265975.5
(2927930.6) (2912489.9) (2923737.4) (2935680.7) (2943891.5)
TDPassYds -1047346.8 -1295474.6 -717841.1 -756821.8 -1270048.9
(2928554.5) (2913457.7) (2924896.7) (2936819.8) (2945113.7)
TDPassTDs -1091752.6 -1054979.2 -1168780.8 -1191102.9 -1121070.5
(770792.5) (749082.5) (755174.9) (751124.9) (743910.0)
TDRushYds -1038794.0 -1287346.5 -709936.7 -749633.7 -1261770.4
(2927774.0) (2912188.0) (2923612.9) (2935630.9) (2943829.2)
TDRushTDs -86636.2 -68778.9 -139077.0 -124242.6 -6860.5
(643778.4) (626067.1) (657717.8) (657380.3) (663593.9)
HistWins 11270.5 1326.6 1496.2 -2420.9 -9263.4 -6782.9
(51132.0) (52817.6) (52253.8) (53336.4) (53902.2) (53346.8)
HistBowls -521435.6 -464489.7 -439494.7 -459686.2 -452940.4 -461940.3
(368074.2) (359064.3) (357380.4) (357687.1) (354971.2) (355114.6)
HistBowlWins 501636.9 417571.2 426305.2 427727.8 452831.3 424508.7
(450773.7) (436889.4) (447415.3) (455830.6) (451921.4) (440332.2)
Distance -21716.0 -24421.3 -23668.5 -22460.6 -22041.8 -24094.7
(16822.8) (16568.4) (16047.0) (16289.5) (16272.1) (16464.6)
UndergradPop -102650.5 -128413.9 -174520.3 -119192.5 -111109.3 -68576.0
(209441.7) (206741.0) (208344.2) (209422.3) (207827.5) (202903.2)
PerCapPI 146883.4 257749.5 265500.9 220867.2 212988.5 213644.3
(286195.9) (328628.3) (318848.8) (322632.0) (323552.2) (321480.4)
GrPerCapPI -22275.7 -4719.5 -16751.0 -8338.8 -4020.3 10219.7
(124128.7) (125816.2) (123405.0) (128331.5) (128030.5) (128727.7)
CityPop -11923135.7 -7057157.9 -15834654.8 -706009.7 3058621.4 -552574.7
(26824968.4) (32268054.1) (28364104.5) (31675075.3) (32890494.5) (32124381.9)
StatePop -1400913.1 -242314.9 -137139.9 -79764.7 -2597.2 271169.6
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(3492057.1) (3963926.5) (4004886.8) (3891568.5) (3964285.1) (3951960.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.790 0.783 0.788 0.780 0.781 0.782
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 45
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players - Wins Included. This table reports fixed effects estimates
of a star basketball player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012
USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different
measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most
Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA
Top 5 Draft Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stars 966953.5∗ 561750.5∗∗∗ 255794.2 165147.4∗ 276439.2 314342.4∗ 239950.0 261080.0∗
(491931.7) (188740.4) (168360.1) (88732.0) (191644.3) (189002.7) (179922.3) (144643.1)
Starst−1 226425.3 13283.8 88317.9 -3280.9 167345.1 -1644.5 22131.5 33415.2
(380815.1) (285594.4) (174900.9) (87014.6) (287882.3) (224140.2) (102344.0) (82020.7)
Starst−2 203893.4 165585.0 205185.0 221952.9∗∗ 234977.4 108587.0 159468.7 69587.1
(336693.0) (218117.7) (155300.2) (100080.7) (243293.3) (199662.2) (113475.9) (86536.2)
Wins 16401.4∗∗∗ 16095.1∗∗∗ 16532.0∗∗∗ 14674.9∗∗∗ 17132.9∗∗∗ 16137.1∗∗∗ 17154.5∗∗∗ 16032.2∗∗∗
(4022.4) (4050.8) (4061.7) (3968.5) (4304.9) (4126.2) (4226.7) (4179.2)
Winst−1 4748.5 4102.8 4100.7 5912.3 4171.2 4528.4 4721.5 4122.7
(4697.1) (4621.6) (4668.8) (4595.2) (4522.4) (4586.8) (4724.2) (4828.4)
Winst−2 15495.5∗∗∗ 14761.6∗∗∗ 14219.9∗∗∗ 10899.3∗∗ 15062.1∗∗∗ 14880.7∗∗∗ 15002.4∗∗∗ 14752.4∗∗∗
(4544.6) (4571.7) (4520.0) (4782.4) (4172.7) (4291.8) (4736.9) (4854.2)
CoachCarTournt−1 53608.3∗∗∗ 53939.5∗∗∗ 53237.4∗∗∗ 53561.2∗∗∗ 53678.2∗∗∗ 54457.3∗∗∗ 54653.0∗∗∗ 52980.0∗∗∗
(16243.8) (16323.8) (16347.0) (16315.1) (16304.6) (16256.2) (16259.3) (16376.0)
CoachCareert−1 -72663.3 -30560.9 -43597.0 -72923.5 -70991.4 -72693.8 -64191.8 -59716.8
(295769.7) (292317.2) (295390.0) (291685.5) (293372.3) (293534.3) (294674.0) (292786.1)
CoachChange 21303.7 18328.6 23666.7 21192.4 21836.9 20925.1 17639.8 17187.5
(61326.5) (61403.0) (60989.1) (61483.0) (61618.5) (61350.9) (61259.9) (61464.8)
NCAATournt−1 165630.5∗∗ 167951.2∗∗ 165258.0∗∗ 172095.1∗∗ 166695.3∗∗ 161106.1∗∗ 159724.4∗∗ 159488.4∗∗
(74989.6) (74251.6) (74014.2) (76384.5) (72835.6) (74381.4) (74244.2) (74821.3)
Round2t−1 -73105.3 -64545.4 -62367.3 -64309.2 -65697.6 -64115.5 -62807.1 -60811.1
(126983.3) (124158.5) (128221.5) (129147.1) (128643.0) (127160.8) (127817.7) (126639.0)
Sweet16t−1 268201.0 262449.6 267328.5 308551.4∗ 284234.0 276561.4 298365.6∗ 286065.7∗
(173635.3) (181712.2) (178524.2) (170488.4) (178246.7) (178620.6) (173498.7) (171741.4)
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Elitet8t−1 -106558.5 -108711.1 -69385.5 2207.8 -87065.8 -69938.5 -86071.3 -93301.6
(453717.0) (459412.9) (473096.7) (434909.6) (465610.0) (474432.6) (451961.7) (451327.7)
Final4t−1 351330.9 357252.4 385537.2 398992.6 372331.3 418360.6 396717.3 394768.0
(363656.3) (372603.0) (365858.7) (379135.5) (402738.2) (402114.1) (377745.2) (377032.3)
Finalt−1 -31004.4 33779.7 -51028.4 36693.2 -112965.9 -44692.1 -23126.8 -17714.0
(269017.4) (338853.1) (307084.9) (287027.4) (322843.0) (344107.1) (274565.3) (277970.8)
Champt−1 1804407.2∗∗ 1954931.9∗∗∗ 1952856.5∗∗∗ 2079971.4∗∗∗ 1858425.7∗∗ 1853390.6∗∗ 1883220.4∗∗∗ 1914658.2∗∗∗
(852024.8) (585288.6) (657342.2) (643846.0) (747454.4) (726504.3) (618545.2) (619006.2)
NSchlsConf 3419.9 2487.8 3225.9 4183.5 5268.2 4192.6 7060.5 5710.4
(40489.6) (40283.4) (40090.1) (40602.0) (40177.5) (40238.4) (40212.9) (40307.5)
NSchlsConfAP -43949.2 -45507.3 -46672.0 -40075.3 -39685.4 -43315.3 -43840.1 -41422.0
(39761.7) (41144.6) (40921.4) (40815.3) (41500.5) (41984.2) (40413.7) (39998.3)
NSchlsConfTourn 862.6 513.1 59.56 -2832.3 1605.7 1610.3 1709.9 2704.3
(39096.3) (38838.1) (38871.9) (38864.5) (39006.7) (38770.9) (39511.4) (39355.3)
NSchlsConfFF -104395.1 -99768.9 -91551.5 -91890.9 -97524.2 -99203.7 -94643.9 -94380.4
(81984.3) (80600.9) (81199.2) (83667.6) (80585.9) (80888.9) (81145.0) (80966.2)
SOS 3635.6 2691.7 2858.0 1951.1 2434.3 2164.3 2137.8 1291.0
(12091.4) (12059.1) (12211.9) (12127.1) (12059.1) (12025.6) (12136.8) (12222.4)
HistWins -1890.8 -2059.8 -2205.8 -2478.7 -2182.4 -2145.9 -1887.2 -1882.4
(2930.4) (2927.4) (2925.2) (2945.1) (2953.5) (2982.9) (2926.2) (2933.6)
HistNCAATrn -30751.4 -28369.8 -27395.3 -43587.4 -35616.1 -32640.8 -33161.1 -38655.7
(58566.4) (59741.7) (59610.3) (58438.7) (59062.4) (58883.9) (59304.3) (58834.5)
HistRound2 -75644.3 -55178.8 -55176.0 -65482.6 -71222.5 -74954.1 -68607.5 -71657.3
(109898.8) (111504.5) (111355.5) (111102.8) (111143.8) (111161.1) (111236.5) (111515.5)
HistSweet16 -109348.1 -110798.2 -92988.2 -63467.9 -84814.2 -78889.9 -100619.0 -104764.2
(141491.3) (142123.7) (138063.4) (134181.5) (139171.6) (139861.1) (145514.9) (145375.8)
HistElite8 132811.7 146398.0 158075.9 170779.1 135952.8 131605.7 112933.1 114534.6
(188347.9) (193316.9) (194087.6) (188281.9) (187836.7) (190321.0) (193890.5) (196082.9)
HistFinal4 277229.8 357279.0 383176.7 399495.3 304066.8 290587.7 303076.4 278903.0
(312838.5) (314248.9) (314886.2) (321911.4) (313574.3) (317596.8) (323032.2) (320433.7)
HistFinal 65092.5 201973.6 205616.7 146366.0 206075.8 195219.3 151495.7 164653.3
(601270.3) (585697.9) (587330.0) (575733.5) (566610.0) (569223.1) (584343.1) (587752.8)
HistChamp -761925.7 -829906.6 -793943.8 -754868.5 -790988.1 -798037.6 -797728.5 -832113.6
(846758.3) (789728.3) (786464.4) (773601.1) (775861.5) (802985.7) (778815.9) (789454.9)
Distance -1028.3 -894.8 -942.9 -1182.5 -1082.4 -1007.9 -1205.4 -1075.8
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(1538.6) (1543.9) (1533.3) (1555.5) (1568.2) (1549.4) (1527.0) (1521.5)
UndergradPop -51465.9 -49241.4 -50692.7 -47641.2 -48865.7 -47912.8 -45444.4 -46252.7
(38075.5) (36967.0) (37792.9) (38400.5) (37508.6) (37989.5) (37532.9) (37093.9)
PerCapPI 13549.5 11129.1 10495.8 3777.8 15420.3 15022.1 11228.6 11050.3
(40711.4) (40368.0) (39494.8) (39902.8) (40113.4) (40208.8) (39757.1) (40299.5)
GrPerCapPI 7657.9 9120.8 10200.8 10847.5 8239.5 9923.4 8541.1 9837.2
(15454.6) (15486.8) (15375.4) (15698.8) (15484.6) (15630.4) (15421.7) (15486.3)
CityPop 838632.4 892973.9 885192.5 844416.6 984081.3 1017251.7 795369.5 774215.2
(1919777.3) (1884569.5) (1900613.0) (1922628.1) (1882562.4) (1869222.3) (1884797.4) (1908816.8)
StatePop -34504.8 13468.7 -9179.8 30621.3 55668.1 52754.1 23559.9 44373.3
(431570.3) (410095.8) (417833.8) (432343.8) (423219.5) (423250.4) (417888.4) (424301.9)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Within R2 0.672 0.672 0.671 0.674 0.670 0.671 0.670 0.671
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.969 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.969
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
214
Table 46
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
first-difference estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from Model
(2.3) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency.
Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six
different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists
(voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for
Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks
are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or
touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
∆Starst 948869.0∗∗∗ 1469685.8∗ 1445711.1∗∗∗ 779553.1∗∗∗ 748806.3∗∗∗ 750360.7∗∗∗
(349418.3) (828796.5) (506010.5) (235433.4) (225132.4) (254279.4)
∆Starst−1 709250.0∗ 1649626.2∗∗ 2120098.8∗∗∗ 573737.5∗∗∗ 590639.4∗∗∗ 739697.0∗∗∗
(402677.7) (674256.7) (569801.0) (207958.1) (208535.9) (223208.1)
∆Starst−2 163983.3 49332.1 194599.5 -55141.1 76767.2 220992.2
(352823.6) (576912.1) (441350.4) (156582.1) (180291.6) (192410.0)
∆Winst−1 -54146.5 -33695.2 -91383.2 -28327.0 -36400.5 -43853.1
(80711.3) (75255.9) (83775.1) (82789.0) (83264.7) (83922.2)
∆Winst−2 20750.4 36759.6 24862.7 42802.2 25832.4 11422.1
(58634.4) (55110.4) (55154.6) (61054.7) (64107.2) (62159.7)
∆CoachCareert−1 884195.7 430509.6 880297.2 -136643.1 -140116.1 -21058.4
(1312309.0) (1255639.2) (1278001.1) (1306426.0) (1301108.3) (1297892.7)
∆CoachChange -73262.0 -26467.6 -54643.8 -4393.0 5901.6 2825.6
(251181.7) (251073.2) (241656.4) (247955.4) (248133.9) (247039.7)
∆BowlGamet−1 439741.8 373694.9 431727.3 371401.8 384588.8 368532.4
(359784.3) (352783.9) (359075.4) (356970.6) (356305.0) (356858.1)
∆BowlWint−1 -215497.7 -93293.9 -47035.8 -228514.3 -241983.2 -242143.6
(354696.1) (340856.9) (325671.5) (342739.8) (345832.5) (347101.1)
∆SOSt 27455.5 37255.0 36421.3 52637.3 52301.9 49399.7
(48864.5) (52187.1) (52476.9) (50442.0) (50416.6) (51039.1)
∆TDPtst -1764.7 2640.5 37705.6 40245.8 37889.2
(69707.7) (69057.6) (70520.5) (71058.5) (70989.1)
∆TDYdst 1541229.3 1510846.0 1168792.7 1222291.0 1247976.1
(2104018.2) (2091956.9) (2096167.0) (2103501.9) (2124458.2)
∆TDPassYdst -1539497.4 -1508668.2 -1168688.1 -1222021.8 -1247752.8
(2103651.2) (2091728.8) (2096283.9) (2103566.6) (2124552.2)
∆TDPassTDst -913215.8 -879058.7 -1138818.8∗ -1163441.9∗ -1139000.7∗
(624718.7) (613457.9) (630121.0) (637136.4) (633583.4)
∆TDRushYdst -1534036.7 -1503408.4 -1162771.0 -1216373.5 -1241862.4
(2103109.5) (2091016.2) (2095591.4) (2102916.2) (2123882.9)
∆TDRushTDst -324770.9 -356404.6 -546340.6 -534016.4 -498471.1
(497808.1) (488928.7) (499535.4) (500650.3) (496791.9)
∆HistWinst 477.1 4820.3 8041.6 -4001.5 -2100.1 -1302.8
(52168.7) (57253.8) (57092.3) (55785.0) (55855.2) (55761.7)
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∆HistBowlst -429669.0 -474205.6 -456987.1 -424740.3 -429260.0 -458484.8
(324241.9) (331002.7) (323843.5) (320931.3) (322325.8) (324853.4)
∆HistBowlWinst 354137.7 372959.8 350225.7 462937.2 447073.5 458095.4
(372663.6) (361051.6) (358653.7) (357565.9) (357698.0) (355794.7)
∆Distancet -27509.6∗ -29520.7∗ -32039.9∗∗ -26164.8∗ -25140.5 -24894.1
(14851.1) (15635.2) (15683.3) (15470.1) (15580.5) (15741.2)
∆UndergradPopt -305926.3∗ -355366.1∗ -351079.5∗ -311359.9∗ -308788.2∗ -306699.0∗
(177753.5) (185453.5) (186002.7) (166927.6) (168213.6) (168737.4)
∆PerCapPIt 175881.2 245285.9 259355.0 237906.1 237430.8 219978.5
(289991.6) (305125.9) (299039.0) (303836.3) (303764.8) (299368.6)
∆GrPerCapPIt -3727.7 7836.6 1401.2 -11569.6 -8007.5 2029.2
(106066.3) (104850.2) (104294.6) (109688.7) (109104.4) (107490.6)
∆CityPopt 28054638.2 16664412.0 14035656.0 18365911.2 18833592.2 16952734.7
(23269063.7) (23092406.6) (22175343.5) (23958552.0) (23516072.6) (23040343.3)
∆StatePopt -1215251.8 -650802.3 -859168.4 -1058134.8 -1029541.7 -787390.3
(2801694.5) (2778169.5) (2812999.1) (2745399.2) (2809285.5) (2786095.6)
∆Conference 216108.4 187016.2 148304.5 222704.3 219111.6 209820.7
(231504.8) (217321.0) (223844.3) (224161.5) (230133.0) (232429.1)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 936 936 936 936 936 936
R2 0.145 0.155 0.169 0.168 0.165 0.162
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 47
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players. This table reports first-difference estimates of a star
basketballl player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.3) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at
an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different measures
of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding
Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft
Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers and, (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Starst 1244669.4∗∗∗ 682364.7∗∗∗ 332745.2 197634.8∗∗ 475602.4∗∗ 435118.6∗∗ 369001.0∗ 395939.8∗∗
(473789.8) (152435.6) (204309.7) (90979.0) (188524.0) (174028.1) (204126.7) (162427.6)
∆Starst−1 1316327.3∗∗∗ 355506.6∗ 157342.8 53072.7 328429.3 271346.3 129652.0 177974.9∗
(339865.8) (197409.3) (157492.2) (87034.0) (254837.0) (187689.1) (123510.3) (104788.6)
∆Starst−2 605049.6 270524.5 37812.9 197711.5∗∗ 125740.9 34561.9 111437.7 102171.0
(369234.7) (188809.1) (159556.9) (99526.1) (231342.9) (200534.0) (115025.0) (96238.5)
∆Winst−1 -1301.9 -1603.7 -934.6 1277.0 -763.9 -1028.1 -407.9 -1202.9
(4706.4) (4601.7) (4711.0) (4571.6) (4688.1) (4743.9) (4704.1) (4713.2)
∆Winst−2 6140.3 5933.1 7128.9 4308.6 7100.3 7057.4 6653.0 5910.6
(5056.1) (4980.6) (5098.9) (5349.8) (5149.0) (5205.0) (5239.5) (5090.4)
∆CoachCarTournt−1 33305.8∗ 33326.3∗ 34080.3∗ 34753.3∗ 33151.4∗ 33005.1∗ 33498.5∗ 33115.2∗
(18660.4) (18780.8) (18727.3) (18652.8) (18535.2) (18281.2) (18778.8) (18692.8)
∆CoachCareert−1 262163.2 295546.3 270967.0 183813.2 236739.8 253957.1 265972.6 270420.7
(259980.7) (258929.2) (264018.8) (257315.3) (260180.0) (260983.4) (257039.7) (256011.5)
∆CoachChanget -4611.6 -6869.6 -4689.7 -4844.7 -5278.7 -4711.1 -8270.4 -9081.9
(54886.6) (54844.0) (54889.6) (54770.4) (54771.8) (54472.8) (54813.7) (55005.8)
∆NCAATournt−1 74719.7 74675.0 67046.6 70089.8 68273.4 61816.5 69830.1 64272.1
(68202.2) (67167.5) (66767.5) (68009.1) (67868.5) (69181.8) (68045.5) (67700.6)
∆Round2t−1 -85080.5 -85634.6 -78693.5 -76779.6 -80149.4 -82603.7 -74958.7 -75548.6
(103244.2) (102833.0) (104510.7) (106486.2) (104118.6) (104476.9) (103440.2) (102373.0)
∆Sweet16t−1 95587.9 119129.6 118149.8 168226.7 119035.8 118929.7 162602.3 141597.7
(118749.5) (126224.0) (126882.1) (121669.4) (127498.6) (125137.8) (124654.8) (123438.1)
∆Elite8t−1 -313071.5 -292302.4 -258628.3 -179807.7 -279848.1 -299177.7 -303678.9 -303212.8
(337691.0) (339913.1) (342523.1) (322040.4) (340484.4) (345180.8) (334222.0) (335192.5)
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∆Final4t−1 -219095.3 -170690.6 -195919.7 -210148.5 -230657.8 -224554.6 -154629.5 -160398.5
(403620.2) (412452.1) (387443.2) (403956.8) (425532.7) (420284.7) (408967.9) (407983.0)
∆Finalt−1 -20853.5 72935.7 -22729.9 111227.5 1639.0 -16337.9 12868.9 33950.7
(258131.2) (334494.6) (310338.5) (222601.8) (261274.0) (268731.4) (267721.0) (275527.2)
∆Winnert−1 515218.4 1121796.8∗∗∗ 1015056.5∗∗ 1308687.3∗∗∗ 943865.2∗∗ 847829.4∗ 1039990.5∗∗ 1067729.4∗∗
(489234.2) (393829.8) (433272.2) (352109.5) (450760.4) (479111.8) (413073.1) (423185.6)
∆NSchlsConft 43502.9 41396.7 39349.8 46093.3 42205.8 39228.4 46549.1 43871.9
(46441.1) (46218.8) (46566.7) (46286.6) (45887.1) (46334.5) (46441.6) (45467.9)
∆NSchlsConfAPt -13052.3 -15469.7 -18245.2 -8652.0 -13483.5 -12887.4 -14829.5 -12345.1
(46963.1) (48238.3) (48605.9) (49411.1) (48440.7) (48940.4) (47794.7) (46554.3)
∆NSchlsConfTournt -12350.8 -12946.5 -9729.0 -16912.5 -8889.4 -9493.0 -11588.6 -10277.3
(45308.9) (45319.5) (45403.0) (44873.6) (45066.1) (44871.2) (45610.7) (45345.5)
∆NSchlsConfFFt -57304.9 -56821.6 -56589.0 -60358.2 -60979.0 -61468.1 -57036.6 -59452.5
(63766.9) (62216.7) (63476.0) (64899.7) (62150.1) (61644.2) (61963.9) (61862.0)
∆SOSt−1 13187.2 12593.2 13027.8 11312.8 12107.4 12144.1 12113.7 11368.7
(9932.5) (9907.4) (10032.1) (10025.9) (9938.5) (10085.9) (9959.7) (9960.6)
∆HistWinst -6248.3∗∗ -6076.0∗∗ -6260.4∗∗ -6379.7∗∗ -6408.1∗∗ -6509.8∗∗ -6419.0∗∗ -5988.2∗
(3096.3) (3070.5) (3114.8) (3093.3) (3148.6) (3169.9) (3105.8) (3075.6)
∆HistNCAATrnt 14157.4 15811.5 19392.1 17058.6 16445.2 20267.4 18377.4 14935.6
(65658.1) (66096.7) (65211.2) (65551.6) (65702.3) (65453.8) (66087.2) (65878.3)
∆HistRnd2t -32880.5 -15504.0 -13549.5 -19867.8 -25276.1 -25021.1 -13155.0 -19326.6
(130537.3) (129231.4) (131319.9) (127476.7) (131509.0) (131654.6) (131030.2) (131018.2)
∆HistSwt16t 24887.9 38188.8 34712.4 56581.1 59016.0 71304.5 44849.9 35880.7
(136107.5) (138638.7) (138781.2) (133537.2) (135459.6) (140942.6) (139387.9) (131827.6)
∆HistElite8t -58198.2 -67712.9 -83369.0 -47078.2 -68912.9 -79856.8 -102662.3 -94145.5
(146252.2) (147578.3) (152915.5) (145376.3) (147409.8) (148945.9) (151412.6) (153192.8)
∆HistFin4t 282957.6 346493.3 305677.5 432115.7 248681.7 239408.4 298909.8 281965.4
(305170.3) (315927.5) (312649.5) (319617.8) (298725.9) (304325.5) (308255.6) (308102.1)
∆HistFinalt -339759.5 -160841.0 -228586.7 -195778.1 -200579.6 -247918.7 -193488.7 -206363.6
(384959.2) (347211.1) (369356.3) (378611.7) (365343.3) (355409.6) (368204.7) (355766.8)
∆HistWinnert -755366.8 -864673.7 -787832.7 -768445.5 -739792.4 -767086.0 -772197.9 -836478.2
(909030.1) (941372.5) (938316.7) (918507.9) (941995.7) (928306.1) (926269.9) (918290.0)
∆Distancet -537.6 -555.9 -587.1 -798.1 -643.4 -542.7 -792.7 -781.2
(1589.6) (1635.2) (1584.8) (1625.6) (1615.3) (1609.3) (1593.6) (1605.8)
∆UndergradPopt -55936.6 -58120.0∗ -51045.9 -51872.6 -54945.6 -53246.9 -46710.5 -49400.2
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(36042.9) (34025.1) (35180.4) (34385.2) (33696.1) (34348.9) (35373.6) (32964.8)
∆PerCapPIt 33400.8 30174.2 31512.5 23621.3 34446.1 37192.6 31129.1 32844.3
(37742.9) (36756.3) (37080.4) (37450.6) (37712.5) (37465.6) (37433.7) (36809.1)
∆GrPerCapPIt 15075.3 16015.3 17198.2 19420.4 15033.4 16145.8 15763.7 15988.7
(14224.1) (14449.2) (14469.3) (14358.1) (14119.5) (14138.6) (14317.5) (14249.5)
∆CityPopt 810717.9 890468.9 845822.9 814232.8 1080732.3 1069248.4 602207.3 585040.1
(1761651.3) (1735986.2) (1726862.9) (1681573.7) (1703770.9) (1716922.6) (1692809.1) (1687281.1)
∆StatePopt 95573.2 249783.1 269071.9 287891.1 290827.5 281120.3 274095.2 291216.1
(379218.7) (344333.9) (353527.4) (363255.5) (352489.5) (354104.0) (353083.6) (357574.8)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819
R2 0.103 0.0990 0.0951 0.106 0.0950 0.0967 0.0952 0.100
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 48
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
OLS estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.4) over the
sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard
errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six different
measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th
place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards.
The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs
and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured
with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards
while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 1079047.5∗∗∗ 1238360.9 1133259.8∗ 688562.2∗∗∗ 682939.7∗∗∗ 653164.6∗∗∗
(289289.4) (896004.8) (578029.1) (215182.7) (207103.7) (236700.4)
Starst−1 231460.8 538886.5 1058006.7∗∗ 279846.5 280493.5 407705.1∗∗
(397490.4) (665666.7) (523856.6) (227686.1) (209903.5) (198800.1)
Starst−2 256403.5 -948961.4∗ -1106412.0∗∗ -279814.4 -191538.5 -149343.2
(361902.0) (510459.2) (524545.0) (219815.8) (217130.7) (208955.2)
Revenuest−1 0.634∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.634∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0469) (0.0466) (0.0463) (0.0465) (0.0468)
Revenuest−2 0.0682 0.0772 0.0802 0.0779 0.0783 0.0789
(0.0633) (0.0603) (0.0600) (0.0604) (0.0602) (0.0604)
Winst−1 -14847.2 -862.0 -55154.9 -14746.7 -18032.2 -22011.3
(99422.4) (98353.1) (104678.3) (103253.5) (102582.5) (104112.3)
Winst−2 -77429.7 -41513.6 -27225.5 -33286.2 -41261.8 -53439.4
(56617.1) (58860.2) (59779.5) (68664.5) (69703.1) (66024.5)
CoachCareert−1 1715688.8 1517318.8 1618001.6 925489.1 929471.6 1089903.8
(1512631.9) (1409909.3) (1397621.8) (1414940.7) (1412892.8) (1403736.1)
CoachChange -95462.1 -66663.3 -77862.1 -51784.0 -28522.2 -32981.2
(337630.7) (352351.2) (345736.8) (345418.0) (344997.4) (342469.0)
BowlGamet−1 -687927.9 -756760.7 -672961.4 -788983.7 -775863.1 -772709.5
(475596.6) (466738.1) (472307.6) (475429.3) (468414.4) (469621.9)
BowlWint−1 288046.4 400718.0 458361.7 351149.8 326236.1 309829.1
(393782.9) (390772.7) (379398.1) (389794.5) (393323.1) (396806.5)
SOS 51809.1 58921.8 58962.0 73413.7 74622.0 70219.9
(57004.3) (57313.8) (58992.9) (59515.3) (59211.3) (58987.1)
TDPts -30825.8 -22234.3 -9301.5 -1996.3 -4059.2
(85977.6) (85755.9) (83582.6) (83820.1) (83620.2)
TDYds 376665.3 380610.4 247775.3 330994.5 293402.8
(3186572.5) (3209443.1) (3226591.8) (3218781.3) (3220367.3)
TDPassYds -369597.3 -373845.8 -243323.0 -326252.1 -288229.1
(3186568.2) (3209592.7) (3226908.6) (3219044.5) (3220573.8)
TDPassTDs -820347.3 -836225.0 -973055.8 -1037798.0 -1015333.0
(721809.2) (712863.6) (709903.2) (716561.5) (712744.3)
TDRushYds -367740.3 -371835.3 -239840.2 -323314.4 -285408.0
(3187225.1) (3210032.9) (3227510.5) (3219736.8) (3221238.5)
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TDRushTDs -101315.3 -179351.9 -185732.9 -207994.5 -185822.5
(660016.3) (666941.3) (636734.7) (638233.7) (633879.0)
HistWins 30915.3 20417.2 18211.6 14585.9 14962.8 14834.6
(37546.8) (37860.7) (37779.8) (36976.7) (37145.9) (37289.6)
HistBowls -554841.7∗∗ -560824.3∗∗ -555038.6∗∗ -496530.3∗∗ -502466.8∗∗ -515950.2∗∗
(260390.5) (255401.8) (256815.4) (249715.7) (249787.9) (251578.2)
HistBowlWins -109935.1 -52253.8 -40695.2 -24408.0 -17567.1 -22140.1
(326160.7) (310007.7) (308163.2) (314767.6) (319018.1) (320639.3)
Distance -3256.2 -3500.2 -2536.3 -4478.5 -4221.5 -4335.6
(10022.0) (9673.9) (9746.8) (10060.9) (10001.4) (9875.2)
UndergradPop 1988.1 -12161.5 -14228.9 -21101.1 -27141.8 -26943.7
(97804.0) (103585.6) (103399.0) (103480.7) (103954.5) (104028.7)
PerCapPI 52178.7 66961.2 76344.3 80875.7 75583.5 71641.2
(141963.3) (137297.4) (135854.6) (139639.8) (139588.3) (139017.6)
GrPerCapPI 40208.4 44195.0 43275.8 19036.3 23879.7 30274.8
(100621.3) (100180.3) (99411.9) (100907.6) (100474.7) (100463.8)
CityPop 14690061.1 10350327.0 8011106.6 9461579.5 9401550.8 9344938.5
(12124261.1) (12335007.7) (12749482.5) (12343110.3) (12313243.0) (12434151.0)
StatePop 177521.1 194540.6 248217.4 174234.3 159525.0 143899.3
(358162.7) (362490.7) (369669.9) (370581.2) (372859.6) (375933.4)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 49
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players. This table reports OLS estimates of a star basketball
player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.4) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different measures of star
player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player,
(2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6)
NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stars 1206300.1∗∗ 635196.1∗∗ 341945.7 247469.1∗∗ 527306.9∗∗ 421527.9∗ 414020.6∗∗ 370848.7∗∗
(501780.2) (245445.2) (212881.3) (99151.5) (236665.1) (254394.8) (190465.1) (155549.9)
Starst−1 462913.2 54083.6 -19918.0 -38558.9 198894.2 17053.7 -42974.3 -10924.1
(315212.3) (279577.9) (189781.5) (88269.1) (325219.3) (246099.5) (126430.0) (78065.5)
Starst−2 -413247.1 26767.6 -50709.7 164020.0∗ -59523.1 -168030.2 8130.3 -91041.0
(362317.1) (227605.2) (213869.0) (98863.0) (369112.6) (261677.2) (194254.3) (120111.6)
Revenuest−1 0.448∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗ 0.441∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗
(0.0823) (0.0813) (0.0816) (0.0813) (0.0816) (0.0818) (0.0814) (0.0813)
Revenuest−2 0.192∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗
(0.0297) (0.0290) (0.0291) (0.0293) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0293) (0.0293)
Winst−1 6011.0 5756.8 6123.9 7507.6∗ 6079.7 5911.1 6474.5 5223.1
(4261.9) (4412.6) (4470.7) (4181.1) (4291.2) (4306.0) (4334.6) (4433.7)
Winst−2 8202.0∗ 6776.9 7673.1 3817.7 7985.6∗ 8356.2∗ 6720.7 7482.8
(4754.0) (4513.5) (4702.4) (4466.6) (4315.5) (4515.0) (4753.7) (4855.8)
CoachCarTournt−1 44632.1∗∗ 43999.3∗∗ 44541.0∗∗ 43340.3∗∗ 45355.4∗∗ 44480.5∗∗ 44033.6∗∗ 44079.1∗∗
(19463.0) (19894.6) (20074.0) (20158.1) (19608.0) (19728.9) (19540.5) (19713.0)
CoachCareert−1 -186613.9 -135308.9 -145741.7 -134982.8 -185301.1 -156790.9 -133499.5 -106543.8
(288071.0) (289959.1) (296798.2) (291648.2) (288015.8) (291108.2) (287163.3) (284059.0)
CoachChange -13247.6 -11962.3 -10224.8 -5233.5 -11763.5 -11399.0 -15070.8 -13199.0
(68897.7) (68803.0) (68826.9) (68953.7) (69037.2) (68553.2) (68938.2) (69266.6)
NCAATournt−1 115584.5 120983.6 110093.5 108834.6 110537.4 100205.7 112591.4 109957.2
(81227.7) (80445.5) (80642.3) (83139.0) (81157.3) (82190.2) (80798.3) (80977.8)
Round2t−1 -164543.6 -150598.0 -151782.0 -160243.5 -146019.8 -152483.0 -143364.9 -141868.2
(129270.4) (126884.6) (126975.1) (129578.2) (128882.0) (127360.3) (128413.8) (128374.6)
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Sweet16t−1 445793.1∗∗∗ 419172.0∗∗ 427315.2∗∗ 465840.0∗∗∗ 426405.7∗∗ 427571.5∗∗ 477195.9∗∗∗ 450454.4∗∗∗
(165884.8) (173351.1) (166647.8) (164354.3) (166727.8) (167560.5) (163760.6) (163199.3)
Elite8t−1 -10392.7 14934.9 93325.4 112250.4 33918.8 38258.1 50490.7 26337.4
(385419.6) (390238.5) (387504.4) (356189.2) (383041.2) (391301.9) (383554.1) (377051.0)
Final4t−1 -57227.5 13557.5 59427.7 8286.0 -10943.9 60890.5 80826.5 62259.4
(421818.6) (446281.2) (429546.8) (430123.2) (460996.2) (460609.7) (452564.4) (455293.6)
Finalt−1 -300987.7 -247369.9 -299080.4 -235792.1 -340469.2 -290243.9 -245262.2 -232758.4
(350685.4) (376541.0) (356213.1) (359965.2) (353018.6) (360152.7) (340895.3) (344554.2)
Winnert−1 1297594.2 1663255.5∗∗ 1607968.5∗∗ 1747320.4∗∗ 1487041.1∗ 1420246.4∗ 1648517.3∗∗ 1672243.8∗∗
(849166.7) (695375.0) (712887.6) (738563.8) (820233.7) (834295.7) (695408.9) (691206.4)
NSchlsConf 27822.9 29991.8 29914.8 32539.3 30691.9 29324.8 32909.2 31387.2
(31629.0) (31709.3) (31826.6) (31790.5) (31540.6) (31734.9) (32136.8) (31784.6)
NSchlsConfAP 22454.7 15360.0 14727.9 24797.3 20556.7 18865.2 19203.0 19769.4
(56494.3) (58410.2) (58432.3) (59055.3) (59834.8) (59595.1) (58948.2) (58101.1)
NSchlsConfTourn 28202.0 30175.6 31082.3 20921.7 32437.7 30782.6 29549.7 30898.2
(48003.6) (48410.3) (48639.3) (48410.4) (48064.3) (48282.7) (48824.9) (49039.3)
NSchlsConfFF -36140.8 -27923.7 -21836.2 -26704.9 -31000.8 -30224.3 -21458.4 -23343.0
(68650.8) (68877.3) (69733.7) (68920.6) (67538.7) (67163.0) (68215.0) (67792.8)
SOS 13337.5 12274.2 12781.6 11714.9 11902.6 11967.7 11678.8 10914.9
(11787.8) (11907.9) (11979.5) (12003.8) (11898.9) (11886.5) (11991.5) (12044.2)
HistWins 101.8 -56.41 -33.10 -22.15 -63.17 -12.25 -68.71 201.0
(1929.2) (1915.4) (1954.4) (1911.9) (1941.3) (1976.4) (1969.3) (1939.0)
HistNCAATourn -53565.8 -54934.7 -56008.6 -62778.2 -57725.7 -57067.0 -57452.6 -60085.8
(45451.5) (46243.4) (45414.1) (46404.5) (46614.8) (47194.7) (46097.8) (45931.2)
HistRound2 21720.0 30445.9 37104.7 26629.5 25622.1 24147.9 33372.2 32558.6
(80744.7) (82476.3) (86308.0) (83036.3) (82043.8) (82092.4) (83584.2) (83175.1)
HistSweet16 -20948.5 643.0 1899.6 39178.8 19471.0 16897.8 2004.0 -703.5
(128013.4) (137708.6) (136452.6) (128342.4) (121424.7) (117290.1) (137979.0) (135976.4)
HistElite8 45765.9 50387.4 43036.8 51390.3 32674.4 31669.0 25604.2 28053.2
(133967.0) (136052.8) (133963.6) (133829.8) (133475.4) (132064.9) (131072.0) (132264.4)
HistFinal4 431610.9 520572.6 479226.8 531320.8 438941.5 438856.3 476489.6 452650.3
(316134.2) (315784.0) (328219.2) (330413.6) (331864.7) (326186.2) (318149.3) (315675.3)
HistFinal -1068049.1∗∗ -953288.7∗∗ -924933.0∗∗ -895721.7∗ -867513.9∗ -909060.1∗∗ -955645.0∗∗ -975649.9∗∗
(465705.0) (445241.6) (449436.9) (462139.6) (459266.3) (455122.4) (433085.5) (438775.0)
HistWinner -622707.1 -633117.7 -657391.7 -596307.2 -639083.6 -691910.3∗ -639940.2 -678648.0∗
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(411160.2) (414867.8) (403935.0) (398700.7) (421273.8) (415081.1) (396892.8) (390302.8)
Distance -2321.8 -2184.2 -2354.5 -2309.5 -2377.4 -2428.4 -2353.1 -2349.4
(1509.1) (1543.4) (1497.7) (1547.4) (1535.9) (1517.5) (1514.7) (1503.8)
UndergradPop 950.5 1459.5 3002.9 4046.8 1847.1 2877.6 3848.0 3755.5
(14195.6) (13949.0) (14735.0) (14831.3) (14285.8) (14971.4) (14797.3) (14022.5)
PerCapPI -23875.3 -23996.7 -25879.5 -26487.4 -23514.8 -23564.2 -23918.8 -23726.5
(22653.2) (23478.6) (23435.4) (22946.4) (22908.5) (22930.6) (22545.1) (23328.4)
GrPerCapPI 22062.7 22657.7 23895.3 24645.1 22503.1 24007.5 22923.0 23037.0
(14613.8) (14803.8) (15089.2) (15086.1) (15111.5) (15106.0) (14991.9) (15024.3)
CityPop 1267825.9 1251383.2 1293222.0 1206210.7 1323921.0 1329166.8 1250995.7 1272407.6
(855346.9) (848467.6) (847420.6) (839509.0) (842134.5) (848038.5) (851817.9) (847076.3)
StatePop -95560.3 -90816.2 -97540.3∗ -104757.4∗ -99733.3∗ -97209.7 -99716.7∗ -98358.2∗
(59285.8) (58174.8) (58981.9) (58671.4) (60255.3) (60474.5) (59292.9) (57900.0)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
R2 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.963
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01224
Table 50
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players at Schools With Division 1 FBS Programs. This
table reports fixed effects estimates of a star basketball player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.1) on the subset of schools
that also have a Division 1 FBS football program over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different measures of star
player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player,
(2) All American First Team, (3) All American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6)
NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Stars 1114532.9∗∗ 707635.5∗∗∗ 375421.7∗ 234764.9∗∗ 367265.6∗ 394478.2∗ 505290.1∗∗ 407254.8∗∗
(551453.9) (212897.4) (191674.2) (103653.3) (190847.6) (208448.9) (238299.5) (203111.9)
Starst−1 104860.9 32287.0 113548.0 -12997.5 251296.3 -16303.1 130230.0 94249.4
(455975.9) (340511.3) (213514.4) (108401.2) (321824.0) (260249.4) (148243.0) (134762.3)
Starst−2 150825.9 160804.2 247456.9 234387.1∗∗ 300116.0 111073.8 124997.9 -3839.7
(387708.2) (245773.4) (189350.9) (117911.1) (236329.2) (210690.6) (152950.6) (133744.6)
Winst−1 12154.8 10160.2 10750.6 15136.5 10211.4 11411.3 10771.6 11238.3
(11816.8) (11670.9) (11931.7) (11751.4) (11609.2) (11671.5) (12034.0) (12206.7)
Winst−2 21788.9∗∗ 19898.4∗∗ 18709.4∗ 13020.9 19679.9∗∗ 20551.7∗∗ 19042.6∗ 24763.4∗∗
(9552.0) (9880.7) (10015.8) (10982.6) (9275.3) (9732.1) (10592.7) (10784.8)
CoachCarTournt−1 51009.4∗∗∗ 51767.4∗∗∗ 51052.1∗∗ 52421.2∗∗∗ 52211.4∗∗∗ 53427.2∗∗∗ 49956.9∗∗ 52697.7∗∗∗
(19438.7) (19446.2) (19578.9) (19398.8) (19642.8) (19506.6) (19720.0) (19559.4)
CoachCareert−1 467654.1 572089.0 515476.9 450088.1 460972.5 474254.7 506618.6 478221.6
(793992.9) (785786.8) (798968.9) (794863.0) (797211.6) (798979.0) (790794.5) (779719.6)
CoachChange 28324.9 20682.5 39182.2 32091.6 26958.0 27224.5 16675.0 24523.1
(150820.8) (150872.2) (150140.8) (151659.0) (151426.9) (150583.0) (151181.8) (150388.1)
NCAATournt−1 266317.1∗ 270618.4∗∗ 259113.4∗ 266463.9∗ 264986.5∗∗ 252185.6∗ 273269.3∗∗ 240664.6∗
(135093.2) (133685.7) (133819.4) (136466.6) (130821.9) (135882.6) (133577.5) (134010.9)
Round2t−1 -56943.3 -42232.2 -43396.7 -64286.0 -44760.7 -42026.0 -32585.4 -54558.7
(189833.9) (188802.7) (195067.4) (193804.0) (193160.1) (190874.0) (188410.3) (191329.1)
Sweet16t−1 322257.1 316975.5 306076.0 373163.6 345566.1 332514.7 354051.8 338248.3
(251965.7) (261671.7) (258920.6) (247710.5) (257849.7) (255575.3) (252629.5) (251137.4)
Elitet8t−1 -153198.0 -130213.7 -80153.7 -37801.3 -120363.5 -76703.7 -125195.1 -108277.4
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(530757.9) (530574.6) (540611.9) (517744.0) (551028.8) (554340.0) (520071.6) (529136.4)
Final4t−1 406411.0 459061.9 454975.2 396057.6 437395.7 508797.3 439610.9 432551.5
(475356.1) (476840.8) (468096.5) (504943.7) (528058.7) (520541.9) (487029.1) (473471.8)
Finalt−1 -230925.4 -122765.8 -249438.2 -163529.0 -346225.4 -240376.9 -204145.3 -244965.1
(342458.8) (451213.3) (383082.9) (378637.8) (403089.1) (415502.9) (354405.3) (330940.6)
Champt−1 1842348.1∗ 1895952.4∗∗∗ 1888025.9∗∗∗ 2004486.5∗∗∗ 1749210.4∗∗ 1758590.7∗∗ 1841494.2∗∗∗ 1718239.4∗∗∗
(964111.2) (632171.8) (719208.1) (705646.0) (834333.3) (808820.0) (681780.7) (608902.7)
NSchlsConf 69494.6 72098.3 75743.2 75450.8 75697.5 72469.5 68573.7 60506.3
(91282.2) (91147.6) (91318.6) (92675.5) (90957.3) (90998.7) (91490.3) (91469.7)
NSchlsConfAP -7815.9 -8770.7 -11758.8 -3693.9 1029.6 -5423.5 683.2 -5564.6
(51896.6) (53469.5) (52947.0) (53218.8) (54304.4) (55569.0) (51960.0) (53398.4)
NSchlsConfTourn -983.4 -1375.1 -2296.0 -11265.5 -1211.5 -574.7 -1172.9 3756.6
(55710.6) (54999.8) (55140.3) (55358.9) (55193.4) (54791.9) (56924.3) (56164.3)
NSchlsConfFF -129228.1 -120836.3 -110797.4 -106437.9 -116672.4 -120829.1 -115340.6 -127809.3
(92046.1) (91145.2) (90939.4) (94537.5) (90295.1) (91367.4) (90724.8) (89948.1)
SOS 11467.5 7362.0 9025.0 5291.1 6830.0 6016.8 6930.8 7024.4
(33072.5) (33264.4) (33527.1) (33337.6) (33310.2) (33112.0) (33199.5) (33378.9)
HistWins -9424.4 -9713.8 -10401.3 -10403.5 -10574.2 -9871.3 -10580.0 -8451.6
(7028.5) (6980.1) (6968.6) (6875.4) (7084.4) (7135.8) (7118.7) (7074.0)
HistNCAATrn -25166.4 -33732.8 -27954.5 -66065.7 -36879.5 -32679.2 -52902.2 -56483.6
(126454.7) (128802.7) (125829.9) (124589.8) (127620.6) (126624.5) (125681.0) (124777.4)
HistRound2 64195.4 84287.3 92310.1 72440.0 82163.7 66529.7 84180.0 85653.9
(148610.4) (150974.6) (150891.0) (153221.0) (153594.6) (152179.6) (153531.8) (156400.1)
HistSweet16 -21679.0 -31544.9 -11948.0 16898.5 8811.3 5419.2 -19566.8 -37108.0
(174757.2) (176368.8) (170345.0) (166193.9) (172502.7) (176390.9) (181140.4) (177234.8)
HistElite8 203838.5 234248.3 246010.3 240327.5 218886.8 202919.2 198824.2 159471.1
(217905.3) (227847.5) (228047.5) (214120.9) (219623.8) (221931.7) (230552.5) (230544.5)
HistFinal4 237281.9 339847.6 388352.6 350177.0 280456.0 251142.8 264863.7 217503.7
(315338.5) (334806.4) (330441.7) (328198.8) (325830.1) (331158.4) (343121.0) (321177.6)
HistFinal 173366.6 314995.0 329923.2 224499.1 335478.5 310589.7 304178.9 216906.6
(598644.0) (585211.7) (585669.4) (568731.3) (559107.1) (563603.5) (591517.6) (607001.4)
HistChamp -684621.1 -751687.2 -704615.5 -670633.7 -685337.4 -709848.6 -740033.5 -727526.0
(897664.5) (836951.5) (831011.2) (816167.6) (821086.6) (847529.8) (834396.2) (807876.3)
Distance -944.2 -724.4 -897.0 -817.3 -1083.7 -972.4 -741.9 -1208.4
(4392.0) (4420.9) (4372.9) (4389.2) (4499.1) (4459.4) (4375.0) (4421.1)
226
UndergradPop -27995.3 -27031.3 -29701.6 -22686.7 -24773.9 -22541.3 -14464.6 -33090.4
(55132.5) (53425.0) (54700.5) (54545.6) (54311.1) (55193.1) (53506.8) (54929.7)
PerCapPI 51620.5 45285.6 45682.7 34633.9 50462.3 50194.6 49149.9 48540.3
(76495.5) (75133.7) (73032.6) (74317.1) (74856.1) (74506.3) (76114.4) (75626.1)
GrPerCapPI 22156.6 27596.5 29149.2 30568.1 26176.8 29169.3 29526.0 26837.0
(29242.8) (29204.3) (29270.5) (29384.9) (29189.2) (29436.0) (29454.9) (28576.9)
CityPop -4969357.8 -4646198.4 -4880432.6 -4663065.5 -3987118.6 -3812831.7 -5683805.4 -4384222.2
(4726563.4) (4375639.7) (4490119.7) (4409855.4) (4007287.1) (3984494.3) (4785989.6) (4391061.3)
StatePop 164476.3 322829.7 258785.1 371388.0 406174.1 391414.9 369963.8 449593.8
(961606.1) (897004.5) (923547.7) (959991.6) (937911.7) (937879.3) (968491.0) (951488.5)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190
Within R2 0.686 0.686 0.685 0.690 0.685 0.685 0.687 0.688
Adjusted R2 0.957 0.957 0.957 0.958 0.957 0.957 0.958 0.958
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01227
Table 51
Marginal Revenue Product of Ex-Ante Star College Football Players. This table
reports fixed effects estimates of an ex-ante star football player’s marginal revenue product
from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2005-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an
annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) Top Rivals.com Recruits
(Rivals.com rating of 6.1), (2) High Rivals.com Recruits (Rivals.com rating of 6 or better),
(3) Rivals.com Five Star Rated Recruit. The last three measures (4-6) are the same as (1-3)
except isolated to only the Offensive Positions (OP) of Quarterback, Running Back, and
Wide Receiver.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Top Riv High Riv 5 Star Top Riv OP High Riv OP 5 Star OP
Stars 291572.2 100964.3 452130.7 844171.8 208951.9 829356.5
(475612.5) (258900.2) (489486.5) (735283.7) (515711.0) (739502.1)
Starst−1 88005.2 -238273.1 447989.4 -478993.5 -315699.6 -366974.8
(359552.0) (263211.1) (287902.5) (422948.6) (293817.5) (405187.3)
Starst−2 477074.7 437018.8 138076.7 174979.9 638371.0 -227883.6
(652932.0) (388483.6) (505997.3) (794618.4) (558654.2) (708797.3)
Winst−1 90967.2 85302.2 61987.1 108444.2 108437.7 93652.0
(102195.1) (93046.1) (102009.4) (95976.1) (92164.1) (96464.9)
Winst−2 25800.3 40110.4 18517.3 62339.0 58695.5 68866.7
(70556.3) (72178.3) (67634.0) (66038.7) (69015.4) (64484.4)
CoachCareert−1 68154.7 139515.6 49078.6 -793740.5 -715548.8 -655175.2
(1985339.3) (2033843.8) (2013093.7) (2029059.8) (2018001.2) (2026444.9)
CoachChange -316877.7 -318515.1 -278585.2 -196192.6 -266078.7 -168104.7
(380130.5) (378732.1) (381359.0) (382650.4) (375641.9) (383067.2)
BowlGamet−1 470586.9 509647.8 546839.3 402070.1 411870.6 450003.5
(434039.5) (411079.8) (443868.3) (448999.1) (424706.8) (434029.7)
BowlWint−1 -368951.0 -373960.5 -355865.7 -276082.9 -342034.9 -248283.7
(462170.7) (448379.6) (459427.9) (443369.3) (442506.3) (451776.9)
SOS 59731.4 47276.1 75504.1 65062.0 67897.2 61438.7
(77225.5) (76807.1) (76774.9) (82551.3) (78234.9) (80314.4)
TDPts 17143.5 14437.4 21653.0
(88496.5) (91088.0) (88995.5)
TDYds -737646.8 -564138.7 -660369.2
(3848779.4) (3873073.1) (3894293.5)
TDPassYds 740048.9 565695.0 662956.9
(3849812.0) (3873762.0) (3895411.7)
TDPassTDs -1090879.0 -981836.9 -1095760.1
(838052.1) (842089.9) (841130.1)
TDRushYds 740323.8 566024.4 663069.9
(3848707.1) (3872831.2) (3894283.6)
TDRushTDs -417648.9 -400670.5 -455236.2
(714010.1) (723405.8) (719863.4)
HistWins -16718.8 -10491.5 -20939.5 -11235.2 -17321.1 -4056.9
(68023.6) (70742.4) (69053.1) (69022.0) (69583.2) (70899.3)
HistBowls -517298.6 -483981.0 -545308.9 -403795.0 -444903.8 -396255.0
(437519.8) (440142.0) (437363.1) (449847.2) (448212.7) (445888.1)
228
HistBowlWins 114090.4 62807.3 144896.4 -8646.2 75364.9 -26268.0
(395633.8) (399301.8) (386280.8) (395085.8) (413892.7) (398151.1)
Distance -62052.5∗∗ -62379.8∗∗ -56486.6∗ -59148.7∗ -60412.0∗∗ -58522.0∗
(31220.9) (30441.2) (32607.0) (29997.7) (29340.7) (30238.3)
UndergradPop -129957.2 -128451.1 -135448.2 -171202.7 -151694.6 -183911.0
(202802.3) (212487.1) (200569.6) (227020.5) (219874.1) (234391.7)
PerCapPI 278907.1 258284.5 242587.2 164184.5 206456.1 169113.4
(355905.3) (348088.1) (347007.7) (365438.6) (369615.6) (360989.3)
GrPerCapPI 7268.9 16402.2 3060.9 39581.2 36382.0 28794.3
(122013.6) (123395.1) (120572.6) (126992.7) (127395.7) (127831.3)
CityPop 2461957.5 -23328931.1 16277245.3 -6244719.4 -22601809.2 -5559699.8
(47063936.1) (41714573.9) (52998112.2) (42375664.6) (37904015.9) (41697652.9)
StatePop 1413565.3 1575566.4 899872.7 739259.9 1571602.0 754123.4
(3830581.7) (3770146.1) (3718579.4) (3987264.6) (3829126.2) (3819461.2)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 832 832 832 832 832 832
Within R2 0.745 0.744 0.747 0.747 0.747 0.748
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.977 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.977
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 52
Marginal Revenue Product of Ex-Ante Star College Basketball Players. This
table reports fixed effects estimates of an ex-ante star basketball player’s marginal revenue
product from Model (2.1) over the sample period 2005-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at
an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for the ex-ante star measure using the Rivals.com Five Star Rated Recruits are
reported.
(1)
5 Star
Stars 317810.8∗ (172843.9)
Starst−1 -153329.7 (111547.7)
Starst−2 275291.1∗∗∗ (98460.6)
Winst−1 1000.3 (5259.5)
Winst−2 8061.1 (5549.4)
CoachCarTournt−1 72803.8∗∗∗ (25416.2)
CoachCareert−1 -60088.0 (370705.7)
CoachChange -15788.3 (61146.6)
NCAATournt−1 222111.5∗∗ (96680.5)
Round2t−1 -135047.1 (129603.5)
Sweet16t−1 261181.3 (199306.2)
Elitet8t−1 40738.7 (628306.7)
229
Final4t−1 204745.1 (497045.2)
Finalt−1 207945.0 (324407.0)
Champt−1 2081114.0∗∗ (813929.5)
NSchlsConf -36771.4 (40831.8)
NSchlsConfAP 2375.0 (42989.8)
NSchlsConfTourn -26117.4 (59486.5)
NSchlsConfFF -61030.1 (84950.2)
SOS -2996.7 (14171.2)
HistWins -4910.3 (5227.3)
HistNCAATrn -27659.0 (74007.5)
HistRound2 -81646.0 (158551.4)
HistSweet16 249765.6 (185963.7)
HistElite8 88674.4 (180113.1)
HistFinal4 -2736.3 (383081.5)
HistFinal 238603.8 (779867.5)
HistChamp -1951539.0∗ (1081441.5)
Distance -427.9 (1880.0)
UndergradPop -54183.8 (56809.1)
PerCapPI 12058.9 (38966.3)
GrPerCapPI 13936.7 (16770.2)
CityPop -1894125.3 (2256818.3)
StatePop 885682.9 (575400.9)
Team Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes
N 2256
Within R2 0.641
Adjusted R2 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 53
Marginal Revenue Product of Expected and Unexpected Star College Football
Players. This table reports fixed effects estimates of the marginal revenue products of
expected and unexpected star football players from Model (2.1) over the sample period
2005-2012. Star players are measured according to one of six ex-post performance metrics:
(1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating alone. The number of star players on a team are then decomposed
into “expected” and “unexpected” star players. Expected stars are those who are stars as
measured by ex-post performance who were also top Rivals.com recruits (rated as a 6.1 by
Rivals.com). Unexpected stars are those who are stars as measured by ex-post performance
who were not rated as a top Rivals.com recruit. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Expected Stars 2720071.0∗∗∗ 3734700.3∗∗∗ 2168631.6 1554102.7 1465080.5 1117334.7
(922689.4) (1100931.1) (1435615.8) (1100580.6) (985100.7) (1021568.3)
Unexpected Stars 1105101.6∗∗∗ 1744591.8 1710230.3∗∗∗ 598792.6∗∗ 582975.9∗∗ 610990.1∗∗
(371108.2) (1114123.8) (609148.3) (273821.4) (259170.2) (281788.8)
Starst−1 768413.4∗ 1443313.9∗ 2117296.5∗∗∗ 463260.7∗∗ 481265.2∗∗ 631606.8∗∗∗
(410486.8) (793151.1) (619475.5) (206689.1) (197573.7) (222658.0)
Starst−2 562101.1 -272997.7 122207.5 4177.3 130089.2 155496.2
(412305.3) (637024.6) (500808.9) (191223.5) (215417.6) (228011.4)
Winst−1 -32711.4 3947.3 -65568.7 18878.6 10558.2 2806.8
(105049.4) (96470.6) (101804.2) (103449.3) (102256.7) (101503.3)
Winst−2 41883.4 104381.9∗ 85021.8 94179.9 77280.7 74368.0
(56659.1) (61508.8) (61971.4) (65550.6) (67989.5) (65025.5)
CoachCareert−1 2590453.4 1959475.8 2491360.8 1370681.5 1347287.4 1466239.9
(2063239.9) (2062362.3) (2079642.2) (2052005.7) (2057270.6) (2071838.5)
CoachChange -228214.8 -129726.3 -168029.4 -90879.8 -68539.6 -77813.9
(317638.0) (305109.5) (306090.1) (316197.9) (316031.3) (314640.8)
BowlGamet−1 859515.7∗ 702657.6 807492.9∗ 619397.3 639135.4 625602.6
(462473.7) (444804.2) (455981.4) (457832.0) (452720.1) (451378.9)
BowlWint−1 -382303.9 -234871.3 -185765.7 -384303.1 -397112.6 -391574.2
(420180.1) (427313.7) (403261.7) (422752.6) (426789.8) (427719.2)
SOS 2205.9 13736.9 10276.9 43144.7 44136.7 42736.9
(53785.8) (57691.9) (55583.1) (56986.1) (56502.3) (56737.6)
TDPts -78795.8 -65124.4 -63258.8 -58334.1 -55882.7
(76454.5) (72174.5) (77500.2) (77699.1) (77406.4)
TDYds 1601733.1 1679710.8 1009981.9 1108282.5 1130228.6
(2954367.3) (2989466.0) (3062251.7) (3058822.4) (3035647.1)
TDPassYds -1598204.2 -1676728.1 -1007750.5 -1105647.5 -1128000.7
(2954865.7) (2990182.0) (3063177.9) (3059702.5) (3036520.0)
TDPassTDs -760665.4 -742350.0 -882894.1 -935091.1 -937112.7
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(787011.6) (771677.1) (781887.4) (780463.0) (774128.3)
TDRushYds -1596545.1 -1675693.9 -1006269.5 -1104997.3 -1126982.9
(2954208.7) (2989375.7) (3062493.7) (3059063.0) (3035847.6)
TDRushTDs 325701.8 266876.2 275879.7 281676.4 295808.3
(637221.7) (609615.5) (655166.9) (660425.3) (653769.6)
HistWins -16545.2 -10323.9 -12596.6 -26207.1 -27405.9 -25882.5
(46958.4) (52072.5) (51087.1) (50586.9) (50739.7) (50567.6)
HistBowls -525595.8 -580740.3 -502373.1 -498124.0 -498988.4 -511390.4
(351223.1) (374918.4) (365935.8) (364337.6) (362668.4) (360055.0)
HistBowlWins 387046.6 403531.5 345629.4 481730.0 481679.2 458897.2
(424395.0) (433124.1) (434286.9) (450237.5) (447948.0) (442219.8)
Distance -25887.2 -26121.9 -25630.8 -21458.9 -21585.4 -22095.6
(16511.1) (17388.0) (17055.4) (17326.9) (17406.1) (17307.2)
UndergradPop -152482.3 -214628.4 -216651.2 -174962.9 -165311.8 -140994.1
(204249.3) (203805.9) (202791.2) (205692.2) (202840.5) (199823.5)
PerCapPI 177110.4 246154.4 270217.5 220570.6 215235.2 207043.5
(317008.1) (332009.2) (321752.5) (327971.9) (327810.2) (322773.5)
GrPerCapPI 31115.0 24619.5 9261.3 5827.7 13506.2 19186.2
(126520.1) (128915.1) (126606.9) (129516.1) (128582.5) (128759.2)
CityPop 16538677.2 -5689565.2 -7176015.7 3746307.5 5152470.8 3054931.6
(25765585.1) (29266968.9) (27632733.9) (30089762.6) (30430080.3) (30159861.3)
StatePop -158738.0 -274072.4 -215313.1 7725.0 23041.0 89334.8
(4028068.8) (4114559.9) (4197933.3) (4122496.7) (4158990.1) (4108354.4)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.774 0.775 0.779 0.774 0.774 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972
F-Stat 3.155 1.592 0.0847 0.743 0.799 0.257
P-Value 0.0787 0.210 0.772 0.391 0.373 0.613
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 54
Marginal Revenue Product of Expected and Unexpected Star College Basketball Players. This table reports fixed
effects estimates of the marginal revenue products of expected and unexpected star basketball players from Model (2.1) over the
sample period 2005-2012. Star players are measured according to one of eight ex-post performance metrics: (1) Wooden Award
Winner, Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All
American First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10
Points Scorers, and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers. The number of star players on a team are then decomposed into “expected” and
“unexpected” star players. Expected stars are those who are stars as measured by ex-post performance who were also a Five Star
Rivals.com recruit. Unexpected stars are those who are stars as measured by ex-post performance who were not rated as a Five
Star Rivals.com recruit. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been
clustered by team.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Expected Stars 1861841.5∗∗ 464789.8∗ 329225.9 180444.1 179831.3 306729.6 351755.1 998639.6∗∗∗
(865063.9) (273430.6) (249630.0) (127554.4) (172113.0) (186153.0) (371360.9) (342904.8)
Unexpected Stars 333899.7 776734.2∗∗ 352397.1 216737.3∗∗ 714362.0∗ 495444.7∗ 305419.4 238009.9∗
(738243.7) (316859.4) (255635.8) (105786.4) (412900.4) (298607.7) (197988.3) (129040.5)
Starst−1 134905.6 24465.2 89835.5 -10156.3 203925.4 1087.7 14305.8 29458.2
(400322.9) (293195.0) (179641.7) (88102.8) (299590.9) (231498.6) (103486.1) (81657.1)
Starst−2 207972.0 156328.3 207951.5 224509.8∗∗ 248992.5 104352.5 174122.5 84942.4
(326755.0) (215013.3) (157744.2) (100878.3) (245767.6) (201283.0) (113355.3) (83915.0)
Winst−1 5543.7 4694.5 4810.1 6687.5 5017.2 5243.2 5527.5 4591.3
(4770.4) (4672.1) (4707.3) (4630.3) (4578.1) (4611.1) (4769.1) (4853.3)
Winst−2 11622.1∗∗∗ 10809.6∗∗ 10366.6∗∗ 7456.1 10949.4∗∗∗ 11040.6∗∗∗ 10884.9∗∗ 11263.5∗∗
(4338.1) (4405.4) (4409.5) (4627.5) (3914.1) (4097.3) (4496.4) (4571.0)
CoachCarTournt−1 53172.9∗∗∗ 53859.3∗∗∗ 52980.5∗∗∗ 53234.5∗∗∗ 53647.5∗∗∗ 54757.7∗∗∗ 54038.6∗∗∗ 49759.6∗∗∗
(16315.8) (16450.1) (16460.1) (16410.5) (16279.7) (16333.9) (16408.0) (16567.3)
CoachCareert−1 -108292.0 -37460.2 -58694.4 -96194.1 -91797.4 -90213.0 -78342.4 -81172.7
(295339.3) (294202.6) (296196.7) (291432.3) (292420.3) (293586.7) (295103.0) (291725.8)
CoachChange 7141.1 -441.5 5439.5 6026.9 3318.5 1929.6 -2300.2 1314.6
(61931.0) (61666.9) (61114.3) (61716.1) (61828.3) (61519.9) (61572.5) (61789.2)
NCAATournt−1 173884.1∗∗ 167026.7∗∗ 164312.6∗∗ 170068.9∗∗ 161540.0∗∗ 158358.8∗∗ 160024.8∗∗ 165053.1∗∗
(76207.2) (74672.9) (75261.0) (77372.7) (73351.3) (74985.9) (75034.4) (75412.5)
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Round2t−1 -64393.0 -64887.7 -58821.0 -64222.8 -54651.5 -58980.4 -57982.9 -55521.2
(126197.8) (125133.2) (129917.2) (130414.1) (128941.6) (127547.4) (128295.7) (126907.9)
Sweet16t−1 269934.2 263658.7 259254.9 308977.5∗ 270254.8 266852.2 304098.4∗ 282864.3
(174618.7) (183854.5) (180824.0) (171083.1) (182308.7) (181546.6) (175207.4) (172288.3)
Elitet8t−1 -183570.1 -154258.8 -93125.7 -23522.8 -114181.1 -95468.9 -120068.8 -137422.8
(459748.3) (460704.4) (476539.7) (439939.4) (468234.2) (476211.1) (455800.1) (453053.4)
Final4t−1 262868.4 345596.7 372028.8 384196.6 338496.2 401319.7 391685.9 390541.6
(340468.7) (381278.1) (370712.4) (387034.4) (408233.7) (413376.0) (393669.2) (395324.0)
Finalt−1 -49520.9 53317.8 -64363.3 28049.1 -86646.0 -44944.4 -26441.7 -27676.4
(261964.9) (336945.4) (300189.3) (284678.7) (326591.1) (340518.1) (267465.1) (262781.9)
Champt−1 2011876.3∗∗ 1848919.8∗∗∗ 1898268.1∗∗∗ 2030169.0∗∗∗ 1756136.6∗∗ 1748700.6∗∗ 1826897.4∗∗∗ 2001601.0∗∗∗
(983545.1) (546635.7) (647804.9) (640066.7) (773877.7) (742747.4) (610354.7) (650977.6)
NSchlsConf 715.7 1342.4 1273.9 2858.1 3783.8 2417.8 5708.0 -136.0
(40634.1) (40315.6) (40310.1) (40489.9) (39983.3) (40115.1) (40289.9) (40457.8)
NSchlsConfAP -39922.9 -43521.1 -46133.2 -38250.9 -38967.9 -41762.8 -42048.4 -41731.0
(38762.4) (41250.5) (40962.9) (40905.1) (41741.5) (42169.4) (41064.8) (40204.5)
NSchlsConfTourn 2638.4 6490.1 4997.1 520.0 8494.3 7314.8 6282.6 4506.9
(39649.6) (38937.3) (38745.2) (39111.6) (38799.4) (38833.9) (39544.7) (39318.3)
NSchlsConfFF -96038.3 -95249.2 -84515.5 -87378.8 -99437.2 -96075.8 -87009.4 -86949.2
(81320.3) (80445.3) (81295.5) (84186.5) (81884.6) (81127.4) (81277.0) (80790.5)
SOS 3653.7 2017.5 2270.3 1310.9 1762.3 1512.0 1374.0 1013.3
(12285.8) (12168.6) (12315.9) (12175.9) (12195.2) (12127.6) (12252.9) (12199.5)
HistWins -3275.3 -3606.0 -3702.0 -3820.5 -3797.1 -3596.3 -3394.6 -3289.9
(2988.2) (2985.3) (2990.0) (2980.8) (3007.9) (3032.3) (2973.8) (2963.1)
HistNCAATrn -22581.9 -21408.3 -20511.1 -38384.8 -29280.6 -25905.1 -27405.0 -31626.3
(59513.1) (60650.2) (60475.8) (59013.6) (59886.1) (59691.1) (60373.6) (59712.2)
HistRound2 -73686.3 -47186.6 -46813.1 -58698.4 -62770.5 -69370.4 -62061.1 -65518.0
(111950.8) (112900.5) (112751.6) (113242.3) (112907.6) (113545.8) (112763.7) (112931.8)
HistSweet16 -94271.4 -112834.9 -91054.2 -57515.5 -78928.9 -76390.2 -95879.0 -104352.8
(144639.0) (146956.7) (141947.9) (138001.4) (141253.1) (144594.2) (150578.5) (149206.9)
HistElite8 151893.0 132758.8 152479.2 160620.1 125282.4 126904.8 99417.2 102743.8
(192402.0) (195962.9) (195915.5) (189163.5) (190183.8) (191309.5) (196454.9) (197994.3)
HistFinal4 243743.3 373651.6 406694.9 415969.1 344176.5 309269.4 319211.5 252523.1
(300480.6) (317226.6) (323887.9) (332454.9) (321350.1) (324644.4) (323956.9) (323615.6)
HistFinal 46621.3 249335.6 221522.8 151931.6 260305.0 227185.3 164304.2 149642.0
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(600326.1) (596545.3) (596074.5) (574160.5) (565424.3) (573067.2) (588679.7) (596535.0)
HistChamp -732156.3 -838407.1 -795661.5 -748260.4 -768595.0 -802130.4 -791374.5 -795041.8
(816413.4) (810434.0) (808279.5) (782478.9) (785216.7) (814934.1) (803125.9) (789442.9)
Distance -1028.5 -969.5 -1074.7 -1296.0 -1257.8 -1186.8 -1387.3 -1145.0
(1511.8) (1557.6) (1543.0) (1572.4) (1588.1) (1552.1) (1547.5) (1529.8)
UndergradPop -50406.9 -47128.0 -49909.3 -46795.7 -49340.5 -47731.9 -44455.8 -51790.0
(39091.6) (38514.6) (38966.0) (39404.1) (38666.3) (39170.2) (38746.4) (37071.7)
PerCapPI 14919.1 10811.5 9450.8 2647.3 15184.9 14988.6 9968.5 9645.4
(41201.9) (40806.3) (39813.0) (39926.3) (40578.8) (40492.9) (40076.8) (40661.7)
GrPerCapPI 5392.7 9524.1 10728.7 11610.9 9186.8 10785.9 8613.6 9186.7
(15781.7) (15596.3) (15528.0) (15876.3) (15655.1) (15886.4) (15677.8) (15875.9)
CityPop 833048.0 916194.4 918594.8 889769.3 1080767.6 1098545.0 812712.7 900306.0
(1887909.2) (1862919.2) (1871686.3) (1894949.3) (1848625.0) (1834969.5) (1862170.1) (1893539.6)
StatePop 3224.6 57476.8 33880.0 73960.6 87689.1 87860.3 71387.8 53784.5
(425925.1) (409078.4) (417295.5) (431915.5) (422900.1) (422559.0) (417247.8) (422258.5)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820
Within R2 0.671 0.670 0.668 0.672 0.668 0.669 0.668 0.670
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.969 0.968 0.968 0.968 0.968
F-Stat 1.560 0.431 0.00326 0.0594 1.476 0.369 0.0122 5.967
P-Value 0.213 0.512 0.954 0.808 0.225 0.544 0.912 0.0152
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 55
First Stage Regression of the Number of Star Football Players on the Number of
Injured Star Players in the Previous Season. This table reports the first stage of the
instrumental variable estimates in Table 56. Standard errors are in parentheses and have
been clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1)
All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees,
and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10
in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference
between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback
in pass efficiency rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Injured Starst−1 3.792∗∗∗ 0.513 2.467∗∗∗ 2.845∗∗∗ 2.618∗∗∗ 1.436
(0.986) (0.982) (0.875) (0.925) (0.966) (0.889)
Starst−1 -0.170∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗
(0.0363) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0370)
Starst−2 -0.196∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.0354) (0.0343) (0.0353) (0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0368)
Winst−1 0.0258∗∗ 0.00647 0.0101 0.0291∗ 0.0289 0.0287∗
(0.0123) (0.00558) (0.00723) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0163)
Winst−2 -0.00888 -0.00140 0.000586 0.00298 0.00531 0.00813
(0.00821) (0.00377) (0.00491) (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0116)
CoachCareert−1 -0.259 -0.0940 -0.157 0.306 0.351 0.162
(0.210) (0.0966) (0.124) (0.297) (0.310) (0.283)
CoachChange -0.0552 -0.000168 -0.0174 -0.126∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0181) (0.0231) (0.0560) (0.0584) (0.0534)
BowlGamet−1 -0.0407 0.00615 0.0140 -0.0720 -0.0553 -0.0212
(0.0570) (0.0260) (0.0333) (0.0806) (0.0839) (0.0766)
BowlWint−1 -0.0211 -0.0125 -0.0320 0.0225 0.0463 0.0539
(0.0440) (0.0204) (0.0258) (0.0621) (0.0648) (0.0593)
SOS 0.00126 0.00921∗∗ 0.0108∗∗ -0.00576 -0.00307 -0.00195
(0.00798) (0.00375) (0.00478) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0111)
TDPts -0.00623 -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.0491∗∗∗ -0.0647∗∗∗ -0.0638∗∗∗
(0.00527) (0.00669) (0.0163) (0.0170) (0.0155)
TDYds -0.373∗∗ -0.467∗∗ -0.339 -0.510 -0.189
(0.151) (0.192) (0.466) (0.487) (0.445)
TDPassYds 0.373∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.343 0.513 0.192
(0.151) (0.192) (0.466) (0.487) (0.445)
TDPassTDs 0.0217 0.0376 0.304∗∗ 0.437∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗
(0.0400) (0.0509) (0.124) (0.129) (0.118)
TDRushYds 0.373∗∗ 0.467∗∗ 0.341 0.512 0.192
(0.151) (0.192) (0.466) (0.487) (0.445)
TDRushTDs 0.0134 0.0772 0.169 0.239∗ 0.224∗
(0.0406) (0.0516) (0.125) (0.131) (0.120)
HistWins -0.0103 -0.00523∗ -0.00754∗∗ -0.00335 -0.00353 -0.00542
(0.00649) (0.00299) (0.00380) (0.00924) (0.00964) (0.00880)
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HistBowls -0.00220 0.0171 0.0110 0.0160 0.0225 0.0519
(0.0400) (0.0184) (0.0234) (0.0566) (0.0591) (0.0540)
HistBowlWins -0.0172 -0.0224 0.00111 -0.151∗∗∗ -0.145∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0166) (0.0212) (0.0515) (0.0538) (0.0490)
Distance -0.000793 0.000485 0.000201 -0.00163 -0.00112 -0.000597
(0.00180) (0.000828) (0.00106) (0.00257) (0.00268) (0.00245)
UndergradPop -0.0363 -0.00142 -0.00306 -0.0345 -0.0366 -0.0545∗
(0.0230) (0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0326) (0.0341) (0.0312)
PerCapPI 0.00806 -0.0191 -0.0236 -0.0146 -0.00635 -0.00232
(0.0296) (0.0137) (0.0175) (0.0424) (0.0442) (0.0404)
GrPerCapPI -0.00287 0.00656 0.00842 0.0204 0.0144 0.00554
(0.0116) (0.00538) (0.00685) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0158)
CityPop 1.498 4.596∗∗∗ 5.176∗∗ 1.236 0.560 3.020
(3.551) (1.626) (2.075) (5.019) (5.239) (4.782)
StatePop -0.249 0.147 0.228 0.504 0.476 0.430
(0.329) (0.153) (0.195) (0.471) (0.492) (0.449)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.263 0.232 0.280 0.312 0.311 0.304
F-Stat 14.81 0.273 7.944 9.458 7.346 2.607
p-value 0.000129 0.602 0.00494 0.00217 0.00687 0.107
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 56
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players. This table reports
instrumental variable estimates of a star football player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman
Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive
touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how
star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone. The F-statistics and corresponding p-values from the first stage regression are
reported at the bottom of the table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
Stars 3352048.8∗ 31016231.2 4461936.1 -325897.0 -451761.8 -638610.6
(2029944.2) (63869507.7) (4631794.7) (1761384.2) (1925194.5) (3548987.3)
Starst−1 1145799.4∗∗ 4683159.5 2482640.5∗∗∗ 336907.6 315453.9 374615.7
(449170.6) (7042909.1) (774044.5) (307185.4) (356973.7) (740135.0)
Starst−2 939580.0∗∗ 5721367.3 719271.2 -182067.4 -72906.5 -115251.2
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(466323.3) (13159114.6) (1104045.3) (392099.1) (414365.1) (786394.5)
Winst−1 -84306.6 -178687.0 -89140.2 47064.3 43107.9 40095.6
(107624.2) (440717.8) (102550.1) (106177.7) (109552.0) (139836.1)
Winst−2 65369.0 143180.8 82589.2 100274.1 85756.2 85903.6
(66246.3) (154561.8) (64187.3) (67170.6) (68894.9) (74135.2)
CoachCareert−1 3085225.6∗ 4644883.5 2880010.4 1544703.0 1627646.1 1628212.6
(1709751.7) (6796621.5) (1757220.8) (1694773.6) (1751238.6) (1720642.1)
CoachChange -92800.2 -134222.5 -114945.5 -205497.6 -226326.7 -235655.8
(330065.1) (603436.0) (314978.0) (369170.3) (412573.9) (533989.0)
BowlGamet−1 941503.6∗∗ 505151.5 769309.4∗ 554650.7 578689.7 602101.5
(451919.7) (962634.1) (438882.7) (448386.7) (445757.8) (441982.9)
BowlWint−1 -339821.8 116548.9 -107854.0 -366926.5 -352897.6 -328632.0
(344562.8) (1019531.5) (362519.6) (336782.8) (345584.6) (382430.0)
SOS 2808.4 -251188.5 -17497.1 36891.5 40216.5 40041.3
(62313.5) (600709.3) (79332.7) (64082.0) (63776.4) (64081.8)
TDPts 95283.4 -16914.4 -103381.2 -121634.2 -134189.5
(422573.0) (119356.1) (121864.3) (150995.6) (241448.5)
TDYds 12124605.3 2783724.8 732582.7 589777.6 916281.0
(24000468.9) (3165958.8) (2548832.4) (2649268.3) (2587671.8)
TDPassYds -12134939.9 -2784401.9 -727063.8 -583979.0 -910093.9
(24030000.1) (3169718.9) (2549810.5) (2650994.6) (2589766.5)
TDPassTDs -1337491.2 -835120.9 -639208.3 -513437.1 -459697.3
(1854185.0) (682423.5) (843389.6) (1059830.2) (1529477.3)
TDRushYds -12121168.6 -2781272.4 -726947.2 -583839.7 -910006.1
(24004226.4) (3168012.2) (2550054.2) (2651352.9) (2589907.8)
TDRushTDs -7320.5 72452.6 383251.2 483927.6 554289.3
(1535094.0) (746527.1) (728374.6) (804437.9) (1027878.3)
HistWins -204.9 136354.3 6045.6 -30329.2 -32342.2 -33341.9
(54792.1) (350503.6) (60459.9) (50183.9) (50555.4) (53359.4)
HistBowls -480759.0 -1027815.2 -530246.5∗ -458221.4 -448684.9 -429201.8
(312590.2) (1262074.9) (312218.4) (309453.7) (313479.2) (367237.6)
HistBowlWins 422329.2 1046815.1 353565.4 321786.8 311813.6 300306.4
(282442.1) (1538861.8) (276004.7) (398068.3) (408742.9) (516667.7)
Distance -22733.9 -40357.4 -25887.6∗ -23063.5 -22641.2 -22712.3
(14176.4) (41881.0) (13796.1) (14421.4) (14316.8) (14327.6)
UndergradPop -59394.4 -157068.6 -205559.1 -209251.8 -202254.1 -209097.8
(194915.1) (362905.3) (175858.0) (187389.2) (191935.6) (264231.7)
PerCapPI 169103.1 821280.9 339000.2 195442.0 196669.3 195767.3
(231400.6) (1327571.9) (255842.7) (232845.0) (232035.0) (232387.3)
GrPerCapPI 25720.7 -175530.1 -16468.8 26424.2 28226.6 25687.8
(91006.8) (460864.0) (98700.0) (97968.4) (95411.5) (93421.9)
CityPop 10240343.5 -140315603.5 -21170577.7 5516002.0 6535518.0 6590143.6
(27824837.4) (298784720.9) (36166628.4) (27302002.9) (27369371.1) (29579455.6)
StatePop 548420.4 -4408405.5 -799029.5 541864.3 579277.8 666830.0
(2620870.0) (10743151.1) (2761825.7) (2681236.6) (2703656.7) (2963498.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.755 0.0766 0.769 0.766 0.764 0.762
238
FS F-Stat 14.81 0.273 7.944 9.458 7.346 2.607
FS p-value 0.000129 0.602 0.00494 0.00217 0.00687 0.107
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 57
First Stage Regression of the Number of Star Basketball Players on the Number
of Injured Star Players in the Previous Season. This table reports the first stage of
the instrumental variable estimates in Table 58. Standard errors are in parentheses and have
been clustered by team. Estimates for two different measures of star player are reported:
(1) Top 10 Points Scorers and (2) Top 20 Points Scorers.
(1) (2)
PTS 10 PTS 20
Injured Starst−1 2.586 (2.762)
Starst−1 -0.0931∗∗∗ (0.0212) -0.158∗∗∗ (0.0216)
Starst−2 -0.209∗∗∗ (0.0213) -0.238∗∗∗ (0.0215)
Winst−1 0.000296 (0.00101) 0.00275∗ (0.00141)
Winst−2 0.00215∗∗ (0.000856) 0.00405∗∗∗ (0.00120)
CoachCarTournt−1 -0.000271 (0.00213) 0.00430 (0.00295)
CoachCareert−1 -0.0371 (0.0669) -0.0602 (0.0929)
CoachChange 0.00326 (0.00922) 0.00307 (0.0128)
NCAATournt−1 0.0158 (0.0141) 0.0194 (0.0196)
Round2t−1 0.00118 (0.0172) -0.00363 (0.0239)
Sweet16t−1 -0.0174 (0.0225) 0.0411 (0.0313)
Elitet8t−1 0.0562∗ (0.0334) 0.0928∗∗ (0.0465)
Final4t−1 0.0644 (0.0451) 0.0606 (0.0628)
Finalt−1 -0.0412 (0.0625) -0.0502 (0.0871)
Champt−1 -0.0660 (0.0623) -0.200∗∗ (0.0871)
NSchlsConf -0.00756 (0.00580) -0.00471 (0.00806)
NSchlsConfAP -0.00300 (0.00612) -0.0121 (0.00850)
NSchlsConfTourn 0.00499 (0.00491) 0.00610 (0.00682)
NSchlsConfFF 0.00221 (0.0100) 0.00525 (0.0139)
SOS 0.00281 (0.00255) 0.00556 (0.00354)
HistWins -0.000111 (0.000563) -0.000373 (0.000782)
HistNCAATrn 0.000888 (0.00966) 0.0248∗ (0.0134)
HistRound2 -0.00983 (0.0126) 0.00563 (0.0175)
HistSweet16 0.0230 (0.0167) 0.0304 (0.0232)
HistElite8 0.0375 (0.0242) 0.0122 (0.0336)
HistFinal4 -0.0195 (0.0308) 0.0560 (0.0428)
HistFinal -0.0465 (0.0444) -0.0810 (0.0617)
HistChamp -0.120∗∗∗ (0.0452) 0.0107 (0.0627)
239
Distance 0.000136 (0.000342) -0.000139 (0.000474)
UndergradPop -0.00969 (0.00596) -0.00982 (0.00829)
PerCapPI 0.00178 (0.00680) 0.00465 (0.00945)
GrPerCapPI 0.000635 (0.00289) -0.00178 (0.00401)
CityPop 0.0606 (0.313) 0.141 (0.435)
StatePop 0.0760 (0.0683) 0.0456 (0.0948)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2820 2820
Within R2 0.199 0.222
F-Stat . 0.876
p-value . 0.349
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 58
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players. This table reports
instrumental variable estimates of a star basketball player’s marginal revenue product from
Model (2.1) over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual
frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates
for two different measures of star player are reported: (1) Top 10 Points Scorers and (2)
Top 20 Points Scorers. The F-statistics and corresponding p-values from the first stage
regression are reported at the bottom of the table.
(1) (2)
PTS 10 PTS 20
Stars -2060650.7 (4712952.1)
Starst−1 -14324.8 (109625.6) -341069.3 (742329.6)
Starst−2 109321.6 (110055.9) -482453.9 (1119310.9)
Winst−1 5621.2 (5236.7) 11295.1 (14340.6)
Winst−2 11545.7∗∗∗ (4428.7) 20542.6 (19901.9)
CoachCarTournt−1 54048.2∗∗∗ (11019.9) 62527.3∗∗∗ (24077.2)
CoachCareert−1 -89894.0 (346243.7) -215499.8 (498255.9)
CoachChange -1326.2 (47678.2) 5237.9 (57968.6)
NCAATournt−1 164567.1∗∗ (73133.0) 205250.6 (125761.7)
Round2t−1 -57319.5 (88987.7) -64365.0 (106811.9)
Sweet16t−1 297907.1∗∗ (116506.6) 384564.2 (237000.8)
Elitet8t−1 -101380.5 (172997.3) 95150.5 (481962.8)
Final4t−1 411656.3∗ (233528.9) 535165.9 (397265.9)
Finalt−1 -39245.0 (323023.4) -138343.0 (452842.0)
Champt−1 1802254.2∗∗∗ (322007.8) 1391137.2 (1020610.9)
NSchlsConf 3510.1 (30022.5) -6613.3 (41622.8)
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NSchlsConfAP -43115.1 (31677.8) -68294.1 (68451.3)
NSchlsConfTourn 7994.4 (25413.8) 21652.5 (41610.2)
NSchlsConfFF -86345.9∗ (51939.1) -74744.8 (66352.6)
SOS 2231.1 (13166.1) 13503.0 (30288.3)
HistWins -3437.9 (2912.1) -4224.9 (3915.4)
HistNCAATrn -26991.9 (49974.5) 24703.1 (131056.4)
HistRound2 -65125.8 (65300.6) -52673.9 (82022.6)
HistSweet16 -88887.3 (86527.4) -27972.7 (177136.3)
HistElite8 110520.5 (125260.0) 133288.4 (160069.4)
HistFinal4 313416.4∗∗ (159279.9) 424863.5 (326582.1)
HistFinal 150795.5 (229661.3) -13264.2 (466980.9)
HistChamp -830267.5∗∗∗ (233714.0) -808790.9∗∗∗ (281542.2)
Distance -1348.6 (1768.0) -1580.6 (2201.1)
UndergradPop -47495.4 (30836.0) -68863.8 (58763.4)
PerCapPI 10535.1 (35178.4) 21206.2 (47344.4)
GrPerCapPI 8847.5 (14948.2) 5920.1 (19544.1)
CityPop 832254.9 (1620582.9) 1119659.8 (2026988.6)
StatePop 95094.5 (353365.5) 198732.0 (470018.7)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes
N 2820 2820
Within R2 0.667 0.533
FS F-Stat . 0.876
FS p-value . 0.349
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 59
Marginal Revenue Product of Gaining Versus Losing a Star College Football
Player. This table reports first-difference estimates of the marginal revenue product asso-
caited with gaining or losing a star football player from Model (2.6) over the sample period
2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in
parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for six different measures of star
player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above),
(3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two
measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touchdowns or yards for Running Backs and Wide
Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5)
being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while
(6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency rating alone. F-statistics and correspond-
ing p-values for the null hypothesis that gaining a star and losing a star are statistically
equivalent are reported at the bottom of the table.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
AA Team HF HN TDYds PERTDsYds PER
∆Starst×GainStars 767259.7∗ 2591514.5∗∗ 1541978.3∗ 764154.7∗∗ 732774.2∗∗ 751373.8∗∗
(409898.9) (1012532.7) (822193.9) (340852.0) (318469.5) (349115.1)
|∆Starst|×LoseStars -971939.3∗ 343956.3 -1333385.4∗ -814791.5∗∗∗ -771677.6∗∗∗ -747472.0∗∗∗
(501617.8) (1150132.4) (802480.9) (265015.4) (252527.0) (281734.2)
∆Starst−1 612304.6∗ 887716.4 2065735.2∗∗∗ 580330.8∗∗∗ 586439.8∗∗∗ 722016.3∗∗∗
(346843.1) (900151.3) (757039.8) (205986.1) (208918.3) (217054.1)
∆Starst−2 213627.3 -364581.0 213379.7 -40878.9 90550.3 227177.4
(354136.4) (755705.8) (548891.4) (172334.5) (189095.0) (207782.0)
∆Winst−1 -50677.6 -43497.2 -91160.7 -29362.4 -35728.6 -42665.2
(77187.3) (73615.2) (84659.0) (82896.8) (83423.3) (83930.2)
∆Winst−2 21278.1 29304.0 22302.5 41061.2 23842.6 9814.5
(57648.9) (54673.9) (55369.7) (61214.9) (64296.4) (62399.9)
∆CoachCareert−1 912558.7 454746.2 876351.3 -122683.0 -152453.2 -47862.7
(1286349.9) (1244946.3) (1279144.8) (1317458.3) (1316553.7) (1319062.2)
∆CoachChange -97085.9 -20920.0 -52804.1 -3982.4 8676.0 5092.7
(250904.1) (251909.8) (241798.2) (248061.4) (248196.3) (246851.6)
∆BowlGamet−1 424009.9 379995.9 425971.7 372331.5 384951.3 367084.9
(357984.3) (348605.9) (358855.9) (356627.4) (357303.5) (357193.9)
∆BowlWint−1 -217844.4 -81500.2 -48854.6 -225603.7 -243262.9 -244554.3
(352866.9) (340343.9) (327967.9) (342580.7) (346082.7) (347783.0)
∆SOSt 25226.9 36307.1 36386.7 51763.8 51629.4 49329.6
(48376.9) (52666.6) (52568.4) (49806.2) (49935.8) (50717.7)
∆TDPtst 7601.7 2953.0 37239.0 40078.3 38347.0
(68879.7) (69007.9) (71909.8) (72314.3) (71997.4)
∆TDYdst 1559251.2 1500897.1 1158677.4 1224378.9 1239798.8
(2068758.5) (2097760.7) (2102810.0) (2115404.3) (2129462.3)
∆TDPassYdst -1558340.9 -1498897.8 -1158655.2 -1224202.8 -1239681.9
(2068368.6) (2097498.8) (2102910.7) (2115458.5) (2129562.8)
∆TDPassTDst -934702.4 -874256.5 -1129918.6∗ -1156894.6∗ -1136985.5∗
(623161.2) (612242.4) (636568.1) (642907.3) (634898.1)
∆TDRushYdst -1552520.9 -1493471.6 -1152702.2 -1218503.7 -1233715.0
(2067733.5) (2096871.4) (2102205.6) (2114792.7) (2128867.4)
∆TDRushTDst -370275.5 -355365.1 -536451.4 -525915.9 -497106.9
(501973.3) (488963.1) (509249.8) (509500.7) (501959.0)
∆HistWinst 2185.7 944.9 7966.4 -3497.8 -916.2 -421.8
(53352.1) (57340.9) (57150.2) (56075.4) (56298.1) (56233.8)
∆HistBowlst -426902.0 -472651.5 -456521.2 -426150.3 -434185.5 -464150.7
(322349.8) (333650.0) (323375.6) (320136.2) (321525.5) (324118.2)
∆HistBowlWinst 339511.3 379703.9 348653.6 464824.7 446929.8 458321.2
(380937.8) (358864.7) (355292.0) (359584.5) (358118.4) (356427.6)
∆Distancet -28744.0∗ -26242.5 -32002.6∗∗ -26050.0∗ -25089.5 -24823.9
(15314.8) (16055.5) (15693.9) (15472.6) (15520.4) (15606.8)
∆UndergradPopt -315703.1∗ -347044.6∗ -348604.4∗ -312620.9∗ -310304.3∗ -304849.5∗
(175956.8) (185787.1) (186828.5) (168214.9) (169465.8) (170093.7)
∆PerCapPIt 203744.0 208831.6 255825.8 239254.2 238047.8 221228.8
(291264.7) (305451.8) (297124.9) (303221.7) (303020.1) (297156.6)
∆GrPerCapPIt -7641.1 11150.3 1484.3 -11145.8 -6783.0 3410.9
(105097.0) (104790.2) (104050.2) (109388.5) (108585.8) (106166.4)
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∆CityPopt 26402100.7 23576891.4 15161309.6 18179455.9 18569451.6 16778202.8
(23311337.4) (25722588.5) (22852332.3) (24443375.9) (23810869.3) (23500378.3)
∆StatePopt -1139331.8 -831547.0 -840449.8 -1045157.7 -1032282.4 -779417.3
(2790221.1) (2851582.6) (2822177.6) (2761412.6) (2820483.5) (2805165.1)
∆Conference 203195.8 177432.1 147283.0 222451.9 218244.9 208360.7
(225037.5) (219374.1) (223933.8) (224730.7) (231127.3) (233022.0)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 936 936 936 936 936 936
R2 0.145 0.160 0.169 0.168 0.166 0.162
F-Stat 0.0884 4.703 0.0252 0.0142 0.00972 0.0000817
P-Value 0.767 0.0324 0.874 0.905 0.922 0.993
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 60
Marginal Revenue Product of Gaining Versus Losing a Star College Basketball Player. This table reports first-
difference estimates of the marginal revenue product associated with gaining or losing a star basketball player from Model (2.6)
over the sample period 2003-2012. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and
have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight different measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner,
Naismith Award Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team, (3) All American
First or Second Team, (4) NBA Drafted Players, (5) NBA Top 5 Draft Pick, (6) NBA Top 10 Draft Pick, (7) Top 10 Points Scorers,
and (8) Top 20 Points Scorers. F-statistics and corresponding p-values for the null hypothesis that gaining a star and losing a star
are statistically equivalent are reported at the bottom of the table.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆Starst×GainStars 1249401.5∗∗ 1022006.2∗∗∗ 385237.4 262206.6∗∗ 612977.8∗∗ 542524.9∗∗ 438588.8 454806.1∗∗
(567449.1) (251755.9) (255794.4) (114139.3) (259816.6) (222327.7) (273236.2) (213839.4)
|∆Starst|×LoseStars -1069510.3∗ 18293.2 -178812.8 -7130.9 -42078.2 -80122.6 -239836.4 -283733.6∗
(609260.0) (406132.0) (226092.5) (130412.1) (527181.9) (242545.4) (190480.7) (160232.2)
∆Starst−1 1207782.7∗∗∗ -21121.5 80006.9 -35134.1 22517.7 59302.2 68989.6 123678.1
(440837.3) (216268.1) (129649.5) (105900.3) (397336.2) (191673.0) (119312.7) (109812.7)
∆Starst−2 556357.4 79487.6 3385.2 150899.9 -30961.0 -61833.0 79607.9 73114.6
(373802.4) (213477.4) (156103.7) (108005.0) (250395.0) (201046.3) (111521.2) (91096.6)
∆Winst−1 -1247.9 -1627.2 -925.6 1387.3 -570.7 -870.8 -387.1 -1093.8
(4714.6) (4596.3) (4713.5) (4595.5) (4713.6) (4777.7) (4709.6) (4727.7)
∆Winst−2 6196.2 5979.2 7156.4 4459.1 7047.2 7190.0 6641.6 5928.1
(5072.0) (5003.6) (5111.0) (5392.1) (5214.1) (5277.7) (5244.8) (5091.1)
∆CoachCarTournt−1 33322.0∗ 32429.0∗ 33551.3∗ 34339.5∗ 33184.8∗ 33185.7∗ 33460.9∗ 32869.6∗
(18719.3) (18740.7) (18768.4) (18589.9) (18539.4) (18330.8) (18767.7) (18733.4)
∆CoachCareert−1 261375.0 306004.8 270328.0 173724.8 228596.8 245944.5 271100.2 270579.4
(260165.1) (259158.7) (263841.6) (257149.4) (259998.5) (261600.1) (255880.3) (255592.1)
∆CoachChanget -4662.0 -5621.6 -3551.2 -4648.5 -4245.9 -5000.7 -8226.6 -8423.6
(54892.4) (54904.7) (54898.3) (54791.6) (54830.2) (54502.3) (54825.1) (55038.8)
∆NCAATournt−1 74306.0 75031.6 64787.6 73656.1 64953.1 61950.2 69087.9 63015.1
(68325.6) (67682.6) (67249.6) (67680.5) (68292.0) (69341.9) (68127.8) (68072.0)
∆Round2t−1 -85566.5 -87958.0 -78463.5 -78593.4 -79557.4 -80160.0 -74907.3 -76394.1
(103404.2) (102920.8) (104784.9) (107142.6) (104542.7) (105230.9) (103345.5) (102453.6)
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∆Sweet16t−1 94961.9 129503.1 119467.6 163591.8 119382.4 117748.4 162388.7 140004.0
(118727.7) (125350.5) (127108.9) (122943.3) (128062.4) (126737.5) (124593.4) (123426.1)
∆Elite8t−1 -313415.6 -300767.6 -260119.8 -177421.6 -285888.7 -314854.4 -300653.1 -302507.1
(338725.2) (335751.8) (342806.3) (321332.5) (341478.4) (344208.1) (335867.0) (334730.9)
∆Final4t−1 -212224.6 -146280.5 -190996.4 -195684.9 -230527.4 -218177.9 -163739.8 -161077.6
(405958.8) (412048.7) (387459.7) (404429.2) (423498.6) (418915.5) (404755.2) (406860.1)
∆Finalt−1 -18821.5 28868.6 -24866.4 175601.5 50331.6 23258.8 8452.3 25085.8
(257894.2) (364194.3) (315975.9) (221087.0) (237051.3) (261103.2) (264954.9) (270258.4)
∆Winnert−1 509139.3 1142686.0∗∗∗ 1010633.3∗∗ 1253753.5∗∗∗ 893806.3∗ 806893.7∗ 1047106.2∗∗ 1066573.2∗∗
(488615.4) (378916.4) (441369.9) (360178.5) (461283.2) (476800.0) (422135.8) (424646.5)
∆NSchlsConft 43565.7 39086.8 38999.6 45340.3 40658.4 37977.5 46164.2 43453.0
(46534.4) (46219.4) (46685.8) (46526.9) (45925.2) (46274.6) (46400.9) (45489.1)
∆NSchlsConfAPt -13223.1 -15063.1 -18015.9 -8326.7 -13161.5 -12519.7 -14444.4 -12056.0
(47198.3) (48696.7) (48558.0) (49813.4) (49081.6) (49199.4) (47567.6) (46331.6)
∆NSchlsConfTournt -12230.0 -13728.5 -9542.5 -15756.4 -7652.7 -8219.7 -12117.1 -10485.2
(45353.9) (45363.6) (45443.1) (44860.6) (45163.6) (44970.9) (45709.2) (45368.3)
∆NSchlsConfFFt -56618.2 -52555.6 -56434.4 -64438.6 -59816.9 -59716.8 -58105.2 -59302.0
(63733.8) (61708.4) (63367.8) (64900.9) (61963.4) (61385.9) (61695.8) (61930.0)
∆SOSt−1 13231.3 12325.2 12846.7 11254.5 11819.7 11835.3 12145.7 11264.5
(9953.0) (9970.2) (10090.9) (9944.5) (9939.0) (10084.5) (9976.2) (9956.1)
∆HistWinst -6222.3∗∗ -5818.7∗ -6305.5∗∗ -6493.2∗∗ -6247.7∗∗ -6407.3∗∗ -6502.9∗∗ -6082.2∗∗
(3094.4) (3082.1) (3117.0) (3095.3) (3147.7) (3166.9) (3083.4) (3041.5)
∆HistNCAATrnt 14013.2 5408.3 17941.3 10563.6 15451.9 18739.7 19069.8 15001.7
(65225.8) (65488.5) (64698.8) (66931.3) (65450.8) (65126.7) (65956.8) (65770.3)
∆HistRnd2t -34142.4 -27453.0 -17689.8 -26478.9 -25598.4 -22550.1 -13689.2 -21391.6
(130393.8) (129651.7) (131531.5) (127870.7) (131487.3) (131762.4) (131042.1) (131514.6)
∆HistSwt16t 27132.6 51058.6 34473.6 59971.5 66405.7 70084.9 47461.6 40256.9
(136897.7) (136597.6) (138411.5) (131247.4) (133073.8) (138172.1) (139717.8) (132236.6)
∆HistElite8t -57027.0 -37887.0 -79264.1 -49440.4 -56036.6 -67480.2 -98448.3 -86627.6
(147449.0) (146422.6) (150858.8) (142602.6) (144040.1) (146066.3) (152677.4) (154122.2)
∆HistFin4t 279799.6 313592.9 305928.5 414293.9 271937.7 259408.1 305566.7 280406.5
(309776.9) (319021.0) (312481.2) (324415.5) (304535.8) (305471.3) (310948.4) (307718.3)
∆HistFinalt -334486.4 -127561.5 -224075.7 -186329.9 -183194.0 -195981.4 -184229.5 -199755.6
(389581.6) (348778.4) (366984.8) (388185.9) (364808.2) (352818.8) (365163.4) (350848.3)
∆HistWinnert -743118.3 -927335.4 -803576.4 -771712.5 -779762.2 -767436.4 -782459.0 -841295.0
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(915554.8) (955214.7) (948226.0) (921832.3) (925451.0) (939362.4) (929336.6) (919229.2)
∆Distancet -542.4 -644.9 -564.8 -965.8 -709.6 -605.0 -805.9 -798.3
(1593.3) (1609.2) (1580.1) (1608.1) (1608.9) (1606.4) (1594.4) (1611.1)
∆UndergradPopt -55864.5 -61866.8∗ -51539.0 -53419.3 -57538.9∗ -54363.7 -46457.9 -49147.5
(36025.5) (33932.3) (35210.2) (34036.0) (33228.6) (34187.3) (35479.7) (32878.2)
∆PerCapPIt 33299.8 29647.5 31822.9 20864.5 34637.8 36597.4 30895.9 33977.7
(37835.7) (37240.4) (37232.4) (37455.8) (37624.8) (37588.8) (37399.5) (37107.0)
∆GrPerCapPIt 15090.8 15783.0 17005.9 19979.8 15119.9 16022.8 15992.7 15724.9
(14224.3) (14418.7) (14487.8) (14645.9) (14166.1) (14133.0) (14399.1) (14201.0)
∆CityPopt 813343.7 960690.9 834331.9 747303.2 1089339.7 1051517.3 624404.9 642793.3
(1759133.0) (1717367.4) (1730453.9) (1651766.4) (1705043.0) (1709831.5) (1727711.7) (1709668.1)
∆StatePopt 103214.9 222000.4 272023.5 310423.6 302706.0 300106.8 274197.9 296181.1
(376536.0) (345488.2) (354413.4) (352520.8) (351630.2) (350233.0) (353222.9) (358030.8)
Team Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819 2819
R2 0.103 0.101 0.095 0.107 0.096 0.097 0.095 0.101
F-Stat 0.0575 3.149 0.504 2.131 0.707 1.758 0.499 0.558
P-Value 0.811 0.0771 0.478 0.145 0.401 0.186 0.480 0.456
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 61
Marginal Revenue of Winning a Basketball Game. This table reports fixed effects
estimates of the marginal revenue of basketball team wins from Model (2.7) over the sample
period 2003-2012.
Program Revenue
Wins 18451.6∗∗∗ (4378.1)
Winst−1 4659.5 (4669.1)
Winst−2 16436.2∗∗∗ (4713.7)
CoachCarTournt−1 54184.5∗∗∗ (16246.8)
CoachCareert−1 -72184.7 (297230.3)
CoachChange 20731.5 (61281.9)
NCAATournt−1 164562.8∗∗ (73893.8)
Round2t−1 -62584.3 (128861.9)
Sweet16t−1 295672.6∗ (170950.7)
Elitet8t−1 -66536.0 (450841.8)
Final4t−1 408528.8 (380143.9)
Finalt−1 -33387.1 (270810.3)
Champt−1 1866059.7∗∗∗ (621434.4)
NSchlsConf 4725.3 (40379.4)
NSchlsConfAP -44714.4 (40760.6)
NSchlsConfTourn 3778.8 (39181.9)
NSchlsConfFF -94229.6 (81111.3)
SOS 2833.8 (12194.3)
HistWins -1764.6 (2928.0)
HistNCAATrn -33022.4 (58785.5)
HistRound2 -71070.3 (111163.3)
HistSweet16 -98047.8 (145989.8)
HistElite8 119522.2 (194549.7)
HistFinal4 289881.7 (319786.8)
HistFinal 141240.8 (588022.9)
HistChamp -829580.6 (792166.4)
Distance -1086.2 (1539.2)
UndergradPop -48837.7 (38063.6)
PerCapPI 12547.1 (39852.3)
GrPerCapPI 9334.8 (15435.1)
CityPop 802241.6 (1910127.9)
StatePop 50491.1 (418001.9)
Team Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes
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N 2820
Within R2 0.670
Marginal Product 8.174
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 62
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players With Media Ex-
posure Interactions. This table reports fixed effects estimates of a star football player’s
marginal revenue product from Model (2.8) over the sample period 2003-2012. The vari-
able NewsHits captures a team’s media exposure and is measured by the number of media
articles mentioning the football team in a given year. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an
annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team.
Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2)
Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touch-
downs or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is
how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
Stars 1527847.0∗∗ 4633685.3∗∗ 2311160.9∗∗ 283874.9
(592293.1) (2171812.6) (1018131.7) (268901.5)
News Hits 1260.6∗∗∗ 1084.3∗∗∗ 1047.0∗∗ 811.2∗∗
(472.7) (390.1) (401.2) (405.0)
Star×NewsHits -305.9 -1152.3∗∗ -534.9∗ 149.7
(205.0) (571.6) (320.6) (171.3)
Starst−1 656178.3 1443532.2∗ 2069323.9∗∗∗ 394184.5∗
(408542.9) (766749.5) (648624.0) (212148.4)
Starst−2 610146.0 -52440.1 200107.1 -27675.7
(409370.9) (629591.7) (492664.2) (187548.1)
Winst−1 -58770.7 -22780.3 -92091.8 -7950.2
(106170.9) (97190.8) (103520.7) (102070.0)
Winst−2 54694.8 107594.5∗ 87616.7 108449.8
(55605.6) (61775.8) (62151.0) (66117.6)
CoachCareert−1 2339675.1 1621998.3 2217796.3 1307032.6
(2045885.0) (2027532.5) (2053493.2) (2017477.9)
CoachChange -117218.9 -68692.2 -93433.2 -34050.5
(314723.8) (297139.0) (300646.0) (314094.0)
BowlGamet−1 832412.8∗ 702335.0 826800.1∗ 647347.9
(462162.7) (434767.6) (454843.2) (452718.4)
BowlWint−1 -323201.5 -257157.9 -198700.0 -359446.5
(407543.8) (417412.3) (395952.0) (418356.1)
SOS -11039.8 124.0 -5667.0 16229.7
(53030.1) (58149.3) (56795.6) (57044.3)
TDPts -32425.7 -25783.4 -29444.2
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(75466.2) (71175.9) (74917.3)
TDYds 1258287.9 1367952.7 945734.5
(2862584.7) (2914654.0) (2973556.5)
TDPassYds -1255423.6 -1365482.6 -943855.2
(2863167.6) (2915489.0) (2974577.2)
TDPassTDs -939128.9 -875102.6 -969194.7
(764527.5) (756904.7) (754886.9)
TDRushYds -1252121.1 -1363012.4 -941362.6
(2862315.2) (2914503.1) (2973592.7)
TDRushTDs 80470.7 59253.4 72260.1
(635488.2) (609356.7) (640994.8)
HistWins -12057.6 -10630.2 -8393.3 -19576.1
(47851.8) (50734.3) (50579.2) (51194.0)
HistBowls -566957.6 -571202.9 -542685.6 -535363.4
(352943.0) (367792.8) (363931.3) (364701.0)
HistBowlWins 431837.6 367572.6 332935.5 471647.9
(428699.3) (444457.2) (437196.4) (449091.5)
Distance -23699.3 -22474.0 -23263.5 -19462.8
(16502.9) (16964.0) (16887.1) (17139.7)
UndergradPop -118826.1 -153796.2 -176927.6 -157810.9
(201994.2) (204239.6) (201006.7) (198825.1)
PerCapPI 168200.5 241221.7 244011.9 202068.8
(307982.0) (327805.6) (318255.4) (321929.4)
GrPerCapPI 25505.0 23641.4 18780.0 8860.3
(127285.8) (125230.2) (124645.6) (129938.1)
CityPop 20139116.1 5160507.1 4868070.5 3167093.7
(25406185.5) (31856067.9) (29240474.6) (30301661.0)
StatePop -775902.2 -100550.6 -301018.3 -70724.3
(3974229.0) (4039599.5) (4104705.0) (4001179.3)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.777 0.779 0.782 0.778
Adjusted R2 0.972 0.972 0.973 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 63
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players as a Function of the
Team’s Media Exposure. This table reports the marginal effects from the regressions
in Table 62 for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by the number of media
articles mentioning the football team, over the sample period 2003-2012. Standard errors
are in parentheses and have been computed using the delta method. Estimates for four
different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman Finalists
(voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive touchdowns
or yards. This table reports the estimates that are displayed in Figure 3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
1st Percentile: News Articles 1520198.5∗∗∗ 4604877.6∗∗ 2297789.5∗∗ 287617.6
(588860.3) (2158927.4) (1011577.1) (267338.2)
5th Percentile: News Articles 1495111.6∗∗∗ 4510388.3∗∗ 2253931.4∗∗ 299893.4
(577776.7) (2116790.6) (990228.7) (262636.0)
10th Percentile: News Articles 1477367.2∗∗∗ 4443554.4∗∗ 2222909.9∗∗ 308576.2
(570106.3) (2087108.3) (975274.2) (259717.9)
25th Percentile: News Articles 1431629.6∗∗∗ 4271284.3∗∗ 2142949.2∗∗ 330957.1
(551026.1) (2011099.4) (937328.2) (253841.1)
Median: News Articles 1341378.0∗∗∗ 3931353.4∗∗ 1985167.1∗∗ 375120.1
(516652.3) (1863516.0) (865360.4) (249659.4)
Mean: News Articles 1245116.0∗∗ 3568784.5∗∗ 1816877.5∗∗ 422224.1∗
(485640.1) (1710394.1) (793841.3) (256351.7)
75th Percentile: News Articles 1170358.8∗∗ 3287213.0∗∗ 1686183.5∗∗ 458805.1∗
(466312.1) (1595330.9) (743010.4) (268991.7)
90th Percentile: News Articles 880788.9∗∗ 2196553.2∗ 1179943.9∗ 600500.8∗
(439935.8) (1199983.4) (604392.6) (362175.9)
95th Percentile: News Articles 627472.5 1242441.9 737084.5 724456.5
(484124.1) (976316.6) (594033.9) (475144.1)
99th Percentile: News Articles 134607.0 -613926.7 -124565.9 965631.1
(692054.4) (1135667.6) (855844.7) (724684.0)
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 64
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Football Players With Media Expo-
sure Interactions by Position. This table reports fixed effects estimates of a star football
player’s marginal revenue product from Model (2.9) over the sample period 2003-2012. The
variable NewsHits captures a team’s media exposure and is measured by the number of
media articles mentioning the football team in a given year. Revenues are real 2012 USD
at an annual frequency. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by
team. Estimates for six different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans,
(2) Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. The last two measures (5-6) are Top 10 in offensive touch-
downs or yards for Running Backs and Wide Receivers. The difference between (4,5,6) is
how star Quarterbacks are measured with (5) being a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating (PER) or touchdowns or yards while (6) is a Top 10 Quarterback in pass efficiency
rating alone.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
Star QB 5332184.3∗∗ 6022057.7∗∗ 2227635.3 458146.7
(2459216.1) (2936698.6) (1763110.4) (617663.4)
Star RB 1893386.0 7346421.2∗∗∗ 3110843.8 743821.2
(1683276.1) (2331204.1) (2016302.9) (544053.1)
Star WR 5033484.0∗∗ -3008518.8 7164596.3∗ -380705.7
(2424484.2) (5474681.1) (3929266.1) (446168.5)
News Hits 1105.4∗∗ 928.8∗∗ 1034.6∗∗ 900.6∗∗
(472.6) (381.8) (404.5) (388.0)
StarQB×NewsHits -559.0 -1026.5 -347.0 112.9
(763.3) (756.5) (491.2) (352.3)
StarRB×NewsHits -927.6 -2763.8∗∗∗ -1280.2∗ -351.1
(696.4) (936.7) (741.3) (353.9)
StarWR×NewsHits -1186.0 673.1 -2345.2 722.8
(776.7) (2485.1) (1700.2) (505.2)
Star TE 878247.4
(1172084.3)
Star OL 1533496.0
(2089403.0)
Star K -1182293.1
(788807.7)
Star P 2299127.3
(2407059.2)
Star LB 1005372.0
(1219271.2)
Star DB 370359.9
(919084.2)
Star DL -492170.5
(1099973.4)
Star QBt−1 2685964.4 1714592.1∗ 2850792.1∗∗∗ 419844.1
(2172106.3) (1009546.0) (856200.4) (507064.7)
Star RBt−1 512294.6 1164631.7 587157.8 455831.5
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(1361063.5) (1565306.9) (1153191.6) (440201.5)
Star WRt−1 2261409.7 -82343.4 3329514.0 264635.8
(1414959.2) (2748815.0) (2117586.8) (406324.4)
Star TEt−1 1588584.9
(977471.9)
Star OLt−1 -710863.9
(1965691.0)
Star Kt−1 -1997853.1
(1280828.5)
Star Pt−1 640109.0
(1353522.6)
Star DLt−1 -1022854.1
(1158229.3)
Star LBt−1 -452561.8
(862596.8)
Star DBt−1 1261088.6
(1094766.0)
Star QBt−2 152973.5 1139158.5 1264182.2∗∗ 308399.3
(1722587.8) (854272.2) (614252.3) (508275.4)
Star RBt−2 -269915.1 -1779313.2 -1556697.8 -294616.2
(995989.1) (1429351.4) (950286.8) (444607.2)
Star WRt−2 1232381.7 -1681622.1 763024.3 49862.2
(882645.8) (2122625.7) (1335241.8) (396092.9)
Star TEt−2 2435922.7
(1859375.8)
Star OLt−2 -372205.3
(1648809.0)
Star Kt−2 -1177121.6
(1338451.1)
Star Pt−2 -1166057.2
(1444158.0)
Star DLt−2 693310.1
(1263470.6)
Star LBt−2 970667.6
(1381379.3)
Star DBt−2 1146414.6
(999671.8)
Winst−1 -76645.4 -16783.0 -107737.8 -3898.1
(108166.0) (98638.7) (107062.5) (109253.0)
Winst−2 43306.5 109015.6∗ 79831.0 104538.3
(56167.1) (63068.6) (64771.7) (71464.3)
CoachCareert−1 3000223.6 1673765.4 2383259.1 1329643.4
(2101270.3) (1999507.2) (2056283.0) (2077973.7)
CoachChange -147900.4 -43539.1 -103611.1 25132.9
(305778.7) (297695.4) (309014.1) (323062.5)
BowlGamet−1 758473.0∗ 697892.6 851781.7∗ 637465.1
(431070.2) (432396.9) (463519.1) (457367.3)
BowlWint−1 -301992.0 -281157.6 -186185.9 -336725.6
(383750.5) (422520.3) (395540.3) (418792.9)
SOS 14189.8 6692.6 10587.0 12519.5
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(52582.6) (59661.2) (58461.6) (57942.2)
TDPts -37907.8 -28048.6 -26072.8
(76065.1) (70924.8) (75743.3)
TDYds 1274005.5 1166833.7 732467.6
(2871222.9) (2932863.2) (2921513.5)
TDPassYds -1270975.1 -1164529.5 -730395.0
(2871748.5) (2933650.3) (2922461.0)
TDPassTDs -972605.6 -879431.2 -980479.1
(772462.0) (757462.8) (738680.4)
TDRushYds -1267421.7 -1161220.7 -728254.2
(2871061.7) (2932642.1) (2921521.3)
TDRushTDs 108586.5 77624.3 73206.7
(635161.7) (618244.8) (640767.3)
HistWins -15869.2 -19892.5 -22199.9 -20833.8
(49866.7) (51182.5) (51037.6) (49678.3)
HistBowls -585951.3 -523087.7 -480686.4 -531257.6
(378029.8) (362290.3) (365162.9) (346037.8)
HistBowlWins 457912.6 426048.5 422671.4 515111.3
(451677.3) (442259.4) (445961.0) (447398.9)
Distance -19826.5 -18412.2 -20893.0 -17135.8
(17510.2) (17320.1) (16896.6) (16817.1)
UndergradPop -119577.8 -147548.5 -203113.1 -149713.3
(210509.7) (205176.0) (206885.1) (201870.7)
PerCapPI 66131.6 234402.9 225447.9 186953.2
(283358.4) (330892.0) (319379.2) (324312.1)
GrPerCapPI 23690.8 20461.6 20490.8 10166.1
(125383.0) (126776.8) (125181.9) (131038.8)
CityPop 7253527.8 11305331.5 7790789.6 4139477.1
(28662474.4) (34187086.2) (29655178.0) (29338509.5)
StatePop -1114556.5 153169.4 -189221.4 -136208.9
(3579536.0) (4076199.6) (4177540.6) (3986050.2)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
Within R2 0.788 0.783 0.786 0.779
Adjusted R2 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.972
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 65
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Quarterbacks as a Function of the
Team’s Media Exposure. This table reports the marginal effects for Quarterbacks from
the regressions in Table 64 for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by the
number of media articles mentioning the football team, over the sample period 2003-2012.
Standard errors are in parentheses and have been computed using the delta method. Esti-
mates for four different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2) Heisman
Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in offensive
touchdowns or yards. This table reports the estimates that are displayed in Figure 5.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
1st Percentile: News Articles 5318210.5∗∗ 5996394.2∗∗ 2218960.1 460969.2
(2442394.8) (2919788.6) (1752356.1) (611816.7)
5th Percentile: News Articles 5272376.5∗∗ 5912217.9∗∗ 2190505.3 470227.0
(2387460.0) (2864499.5) (1717225.8) (593152.8)
10th Percentile: News Articles 5239957.3∗∗ 5852678.6∗∗ 2170378.8 476775.2
(2348835.0) (2825561.7) (1692516.1) (580457.3)
25th Percentile: News Articles 5156394.1∗∗ 5699210.8∗∗ 2118501.0 493653.7
(2250235.6) (2725887.7) (1629394.5) (549886.1)
Median: News Articles 4991503.4∗∗ 5396381.3∗∗ 2016133.3 526959.2
(2060380.8) (2532515.5) (1507584.8) (500457.8)
Mean: News Articles 4815631.7∗∗∗ 5073384.8∗∗ 1906948.4 562482.7
(1866560.9) (2332136.1) (1382585.2) (467851.9)
75th Percentile: News Articles 4679049.6∗∗∗ 4822545.3∗∗ 1822155.3 590070.3
(1724110.0) (2181745.0) (1289938.9) (459689.8)
90th Percentile: News Articles 4150002.1∗∗∗ 3850924.8∗∗ 1493711.3 696930.1
(1283772.9) (1665987.1) (988372.6) (567315.6)
95th Percentile: News Articles 3687190.3∗∗∗ 3000949.3∗∗ 1206387.8 790411.3
(1159980.1) (1371225.3) (854641.4) (775145.9)
99th Percentile: News Articles 2786719.6 1347192.7 647356.4 972293.2
(1745418.4) (1544953.0) (1095029.7) (1277199.5)
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 66
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Wide Receivers as a Function of the
Team’s Media Exposure. This table reports the marginal effects for Wide Receivers
from the regressions in Table 64 for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by
the number of media articles mentioning the football team, over the sample period 2003-
2012. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been computed using the delta method.
Estimates for four different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2)
Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. This table reports the estimates that are displayed in Figure
6.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
1st Percentile: News Articles 5003833.5∗∗ -2991691.6 7105967.0∗ -362636.1
(2408114.7) (5422487.7) (3891184.4) (439785.3)
5th Percentile: News Articles 4906579.9∗∗ -2936498.5 6913662.7∗ -303367.7
(2354748.1) (5252811.0) (3766940.7) (420833.7)
10th Percentile: News Articles 4837790.7∗∗ -2897459.5 6777642.6∗ -261446.2
(2317315.8) (5134293.7) (3679717.6) (409434.7)
25th Percentile: News Articles 4660480.6∗∗ -2796833.0 6427039.2∗ -153389.8
(2222134.5) (4835226.1) (3457716.3) (388791.2)
Median: News Articles 4310604.6∗∗ -2598272.3 5735213.0∗ 59831.9
(2040686.6) (4278536.8) (3034504.9) (390008.3)
Mean: News Articles 3937428.3∗∗ -2386488.4 4997314.2∗ 287253.2
(1858797.1) (3752215.1) (2613843.5) (449522.0)
75th Percentile: News Articles 3647619.1∗∗ -2222016.7 4424261.0∗ 463868.9
(1728207.5) (3411771.5) (2319871.6) (525100.2)
90th Percentile: News Articles 2525050.8∗ -1584939.9 2204554.1 1147985.2
(1360957.6) (3025560.3) (1738433.0) (921246.6)
95th Percentile: News Articles 1543025.9 -1027623.9 262750.4 1746451.4
(1321392.3) (4006629.3) (2281514.3) (1313348.4)
99th Percentile: News Articles -367653.1 56719.1 -3515324.2 2910858.5
(1977335.4) (7330911.3) (4561965.4) (2105319.9)
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 67
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Running Backs as a Function of
the Team’s Media Exposure. This table reports the marginal effects for Runningbacks
from the regressions in Table 64 for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by
the number of media articles mentioning the football team, over the sample period 2003-
2012. Standard errors are in parentheses and have been computed using the delta method.
Estimates for four different measures of star player are reported: (1) All Americans, (2)
Heisman Finalists (voted 5th place or above), (3) Heisman Nominees, and (4) Top 10 in
offensive touchdowns or yards. This table reports the estimates that are displayed in Figure
5.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AA Team HF HN TDYds
1st Percentile: News Articles 1870197.0 7277325.7∗∗∗ 3078838.3 735044.1
(1666992.0) (2310349.7) (1999583.3) (538541.4)
5th Percentile: News Articles 1794136.9 7050692.4∗∗∗ 2973860.3 706255.3
(1613745.1) (2242302.5) (1944973.4) (521108.8)
10th Percentile: News Articles 1740338.3 6890390.9∗∗∗ 2899607.6 685892.5
(1576245.7) (2194521.0) (1906572.5) (509416.6)
25th Percentile: News Articles 1601667.9 6477199.8∗∗∗ 2708214.8 633405.5
(1480289.5) (2072848.1) (1808544.4) (482009.0)
Median: News Articles 1328037.1 5661872.9∗∗∗ 2330550.0 529835.9
(1294646.4) (1840436.1) (1619956.2) (441742.1)
Mean: News Articles 1036183.8 4792248.7∗∗∗ 1927734.5 419369.1
(1104392.1) (1607937.0) (1428295.7) (423656.4)
75th Percentile: News Articles 809530.0 4116897.5∗∗∗ 1614907.4 333580.4
(965123.3) (1443150.4) (1288942.2) (429460.1)
90th Percentile: News Articles -68407.2 1500941.8 403179.7 1280.1
(601397.0) (1060292.1) (902224.1) (587171.3)
95th Percentile: News Articles -836428.4 -787501.2 -656842.0 -289416.9
(758802.0) (1254993.1) (938130.5) (817944.8)
99th Percentile: News Articles -2330730.6 -5240015.3∗∗ -2719275.5 -855012.0
(1702317.0) (2428964.0) (1779810.5) (1338658.7)
N 1040 1040 1040 1040
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 68
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players With Media Ex-
posure Interactions. This table reports estimates of a star basketball player’s marginal
revenue product from Model (2.8) over the sample period 2003-2012. The variable NewsHits
captures a team’s media exposure and is measured by the number of media articles mention-
ing the basketball team in a given year. Revenues are real 2012 USD at an annual frequency.
Standard errors are in parentheses and have been clustered by team. Estimates for eight
different measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award
Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team,
(3) All American First or Second Team and (4) NBA Drafted Players.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AW AAFt AA Drafted
Stars 588472.6 395654.3 -93061.5 232661.0∗∗
(849430.7) (324183.3) (328625.0) (114617.1)
Starst−1 157025.1 15131.3 112783.4 9315.8
(379744.4) (287768.8) (173239.5) (92096.2)
Starst−2 200920.0 167969.9 201555.6 235651.1∗∗
(328418.7) (221090.4) (154874.8) (101868.2)
News Hits 446.7∗∗∗ 444.2∗∗ 448.2∗∗ 583.0∗∗∗
(159.8) (182.8) (205.7) (206.6)
Stars×NewsHits 122.5 11.28 163.7 -109.8
(610.6) (177.7) (209.1) (94.54)
Winst−1 4537.3 3999.5 3813.1 5279.3
(4682.2) (4623.6) (4638.1) (4573.3)
Winst−2 12346.3∗∗∗ 11819.3∗∗∗ 11104.2∗∗ 8178.9∗
(4321.2) (4395.5) (4359.1) (4619.7)
CoachCarTournt−1 52528.2∗∗∗ 52526.3∗∗∗ 52217.8∗∗∗ 51623.5∗∗∗
(16288.0) (16347.0) (16529.8) (16371.7)
CoachCareert−1 -67393.3 -31969.4 -41421.6 -54890.4
(295827.2) (293222.0) (295276.0) (290423.7)
CoachChange 9487.0 7056.4 10431.8 12642.0
(61218.2) (61286.2) (60971.1) (61058.9)
NCAATournt−1 155183.0∗∗ 156048.0∗∗ 159387.6∗∗ 158003.4∗∗
(74734.8) (75034.6) (73998.4) (76073.5)
Round2t−1 -75453.6 -68600.0 -66214.4 -71452.5
(127022.9) (124950.7) (128181.3) (129267.9)
Sweet16t−1 235718.6 237722.4 234165.7 276679.6
(170321.1) (178978.1) (173296.2) (169804.0)
Elitet8t−1 -147538.5 -155104.1 -150278.0 -47642.5
(455950.8) (456147.8) (467063.7) (424085.1)
Final4t−1 294967.2 295383.8 309361.9 391479.5
(387936.7) (383458.8) (379385.0) (401090.3)
Finalt−1 -113990.8 -64720.5 -125992.1 -49994.4
(309674.1) (363908.5) (347783.4) (327206.6)
Champt−1 1773324.1∗∗ 1873470.1∗∗∗ 1856519.0∗∗∗ 2079244.7∗∗∗
(858311.9) (610972.8) (678905.9) (655752.8)
NSchlsConf 1578.5 844.9 925.8 472.5
(40030.2) (39915.3) (39437.2) (40515.0)
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NSchlsConfAP -53395.3 -54596.2 -55297.0 -50798.8
(39588.2) (41279.3) (40506.7) (41024.4)
NSchlsConfTourn -72.31 -140.0 -269.2 -6971.3
(40178.3) (40065.3) (40039.8) (38525.9)
NSchlsConfFF -120766.3 -116491.7 -114384.4 -103640.9
(83418.8) (82859.5) (83514.2) (84102.1)
SOS -4199.6 -4821.7 -5255.2 -6439.6
(12317.7) (12394.2) (12471.3) (12502.9)
HistWins -2963.0 -3047.8 -3193.1 -3296.0
(2908.1) (2913.6) (2910.5) (2923.7)
HistNCAATrn -21079.7 -20178.6 -19123.2 -33086.6
(58438.0) (59883.5) (60071.3) (58375.0)
HistRound2 -63994.4 -47475.1 -53692.2 -42805.8
(109256.3) (111212.1) (112508.3) (109715.0)
HistSweet16 -116742.0 -114420.6 -95267.2 -72617.8
(144241.1) (142943.8) (137927.0) (134728.7)
HistElite8 113112.5 123497.9 126328.6 153465.9
(178719.2) (184541.0) (184250.4) (179517.0)
HistFinal4 289992.4 357069.9 392826.7 418482.5
(322075.7) (317900.1) (328469.4) (326402.8)
HistFinal 121801.5 226104.2 226640.5 207799.0
(599612.6) (592969.7) (597996.7) (578786.7)
HistChamp -705770.9 -775991.9 -748345.7 -713955.6
(845244.3) (795785.6) (797703.6) (781527.7)
Distance -748.6 -671.7 -673.9 -768.7
(1569.4) (1558.2) (1583.2) (1525.9)
UndergradPop -47590.0 -45863.9 -47014.3 -43557.0
(38776.8) (37715.5) (38401.7) (39003.7)
PerCapPI 18195.3 16484.9 15493.5 8589.7
(40359.3) (39882.0) (39224.3) (39652.7)
GrPerCapPI 6879.7 8177.3 8356.7 10353.4
(15567.2) (15527.1) (15363.5) (15616.5)
CityPop 847637.3 889131.5 877856.8 779643.1
(1845638.1) (1816622.7) (1827867.8) (1851544.0)
StatePop -149.1 43559.0 18591.8 56614.8
(432716.0) (412377.8) (419491.4) (436959.5)
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Confr. Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2820 2820 2820 2820
Within R2 0.673 0.672 0.672 0.675
Adjusted R2 0.969 0.969 0.969 0.969
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 69
Marginal Revenue Product of Star College Basketball Players as a Function of
the Team’s Media Exposure. This table reports the marginal effects from the regressions
in Table 68 for various percentiles of media exposure, as measured by the number of media
articles mentioning the basketball team, over the sample period 2003-2012. Standard errors
are in parentheses and have been computed using the delta method. Estimates for four
different measures of star player are reported: (1) Wooden Award Winner, Naismith Award
Winner or the NCAA Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player, (2) All American First Team,
(3) All American First or Second Team, and (4) NBA Drafted Players. This table reports
the estimates that are displayed in Figure 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AW AAFt AA Drafted
1st Percentile: News Articles 588962.5 395699.4 -92406.7 232221.9∗∗
(847323.6) (323621.7) (327938.5) (114371.4)
5th Percentile: News Articles 590799.9 395868.5 -89951.3 230575.6∗∗
(839437.9) (321520.9) (325370.6) (113456.4)
10th Percentile: News Articles 592147.3 395992.6 -88150.7 229368.2∗∗
(833671.7) (319985.6) (323493.8) (112792.0)
25th Percentile: News Articles 595454.5 396297.0 -83730.9 226404.7∗∗
(819579.6) (316237.0) (318910.7) (111185.7)
Median: News Articles 602191.4 396917.2 -74727.7 220368.0∗∗
(791159.9) (308690.7) (309683.1) (108026.4)
Mean: News Articles 619777.6 398536.3 -51225.4 204609.4∗∗
(719073.9) (289620.5) (286370.9) (100581.2)
75th Percentile: News Articles 622892.0 398823.0 -47063.3 201818.7∗∗
(706675.4) (286347.9) (282374.6) (99397.9)
90th Percentile: News Articles 668580.5 403029.2∗ 13994.8 160878.6∗
(543578.6) (242976.9) (229972.5) (87958.2)
95th Percentile: News Articles 707042.0 406570.0∗ 65394.9 126414.3
(451946.3) (215697.5) (199287.0) (88658.4)
99th Percentile: News Articles 835900.6 418433.0∗ 237601.5 10947.8
(659140.2) (223596.4) (241659.1) (145320.2)
N 2820 2820 2820 2820
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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